THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 45, 21 August 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

The Western battle as a whole moves slowly, but .the activity remains high in the extreme south of the Western area, in the high country on both sides of the Oise. Here the French are dfeveloping, with all the rapidity possible, the advantage lately secured by the capture of the Lassigny hills. .The latest, reported attack affects some fifteen miles of front, of -which about two-thirds lie to the north-west and onethird to the south-east of the river. The northern flank of'the attack is at the Bois dcs Loges, five ' miles south of Roye;. and the, south or right at about Caiieponti A brief message -records an advance.'of four miles. In the absence of details it is not possible yet to judge the effect of this success, but tie evident aim of the attackers is to loosen the hold the Germans have.on, the large area of woods between the Aisne and the Oise, and on the western end of the heights of the Aisne.

The Germans are south of the Aisne from Soissons eastward; and if the country was unobstructed by forests and more, or less plain, the line of the Aisne would be effectually turned and the whole enemy front as far east as the Argonne and also away to the north would be unsafe and difficult to hold. The hills and woods, and especially the steep ' and folded heights north of the Aisne, constitute a stubborn corner-post upon which the German line holds firm. It is therefore very difficult to outflank the defences along the Aisne and the Vesle by attacks between Soissons and the Oise. > The object of the' French offensive now is therefore to turn the same positions from still further, away, on the west side of the Oise, or rather along the valley of the river, by a direct drive upon Noyon. Secondarily, success in piercing the enemy line here will carry with it the outflanking of the present enemy positions from the Oise northward to the Sonime, and would involve the withdrawal of this front by several miles. The process of the French attack is that the Germans on the whole front from the Somme south to the Oise have hitherto been opposed by armies based to the west of them and tending to move east; that is, they have been holding frontal attacks; and now they are also attacked by an advance from the south, which threatens to crush them up lengthwise, and split them off from the forces on the Aisne heights. Thus the method is superficially one which aims at encircling the armies between the Somme and the Oise; but inasmuch as these can only be saved, if disaster threatens, by a withdrawal that must involve the Aisne armies as well, the major object of reducing the'Aisne heights is in view without the necessity for a direct battle in that difficult region.

One 'Of to-day's messages, covering the new French offensive, refers to the enemy forces as including thirty fresh reserve divisions, besides 400,000 new young troops of the class of 1920, none of whom will be 19 till next January. This is in contrast to recent reports that only sixteen fresh reserve divisions are left; and in the meantime, t question of the enemy's available reserves remains in doubt. The point is material, of course, but it will be tested without the necessity' for figures by the action the enemy takes in the ■, lls© of Ms troops. He is faced with a predicament that forces him to use up troops or els© give ground; and at present he is doing both. On numerous sections of the front he is slowly withdrawing his advanced sectors, so that on the he is reducing the length of his line, and consequently the number of troops i"equired in the straightened sections; and ho is fighting stubbornly in some of the: most defensible ground in France, using, we may be sure, the most economical rules he _ knows in the use of his reserves for the purpose. At all costs he must avoid the breaking; of his front during this fighting season; and he must also avoid a large retreat at this stage of the- war. '

The new military position in France is such that if military reason alone prevailed, German command: would probably be ready enough to make an extansive retreat, so as to get away from the hammering tactics of the French, and reduce the front to more easily manned dimensions. But the moral factor in the German nation is paramount just now; and to break off the battle and retire to a new Hindenburg line before the end of the season, which opened with sweeping German victories, would be certain to have most serious results. The things that have happened are bad enough. It will, perhaps, be time for such a retreat when the campaigning season is over and the German publicists have had time to prepare their intelligent audiences for tho particular type of success which such a retreat implies, without fear of misunderstanding. The preferred moment for sucti a retreat is naturally not one when the. Allies are attacking vigorously and dangerously, but one when the battle-front is quiet to outward seeming, biit "loaded _to the muzzle" in fact, as was the case in 1917. Apart from the danger of alarming the gublic by an immediate big retreat, the rerman command has probably to consider a still more important fact. It took months to prepare the "Hindenburg lines/ and due notice was given months ahead, by the battle of the Somme, that it would be required.; This season's fighting has only just turned against the enemy. A month ago he probably believed that every yard heliad gained he could hold; and it was on his new territory that lie proceeded to make his big defences, where attack might be feared. He has now been notified of the need for a new retreat, and a month is not long enough to make ready for it. Possibly it is not enough even for the drafting of a general and detailed plan of the necessary magnitude.

A message received late this morning aanounces an advance of four miles by the British, in the Lys salient in Flanders. Prior to that, the British had reached, at the apex of this salient, the Vieux Berquin-Merville-Paradis road, which runs practically north through Merville. This road marked an advance of up to two miles from the position occupied &t> the point of- the salient made

by the German offensive, and if the new progress is on a regular front, a very large slice has been cut 'off the nose of the Germans' northern wedge. This advance is not shown to bathe result of an offensive, and it is in any case clearly the policy of the enemy to abandon the Lys Velley wedge as no longer likely to be of service to him, and consequently an expensive and dangerous excrescence on his front.