A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 195, 15 May 1941, Page 8

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Battle Of The Atlantic U.S. NAVAL PROBLEM

The question of United States naval escorts for merchant ship convoys across the Atlantic was being discussed actively in the American Press last month. Ships have always come uppermost in the category of British needs from the United States. This was true before, during and since the passage of the Lease-Lend Act, says a writer in the “New York Times.” The war cannot be won by the British without adequate accession of cargo bottoms to replace those being steadily sunk by German submarines and surface raiders. And unless the accession is prompt the difficulty of holding out till it is adequate is much greater. Because what President Roosevelt called “a bridge of ships” is required to transmit the full effects of the Lease-Lend Act —a continuous and broadening bridge, as well—the prob lem of constructing and maintaining it is the primary one for the American Government. That is why ships come into every important conference and conversation. Escorts For Convoys The oceans have been Great Britain’s safety zone, empire builder and supply transmission belt. The two largest of them have long been hailed as the walls of safety for the United States. But in the irony of nature these oceans are also the greatest menace that now exists to the joint war effort of Great Britain and the United States.

An Amer|can naval historian, Dr. Arthur J. Marder, has just completed another compilation of the reasons for this and the outlines of the shipping problem. It is released by American Defence, Harvard Group. In his book, “The Anatomy of British Sea-Power,” Dr. Marder’s study brings him to the conclusion, widely held in Washington,' that American naval convoys are essential to solve the problem of shipping. Discussions of ways and means are already being conducted by British and American naval officers,, although the President has not yet indicated any intention to advocate this as a policy. He has confined himself to the merchant vessel aspect of the problem. U.S. Shipbuilding

Mr. Roosevelt said on April 4 that he had aUocated 500,000,000 dollars from the lease-lend funds for the construction of 212 cargo ships, 56 shipways and repair facilities for damaged merchant ships. Previously, contracts for 260 had been let, of which 60 were ordered by Great Britain. The first of these are promised toward the end of 1941 or early in 1942. This makes 472 vessels.

At the beginning of March, 1941, about 451 merchant ships were under construction or contract in American yards, their tonnage being 3,500,000, of which 1,000,000 was promised this year. In addition to this the Maritime Commission sold the British the remains of its laid-up fleet, 100,000 tons. Some extra tonnage con be found by the transfer to Britain of American vessels in tie coastwise trade, and a way may be discovered to turn over the 600,000 tons of alien ships in United States harbours. That is the lot: a top of 2,000,000 tons from the United States this year and about. 1,000,000 produced by British shipyards. British Losses

But between July 1, 1940, and February 1, 1941, the rate of British shipping losses was about 3,500,000 Lous a year. This, as Dr. Marder points out, does not, however, account for damaged ships which will require long repairs, and there is no accounting either for the loss of the cargoes which are essential to the conduct of the war. Without considering these vital points, the score at the present rate is 5,000,000 tons a year lost and 3,000,000 replaced. The Royal Navy, which must escort the merchant ships in the Atlantic and furnish troops and supplies for all the far-flung British fronts, is short of destroyers, the essential convoy unit. At the end of the World War Great Britain had 435 destroyers. Now, including the 50 American destroyers, the British force is believed to be about 250. The Germans, holding the coastline from Norway to Spain, can reach their stations much more quickly and safely than during the World War, and their submarines can remain out longer and need not be so large. And since the collapse of France light German war craft can work effectively in the English Channel and its approaches, which they could not do before. , , To the advantages possessed by the enemy’s submarines in the Atlantic must be added the German air arm, also able now to base on the long coastline from Norway to Spain, and the denial by Eire to the British of antisubmarine bases in that island. The use of these, Dr. Marder estimates, would extend the British convoy and aeroplane range 300 miles and better protect the trade laue to the Clyde and Liverpool. Only One Solution

“There remains only one solution, writes Dr. Marder, after a long and detailed analysis of the problem, "ami that is the control of sinking by reinforcement of the British Navy. That reinforcement can come only through the use of American naval vessels ami planes.” Once this becomes American policy, the outlook grows much brighter for Hie bridge of ships and the cargoes that must be transmitted, says the “New York Times.” More difficult to replace even than the submarines are their officers and crews. In the World War twenty-two of the 400 German commanders were credited with 60 per cent, of the sinkings. Thus effective convoying would not only deliver the product of the “arsenal of democracy but also paralyse one of the most important weapons the Germans have for winning the war. Some advocates of the policy would compromise, on the "step-by-step theory, releasing more of our destroyers. but requiring that they be manned by the British. The objection offereu by the more realistic grapplers with the Atlantic problem is this: it takes weeks to learn to man strange erait, and the vital clement of time would be lost in the compromise. If the nettle is to be touched at all it must be grasped, runs this opinion, which hts into the view of those naval experts who think we cannot afford to transfer any more warships and will have more at the finish if we man the convoys ourselves.