"THE MYSTERIOUS UNIVERSE"

Evening Post, Volume CXVIII, Issue 101, 26 October 1934, Page 8

"THE MYSTERIOUS UNIVERSE"

(To the Editor.)

Sir, —In yonr interesting leading article in last Saturday's "Post" you rightly refer to certain comments of Sir James Joans as being a question of philosophy anil not of physics. As regards the "appalling" square root of minus one, it might be a good idea to set up a temple dedicated to this sacred arcanum, which may be represented by a visible symbol so that the vulgar may have something tangible to which to bow down and worship. The idealising of the world was conceived long beforo Jeans and his philosophic predecessor, Bishop Berkeley, appeared on this planet. The Hindu philosopher centuries ago developed notions similar to some of thoso of Berkeley, for the fundamental tenet of the Vedanta philosophy consisted not in denying the existence of matter, but in correcting the popular notion of it and contending that it has no essence independent of mental perceptionj that perceptibility and existence are convertible terms. But the present-day version is that everything is simply a matter of non or semi-Euclidian geometry. Thus if one happens to knock one's head against a brick wall or stop a bullet it is only a question of geometry. But Sir James Jeans is privileged to say what he likes about his high-flown mathematics, because no ono is able to follow him, much less contradict him. However, when ho launches into philosophy the matter is a little different. In Jus "Mysterious Universe" (p. 120, etc.) it is evident that Jeans as a Bcrkeleyian or at any rato subjectivo idealism meets with his approval. Berkeley has been, philosophically speaking, a disturber of tho peaco, and for 200 years philosophers have been brooding over the nature and consequences of idealism in one form or another. In his "Principles of Human Understanding" Berkeley maintained that if anyone can conceive it possible for ono extended movable substance or for any idea (in Berkeley's sense) to_ exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, he would readily give up his cause. Ho also remarks: "I do not see how the testimony of sense can bo alleged as a proof of anything which is not perceivod by aenso." Consequently, the existence of a heavenly body which may bo known, although no human eye had seen it, would bo explained by Berkeley that tho existence of such a body w.ms duo to its being perceived by God, the Divino Unity upon which every perception or percipient depends. Nevertheless, there arc in this view some matters very much in doubt. Taking for granted that God exists how fiin wo tell tlmi; our perceptions are like those which Berkeley supposed to bo God's'? How can the human mind, which is neither infallible nor oumisficni, be in :i position to mflke snob ;>,

claim'? While the existence of the object (:is wo mortals apprehend it) is certainly conditioned by tho subject, does this make valid tho gratuitous conjecture that the object apart from the subject is similarly apprehended in the mind of God1? This is the main l)one of contention, although there are other points in Berkeley's philospphy which have been criticised.

It is not surprising in view of the above that Sir James Jeans, who sees everything through mathematical spectacles, believes in a mathematical God, with the attendant mystery of the .square root of minus one. How tills mystery would explain, for example, wiiat wo consider the beauty of a lily would be interesting to know.—l am,

B. A. BIiOADHEAD,