THE PACIFIC WAR

Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 96, 19 January 1944, Page 5

THE PACIFIC WAR

Analysis Of Allied Strategy BOUGAINVILLE COUP

(Official War Correspondent, N.Z.E.F.) SOUTH PACIFIC HEADQUARTERS, January 18. Rear-Admiral Robert B. Carney U.S.N., Chief of Staff to Admiral Halsey, in an interview today summarized the successful Bougainville campaign and made some observations on the course of the Pacific war. He told war correspondents: “Our campaign against Bougainville was laifnched primarily to give us bases close enough to Rabaul to give us fighter cover for sustained bomber attacks on that stronghold. It was a matter of geometry. We figured out the action radius of our fighters and how long we needed them over this target. Then we picked Empress Augusta Bay as the logical objective. “We, expected the landing would provoke violent Jap reaction. We actually looked forward to by-products—such reaction as a chance to engage his surface and air forces. Because we had feinted at Choiseul, the Shortlands, and elsewhere, the surprise was almost complete at Erapres Augusta Bay. Then we poured troops into our beachhead faster than the enemy could counter. Additionally he had sent forces into Choiseul and the Shortlands, along with heavy equipment, which became a distinct liability and very soon expensive to maintain.

“Even the Japs’ hastily-produced artillery failed to halt our aggressive troops at Torokina. The Japs have no mystery to those lads. They went after Tojo’s prowlers with a spirit and confidence that smashed every Jap effort before it got started. The ground operations have been perfectly executed. . Japanese Reaction.

“Their first major reaction was to bring ships down from Truk to replace those lost in the battle with our forces led by Rear-Admiral A. S. Merrill on November 1 and 2, and to further supplement their surface strength in the New Britain area. So we hit them with a carriers’ strike on November 5, hitting all 10 cruisers found in Rabaul harbour. Six days later we did it again, mainly to convince the enemy we could hit him at any time we wanted. Outstandingly successful, these raids proved that his bases were not immune from well directed carrier operations. “Under continuous air cover we pushed to completion three airfields within the Empress Augusta Bay perimeter. The bomber strip was an especially magnificent job. It is saying a lot to call it one of the outstanding of the Seabees —the outfit which is virtually spearheading the South Pacific campaign. ‘Thus with air support we now control the sea well to the north of Buka Island. The Jap has been forced to resort to night barge traffic between New Ireland and Buka for evacuation and supply, and our night air missions, teamed with the destroyers and P.T. boats, tightly restricted these activities. The enemy is not only not getting enough through to implement any offensive action, but we will actually starve him out, as at Kolombangara. In effect, we surrounded the whole island by one landing. The Japs have given up all attempts to hold the Buka and Bougainville airfields to use, and only a few float-planes haye operated out of this aiea. ‘‘Now we are conducting round-the-clock assaults on Rabaul, including highly damaging masthead-level attacks against shipping and installations, and low altitude attacks against airfields and revetments.

“The Jap. reacted by sending a few puny raids down into the New Georgia area. I do not think he can maintain even that place,” said Admiral Carney. ‘‘His desperate attempts to maintain contacts with Buka have been soundly pun-, ished, specially by Captain Burke’s destroyers. There is no question about it, Buka is already a liability to them. The Next Moves.

“The two next obvious points of Jap. strength are Rabaul and Kavieng (New Ireland). It is perfectly evident to everyone that the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific forces are pushing along their respective areas toward eliminating these, bases. They are next on the list and we plan to put them out. “But just how we will do it will be something the enemy least expects. It is not in accordance with the familiar pattern. “Now let us consider the South Pacific and the Central Pacific. Picture our offensive arc from the Gilberts to the Solomons. All that the Jap. still holds between t-hese two areas and which he might use to advantage against us is Nauru Island. All I will say about Nauru is that it is not logical to expect us to permit him to occupy this salient much longer.

“In our Christmas operations over. Rabaul we exerted diversionary pressure to keep the enemy’s air strength spread during General MacArthur’s lightning operations at Cape Gloucester. On New Year’s Day we brought Kavieng into the pictuer with a carrier strike that caught two cruisers and two destroyers—which indicated that the Jap. is still running an occasional section of the Tokio Express. This rat-catching is similarly connected with the South-west Pacific operations. Just for luck we did it again four days later. Our continued aerial observation over Rabaul and Kavieng indicates that the enemy has already lost all confidence in his ability to use these bases for anything of great value. He knows his number is up. We have proved we can hit him exactly when and where we want. By co-ordinating our forces in the air and at sea we will blockade his New Britain-New Ireland forces, which may total about 100,000 men. Enemy Between Two Fires.

“It is even possible he might attempt to evacuate Rabaul if it becomes really untenable, and if he can find the means to withdraw. How IM£ will he stick it out? He quit Kolompargara after five weeks. The evacuation of south Bougainville. It has been a smooth and perby barge. And he would dearly love to get out of Choiseul if he could. If he evacuates we win the easy way. If he tries to hang on we have more and better chance of battering his ships and planes and .battering his ground forces.

“The enemy would like us to become entangled in a rearguard action instead of employing our. present tactics. This would delay us in our movement into his stolen empire and would play right into his hands. But we are not going to play that way. “I would like finally to speak of our great pride in the co-ordination of the air, surface-and ground forces at Bougainville. It had been a smooth and perfect piece of team work —the result of a year of hard work learning the art of combined operations. Each service sneaks with the highest admiration of the others, and that is the acid test. “Our major objective? Admiral Halsey has made that quite plain—a geographical location to be known as ‘Where Tokio used to be.’"