A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 109, 1 February 1941, Page 10

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Hitler’s U-Boat Threat POSITION OF EIRE Four siieeehes made during tlie la-t three or four days dealt with varying usi>evls of one import tint stiujcci. i a’o of the speakers were Germans--Grand Admiral Rueder ami Fuehrer Hitler—one was Mr. De Valera and (lie lourth was Mr. Cross. British Minister of Ship]ung. There is -great, .significance in the fact, that the two Germans, tlie Irishman and tlie Englishman were ad concerned with the vital importance in the present struggle of the issues that are being decided on the sea. Germany Worried

Admiral Raeder addressed himself to German shipyard workers. He emphasized the important part they were playing la Germany’s war effort. But it was also clear from the genera! tenor of his remarks that the Nazi High Command Is seriously worried about the tremendous hammering that the [R.A.F. has given, to Germany's principal shipbuilding yards and to her U-fooat -bases ou the home and the French coasts. The frequent heavy bombings of German ports must have wrought great havoc in the shipyards and gravely hampered the U-boat construction programme. This would explain Admiral Raeder’s exhortation to the shipyard, workers to stand up to their ordeal. A good deal of Hitler’s hysterical tirade was devoted, to threats of everincreasing violence iu the U-boat campaign against British and Allied merchant shipping. It is clear from several passages In his speech that he is genuinely alarmed and worried, not only by Great Britain's rapidly-growing strength on the sea, in the air and on land, but also by the rapidly-approach-ing reality of immense help from the United States. U.S. Aid To Britain

As in the last war, Germany's naval and military leaders scoffed al the idea of American aid ever being in time to affect the issue of the struggle, so ic has been in this war. In 1917 the German leaders boasted that their ‘unrestricted submarine campaign” would starve Britain into submission before American assistance could become effective. But. events proved them utterly wrong. In the present war Germany started her unrestricted submarine campaign on the very first day, but it was held in check until the collapse of France deprived Britain of the valuable services of the French Navy and gave Germany a tremendous advantage in her possession of advanced I -bout ami seaplane bases in the Channel and the Bay of Biscay. Hitler’s Threats

More than ever, it .is apparent that British sea power is the vital and dominant factor in the present struggle. It is to her command of the sea that Britain owes the spectacular military victories achieved iu Libya. Hitler ami his hordes are powerless to check the flowing tide of British successes against Italy across the Mediterranean. Hitler knows little ot the sea and ships. He, clearly, has not understood the real meaning of sea power. He now sees it working full time against him and he is afraid of it—hence Ins hysterical outburst of what his L-boats are going to do. He is going to defeat Britain with his U-boats, winch are also to prevent the United States from sending aeroplanes and tanks and other supplies to help her. Hiller is learning the lesson of sea power too late. Mr. De Valera Speaks

In a broadcast speech. Mr. de Valera said Eire had ‘’not a moment to lose in preparing for the worst regarding all supplies normally imported. . . . In blockading each other the belligerent are blockading us and the results are serious.” .Mr. de Valera is learning something about sea power. 'l’hore much that he should have realized long ago. As the ■•Economist” recently remarked, when we are lighting lor the restoration of rules of iutermitiona. order against an opponent who observes no limits on his actions, must we throw away the whole tight rather than break a single rule outsell e?. These are questions that torture the philosopher. But the common man mis no doubts. He knows that if you engage in war you implicitly accept tae doctrine that the end sometimes justilies the means. Our victory is hue s only chance of preserving her sovereign independence; in her interest as mueu as in our own, our job is to win the war ami we mav not be able to do that it wo always keep the rules that Hitler breaks. Mr. Churchill’s reference some months ago to the severe disadvantage imposed on the Royal Navy in its light against the submarine by the latk 11 the Irish bases that were handed back in 1938 was followed by a quite unnecessarily abusive speech by Mr. de Valera in which he said that the would never, in any circumstances, be allowed to use any of the facilities oi Eire and that any attempt, to secure a different result could only end in bloodshed. Attitude Of Eire

There has never, in the past, been a time when Ireland and her aspirations for national freedom and unity have been without numerous and powerful friends in England; but snch ■r time lias come now if, in this matter. Mr. De Valera speaks, as he appears to, for Hie Irish people. That, after Hie repeated demonstrations of what Nazism means and of what happens to small neutrals who come within Hitler’s grasp, Ireland should still prefer to hell) England’s enemies (for that is what her present attitude amounts to) will be taken as a final proof that reason, forbearance and moderation are out of place in relations between England and Ireland. They must not, howver, take clear thinking with them into the. discard. "We cannot afford to be •■uided bv our emotions.” said the “Economist.” “Unlike Mr. De Valera, we arc not protected by a powerful neighbour. it would, of course, be easy to >ny Hint since Mr. De Valera refuses to assist our convoying work, nothing brought, to those islands 'in British convoys should be released to Ireland. If we did Hun. Ireland's economy would collapse. j, •■lf Hie ports became a matter or life and death—for Ireland as well as for England—there can be only one wav out: we must take th em - , ' would, of course, revive all the old bitterness. But if bitterness there must be, let us have the bitterness and the bases, not the bitterness alone—wtucn is all mere‘retarliation’ would P r nvokeThere are. doubtless, many who w agree with the "Economist’s” suggestion. despite Mr. De Valera’s sarcastic rejoinder about "scraps of paper, but Irish ports or no Irish Britain will not be daunted by the Uu-eats of Hitler and