RANDOM NOTES

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 195, 14 May 1940, Page 6

RANDOM NOTES

Sidelights On Current

Events

(By

Kickshaws.)

Badminton, it is stated, may have to stop for lack of shuttles. Maybe they are all being used to weave the destinies of the world.

Umbrellas, it is declared, must now match women’s fashions. At the rate things are going the umbrella will have to be content with its bare framework too.

Roosevelt states that Nazi methods are a challenge to the type of civilization to which us three Americas are accustomed. Even our civilized grammar appears to be endangered.

The German attack on France via Holland and Belgium has in it nothing that might be termed of strategic or tactical inspiration. It follows ageold lines, only the weapons are different. Indeed, the French must know almost by heart all the opening gambits of this attack, much as a chess expert knows the correct moves to forestall a certain opening. In considering the situation one must therefore dissociate the strategic plan from the tactical use of new weapons. The new weapons may assist or expedite the plan, but they cannot save an unsound plan from difficulties inherent to its conception. Indeed, new weapons are largely counterbalanced by new weapons used by the opposing forces. There remains then the Plan and, as in the game of chess, the Plan is usually more important than anything else. In the present attack the most significant factor is that the German opening gambit follows traditional lines. Months ago plans had been evolved by the Allies for this precise line of attack; troops were ready to put those plans into operation, and complete liaison had been established with the two nations now attacked.

Possibly before one can appreciate the present situation it is illuminating to get down to bare facts, both in the present war and the Great War. The fundamental policy to frustrate a German attack through Belgium has been during almost a century for the Belgian forces to slow down the attack until Allied forces can advance to assist them. This fundamental policy was not carried out In 1914. The French generals had become obsessed with a scheme to forestall the German blow by taking the offensive further south in. France in a left and right-hand punch calculated to upset the German plans. Actually when this was done in 1914 the French offensives failed. The Frencli armies were sent reeling back. The British had permitted themselves to be diverted into this French scheme and ended up in a very precarious position on the French left wing. The result was that the Germans in Belgium easily swept aside Belgian resistance, encountered no serious French opposition, and very nearly captured Paris. Admittedly the Gormans manoeuvred themselves into a position from which a knock-out blow was delivered by the French on the Marne. It was a last despairing effort and had it failed Paris would have been doomed.

The fundamental plan for the defence of France from an attack through Belgium is the same today as it used to be before 1914. This time Allied forces have not been diverted elsewhere and the strategic errors of 1914 will not be repeated. The Dutch and the Belgians have opened the initial phase of the defence by a stubborn defensive. It is too early to say how successful this defensive has been but it seems clear that it has given the Allied armies waiting opposite Belgium time to move to the assistance of the two attacked countries. This means that by the time the Germans produce their’full pressure there will be adequate defence forces in readiness to oppose that pressure. This was not the case in 1914. Exactly where the Allied forces will take up a defensive line depends entirely on how much the Dutch and Belgians have been able to delay the German pressure. It is inconceivable that these two nations could do more than delay the Germans and more must not be expected. The important fact is that the Allies were ready and have put into action the appropriate counter move. 1 « * #

The fact that the German advance has not been stopped on the political boundaries of Holland and Belgium must not be considered important. Defence lines rarely coincide with geographical boundaries. The first real defensive line of the Belgians is along the River Meuse. This river runs north-east through the southern regions of Belgium and is strongly defended bv modern lines at important openings such as Leige and by' other forts. The river affords a natural defence line and based on it are a deep series of artificial defences. South-east of the Meuse lies the Ardennes. It is a barren area of mountains, woods and twisting roads, and is of no serious industrial significance. In fact, it provides all the ingredients for a strategic trap for a German invader. If the Germans were held on the Meuse the French might initiate a pincer-like movement from the south and the Belgians from the north, nipping off German forces entrapped in the Ardennes. The Belgians therefore are concentrating for the moment on delaying the Germans along the Meuse when their outer defences are pushed in and buckled by the Germans. If the Meuse defensive line fell there are four other lines of natural resistance, but each involves the abandonment of more and more of industrial Belgium. The most important of these other lines of defence follows the Albert Canal, which runs to the sea in a north-west direction cutting Belgium in two parts with the Meuse forming a wide loop to the east.

The problem which confronts the Dutch is twofold: to delay the German advance and to keep contact with the Belgian forces. The Dutch defences in the north-east of Holland depend largely on inundations. Large areas suitable for flooding have also been developed elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Dutch defences are not in the same high state of readiness as are the Belgian defences. A complete chain of pillboxes has been constructed along the German frontier. Flooding and defensive operations in Hie areas of the River Maas and the Yssel, adjacent to the German frontier, are capable of delaying a German advance but not of holding it for any length of time. One must assume, in fact, that in the north-east area only a brief check could be made to arrest the German advance. The River Rhino roughly cuts Holland in two parts. If the’ northern area is incapable or prolonged resistance the area west of the Rhine offers more natural tealures. If the Germans cross the Maas River early in the operations and advance westward, the Dutch may. be forced to defend a line along the Waal River. This might entail He separation of the Dutch from the Belgian forces before the Allies could arrive to aslsst in large enough numbers.