GERMANWARPLAN

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 37, 12 August 1914, Page 2

GERMANWARPLAN

ATTACK THROUGH BELGIUM - BIG TURNING MOVEMENT ASSAULT UPON LIEGE. A military correspondent of the Fortnightly Review contributed an article not long ago on the probable plan of campaign which Germany would adopt in the event of a war with France. The developments of the last few days make the article of great importance and interest. "The main German idea upon which the plan has been formed," he wrote, "is that France must be seriously damaged in the first three weeks of the war, so that Germany may find herself in the position 'of victor in the first round, before England and Russia Have entered the field. There was a time when it was thought that the chances of a direct attack on the line of the Vosges Were not inconsiderable, and that weak spots might be found between Belfort and Verdun. But this point of view is now held in only a modified degree, for it is considered that the beet chance of making tho frontal attack a success will bo by executing a disconcerting and menacing movement through' the comparatively Open ■country between Verdun and Sedan. "a broadened front. "With this end in view the Germans have, for the last fifteen years, been making the necessary preparations to secure that broadened front for their advance which is essential for the accomplishment Of their purpose, and these preparations are now practically completed. The line of the Vosges, is not merely exceedingly formidable as a fortified position, but it is also exceedingly narrow. From Belfort to Verdun, the two extremities, is no more than . 145 miles, and although Belfort might be turned by the violation of Swiss territory, the invading army could only operate against Lyons, which would take time, and exercise little or no interest on the first phase of the war. It is not safe to assume anything too positively in a problem which must become modified by fresh factors from time to time, but unless Austria can be induced to carry out an offensive movement thi'ough Porrentruy and the Rhone, Valley, Germany will stand on the defensive in South Alsace. In any case, there is no necessity for any overwhelming anxiety on the part of the French authorities with regard to what may happen south of Belfort. Here, if anywhere, the opening for an offensive movement seems more favourable to France than to Germany. ' THE LINEi OF THE VOSGES. "The contracted front of the Vosges fs almost as setfious a disadvantage to the enemy acting on the offensive as the formidable character of its defences. The lines of advance for any considerable body of troops are also further diminished by considerable stretches of impossible country. For instance, any advance between Belfort and Epinal, speaking, ac we are, only of large operations, ■ would be out of the question. There are, indeed, only four lines of advance open to the Germans in this quarter. They are from Metz to Verdun (two roadsf, through Pont a Mousson to Commercy, through Chateau Salins. to Nancy and Toul, and r from Strasburg to Luneville. The last two named are available for a combined attack on Toul and its system of dependent forts. The total frontage for the German advance between Verdun and Luneville is then, no more' than 70 miles. In this res.trioted space It, would be impossible' for the Germans to * employ more than half a. million men, and in the event of a-ny reverse or breakdown in the execution of the plan of attack the Germans would find themselves exposed 'to heavy loss before they could get outside the range of the French fortress artilkfy. "Although the German authorities are set on putting the efficiency of the Vosges for^ to the test, and also of experimenting with some of their new theories for' the capture of fortified places, it is to the widened front that they are mainly looking as the scene of their first victories., From Luueville to Verdun they have 70 miles of fortresses, fort, and battery in front of them. From Verdun to Givet there are 75 smiles of undefended country. -Longwy and Montmedy do not count as fortresses. Givet-Charlemont and Mezieres, both on the Meuse, are more up to date, but from Verdun to Mezieres stretches open country with a frontier of 50 milea. This is Germany a objective. 1 ' BELGIAN NEUTRALITY IGNORED. When the French drew the line of the Vosges fortifications at Verdun it was assumed, the writer says, tha,t Germany would respect Belgian, neutrality, but it is evident that the Germans will do no sucli thing. For some time they have been making preparations for taking the offensive through neutral territory from Dalheim to Treves. By these means they obtain six excellent roads leading into France. "Having conceived the plan," the writer goes on. "the Geman authorities did not tarry in making the preparations behind their own frontier to render it capable of execution. For the last seven years Germany has been entirely engaged in providing frontier railways flanking the projec£ed front and .in Unking them up with the two bases on the middle Rhine at Coblentz and Cologne. In addition to the railways, double-lined and metalled for heavy traffic, sidings have been provided at all the stations, and at suitable points between them. Between Mon^oie and St Vith landing spaces sufficient for over 120,000 men have been provided, and it is confidently asserted tha.t^ force could be thrown across the Belgian frontier near Francorchamps in a single night without the Belgians knowing what was coming, the troops to be employed being entrained at Coblentz, Cologne, Bonn, and Gladbach. There is not the "smallest reason for hoping that this despatch of the advance force of the invader would miscarry. If the whole corps d'armee were not over the border in the ,24 hours, at least, a sufficient part would be over to make sure of the possession of Libramont in half that time. Under the present system, perhaps under any, there is no possibility o"f the Belgians doihg anything to arrest or even delay this movement. The completeness of the success of Germany's attack on the north-east frontier of Franco would depend on tho fate of Liege. If it passed into her hands in tile first few days ot the war German strategists wonld have no anxiety about J their light flaAk and wonld pi ess on the broad fiont from Givet to Thionville. But the left wing, moving through Treves, Thionville and Luxemburg, would be even more formidable. Its object

would be Stenay and Vouziers. The taking vp y of a strong position on the Aisne by the two armies moving through Belgium and the Grand Duchy would represent the successful achievement of the first stage in the German plan of campaign against France. WHAT FRANCE MAY DO. "To obtain her primary objectives, Germany is prepared to waste a large number of men. The cost of men will not prevent her straining every effort to obtain her ends. If the French pour over into Belgium to meet her half way, they will be playing her game and equalise the chances of t loss. An obstinate defence without risking too much in any pitched action north of the Rheims-Laon-La, Fere line is clearly the best French strategy. Time Would thus be gained for England' to play her part, and the further German troops have gob south of the Semoie, the better our chance of striking at their rear. It will not be a bad thing for France's chances' of final victory if the first great battle of the war can be deferred until tho Germans ftre in the Aisne Valley."