A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 139, 8 March 1941, Page 10

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Long Arm Of The Navy BOLD SEA RAIDERS The naval raid on the Lofoten Islands, though a relatively minor operation, was, as today's cable messages reveal, completely successful, and achieved important results. It came as a complete surprise to the enemy, and was a reminder to Hitler that the British blockade of Europe operates from the Arctic Ocean to the Dardanelles. The. operation was carried out by British light forces—probably destroyers, with more powerful ships in close support—and Norwegian marines and British troops. This successful raid is yet another example of what Mr. Churchill has described as “the flexibility, the celerity, and the baffling nature of that amphibious power which Britain alone wields, but which she has so often neglected.” Lofoten Fisheries The Lofoten Islands lie off the northwest coast of Norway, between 67 deg. 30m in. and 69deg. 20min. north latitude, and are separated from the mainland by the Vestfjoid. The extreme length of the group is about 150 miles, the aggregate area about 1560 square miles; the largest island is Hindo, with an area of 860 square miles. Though situated within the Arctic Circle, the climate of the islands is not rigorous, and tbe coast is never frozen. The chief importance of the Lofotens lies in their cod and herring fisheries, which employ many thousands of men during the season from all parts of Norway. Normally, large quantities of dried cod and salted herring are exported from tbe islands, as well as cod-liver and other oils and artificial manure which is manufactured from the fish refuse. Undoubtedly the Germans have been exploiting the resources of the Lofotens since their occupation of Norway. From the Nazi point of view such a prolific supply of fish, oil and fertilizer was too good to be missed in these times of blockade, and, with their characteristic thoroughness, the Germans probably monopolized everything they could lay tbeir hands on. Complete Success

The British raid obviously had been planned with the greatest care and was carried out with conspicuous success. With a false sense of security the Germans apparently had only an armed trawler to meet the attack This vessel was sunk with the loss of one officer and six ratings. Nine German merchant vessels and one enemycontrolled Norwegian ship were also sunk. The losses inflicted on enemy shipping totalled 18,000 tons, including one fully-laden ship of 10,000 tons. The landing party destroyed the shore factories and took 225 prisoners. No damage or casualties were sustained by the British forces. The success of the Lofoten raid, relatively small though it may be, is yet another reminder of the ability of the long arm of British sea power to strike effectively at the enemy, and that the blockade of Europe is a most potent weapon. Hitler On Blockade

The most convincing evidence that Germany is increasingly feeling the pressure of the blockade is to be found in the recent speeches of Hitler himself. He has complained of the accident of Britain’s geographical position and threatened that he will “once and for all, put a stop to the fantastic state of affairs by which England, owing to her geographical advantages, can blockade Europe.” Hitler has repeatedly stated during the last five or six months that Germany is preparing for a decisive struggle at sea that will break Britain’s blockade of Europe and will in turn deprive her of overseas supplies. ■He has talked darkly of a huge fleet of submarines of an entirely new type that shortly will start an all-out campaign against British shipping. At the end of January he warned the United States that “whoever believes he will be able to help the English must definitely know one thing: every ship whether with or without a convoy, that comes before our U-boats will be torpedoed.” Mahan On Sea Power

In surveying the present situation in Europe and on the seas, many analogies are to be found in tbe writings of Admiral Mahan concerning the influence of sea power. The conclusion to which Mahan was brought by his studied, and in particular by his final studies, of the Napoleonic Wars, as to the part which sea power played in that great struggle, was that the economic results which it produced, slow-acting though they may -have lieen. were in the end decisive. Bouaparte had the resources of Europe at bis disposal, but not the resources of the world. He needed these also. As so it is today with Hitler. Napoleon exhausted the "stored-up aggressive strength of France.” while Britain, preventing him from refreshing the dwindling vitality of France, was nourishing her own by a constant opening of new -markets and breaking through, by every means in her power, and with the willing connivance of France’s dependent allies, the ring Napoleon tried to draw round Britain. The instruments of sea power have changed but not its fundamental principles. The means by which goods are carried in and out of a country have been extended. A new means of attack find invasion, by air, has been brought within the power of man; but iu its broad essentials Mahan’s verdict applies equally well to the position of Germany today. War Of Endurance It was Mahan, too, who wrote that “while Great Britain was making appalling drafts upon her future in her ever-mounting debt, France was exhausting a capital which no forcing power could replace by her conscriptions.” It was a struggle of endurance. “The credit of France was gone, and her people could not bear any added burden until the sea, over which Great Britain moved unresisted, was open to them. The people of the Continent had become bitterly hostile through the sufferings caused by the blockade, and the Imperial power could only be maintained by an army which was itself filled by borrowing on the future; its capita], its reserve, were fast being exhausted.” Mahan thus interpreted the influence of British sea power in the Napoleonic wars. “The directly offensive use of Britain’s maritime resources, in order to repress the French system of aggression, consisted in throwing back France upon herself while at the same time cutting off her resources. . . . Even provisions were deemed to tie contraband of war on the ground that when there was a reasonable hope of starving her Into peace, to supply tnetn contributed to prolong hostilities.” — (S.D.IV.)