LAND v. SEA POWER

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 45, 21 August 1918, Page 6

LAND v. SEA POWER

It. is a peculiar fact that, with one exception, the : forces of the enemy nowhere look out' upon the ocean. After four years of struggle on land in order to neutralise sea-power, and to establish himself upon trade routes and strategical highways, the enemy's record in the conquest of sea frontage is short and easily told. In the Baltic Sea, he started possessor of the key position, and of the

military force to use it; to-day he holds, at Russia's expense, an extended front, and can fairly claim to have made the Baltic a German lake; but for' the promotion of an ocean trade the fact profits him nothing. In the North Sea, also, he has extended his frontage by process of land-conquest; there he holds most of the Belgian coast, which he has found to be destructively useful, but which has never permitted him to enter the Atlantic save in a raiding capacity. Since the retirement of Russia and Rumania, who were the only Allied frontagers on the Black Sea, that water has become entirely an enemy preserve; but,' however considerable its local importance, it exercises no influence on the great sea-tracks of the world; and the Mediterranean—which does —is still dominated' by the Allied power. In the course of four years Austria-Hungary, side-tracked in the Adriatic, has made some progress southward—gathering in Durazzo—and also on the Italian side, but here again the gains possess no more than a local importance, which—except insofar as submarine action is concerned—ceases in front of the closed gates of the Straits of Otranto. There was a time, when the Mediterranean routes, unconquerable from the Adriatic, seemed to be vulnerable from Greece, but just before the Allies dropped off Gallipoli they pusljed their way into Salonika, with the consequence that an enemy occupation of the Greek ports was prevented, except in the case of Kavala, which was practically given away by ex-King Constantine. The net result is that, although Gallipoli and Salonika have not been great offensive successes, the Mediterranean situation has remained sound, and practically unaffected by the strips of coast-line in the possession of Bulgaria and Turkey, which latter country has been compelled to yield part of the Palestine coast to the British. Despite all the efficiency of its land power, notwithstanding all the lives spent to win the Channel ports, the enemy combination has not seriously extended its frontage on the sea. Nowhere can its armies look out upon the ocean, except perhaps in Southern Arabia, where a few Turkish guerrillas possibly preserve the tradition of great blue waters where the German flag no longer flies.

There is now some chance that Finland and even Ni^way may be placed in the predicament in which Greece found herself under Constantine. Greek Royalty's unneutral hospitality to Germany could not be tolerated by the Allies; nor can_ they accept unmoved a German-Finnish irruption to the open ocean through North Russia, or Norway. Just as Germany planned to have submarine bases in Greece, so she has contemplated striking from Finland to the sea, so that she may put a fresh spoke in the wheel of the maritime power that crushes her. Here, as elsewhere, the enemy must be penned up in the hinterland—must be blanketed, as it were, with his own element. Hence the establishment of new Salonikas on the Murman and White Sea coasts; which act has cost us war with the Bolsheviks, and which will probably (according to the official summary) lead to war with Finland. In that case the Finns will suffer the fate narrowly escaped by the Greeks: . they will become the cannon fodder of Germany. Even if it be conceded that a free Finland has a geographical and economic claim to a northern ice-free port, such a claim cannot be admitted when presented at such a, time and in such a manner. Probably Finland's main reason in reaching out for the ocean is that she cannot trust herself to be cornered in tho German lake' known as the Baltic Sea; but to become the tool of the country that she fears as a neighbour is a poor way of solving the problem of the northern land-lock. A Finland occupied by a German army can certainly not be classed as free; and enemy forces, whether uniformed as Finns or as Germans, will not be pei'mitted to reach the ocean, or to close the northern 4a«r to Russia, so long as thci'u

are Allied forces adequate to check them.

As in Europe, so in Asia. At Vladivostok, and in the Persian Gulf, tea power has erected its barrier against the enemy, and is busy with plans both defensive and penetrative. Will the landpower of the Quadruple Alliance break through this containing-wall, or will it be smothered by the enveloping strategy of the maritime nations? Numbers are against the enemy, but the possession of interior lines is on his side; and in warfaro superior mobility is capable, to a certain degree, of discounting numerical inferiority. And when the final analysis of the war comes to be made, it will probably be found that this advantage of inner position is the secret of the enemy's prolonged resistance to an envelopment process which, though tardy, is nevertheless irresistible.