FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS

Dominion, Volume 31, Issue 154, 26 March 1938, Page 11

FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS

Mr. Chamberlain Outlines His Attitude FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF GOVERNMENT’S POLICY UNCHANGED Effect Of Recent European Events (British Official Wireless.) Rugby, March 24. The eagerly-awaited statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, at the beginning of the.debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons was heard by a House crowded in every part. A similar statement was made by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, in the House of Lords. The statement reviewed in turn the position of the League of Nations; the new situation arising from recent events in Austria and in particular the position of Czechoslovakia; the definition of Britain’s commitment, to which Mr. Chamberlain announced the Government’s inability to make any addition; the British attitude to the recent Soviet initiative; the situation in Spain and the conversations between Britain and Italy in relation thereto; and the acceleration of British rearmament. Mr. Chamberlain described it as a statement on “the attitude of His Majesty’s Government as affected by recent events in Europe,” insisting on the word “attitude” in contradistinction to “policy,” since the fundamental basis of British foreign policy remained unchanged in the maintenance and preservation of peace and the establishment of a sense of confidence that peace would ifi fact be maintained.

The Prime Minister reminded the House that His Majesty’s Government had already placed on record its judgment on the German action in Austria. The consequences of that action remined —there had been profound disturbance of international confidence.

Accordingly, His Majesty’s Government had given. special attention to this question, and in particular had fully considered whether the United Kingdom, in addition to the obligations of the Covenant of the League and of the Locarno Treaty, should, as a further contribution to preserving peace in Europe, now undertake new and specific commitments and in particular such a commitment in relation to Czechoslovakia. The existing commitments of Britain were: First, the defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression under the Locarno Treaty. Secondly, treaty obligations to Portugal, Irak and Egypt. Thirdly, there was a Covenant obligation. COVENANT OF LEAGUE Mr. Chamberlain cited the definition of the position by Mr. Anthony Eden when the latter, as Foreign Secretary, said: “In addition, our armaments may be used in (bringing help to a victim of aggression in any case where in our judgment it would be proper under the provisions of the Covenant to do so.” Such a case, Mr. Chamberlain remarked parenthetically, might include Czecholovakia, and he further cited Mr. Eden as follows: —“I use the word ‘may’ deliberately, since in such an instance there would be no automatic military obligations save for areas where their vital interests are concerned.? “Hi s Majesty’s Government * stands by these declarations,” Mr. Chamberlain said. “It has acknowledged that in the present circumstances the ability of the League of . Nations to fulfil all the functions originally contemplated for it is reduced, but this is not to be interpreted as meaning that His Majesty’s Government would in no circumstances intervene as a League member for the restoration of peace or the maintenance of international order if circumstances w’ere such as to make it appropriate for it to do so. “I cannot but feel that the course and development of any dispute, should such unhappily arise, would be greatly influenced by the knowledge that such action as it may be in the power of Britain to make will be determined by His Majesty’s Government of the day in accordance with the principles laid down in the Covenant.” CZECHOSLOVAK PROBLEM Mr. Chamberlain mentioned two further possibilities—an assurance to France of full support in case of her action under the treaty with Czechoslovakia, or a declaration against interference with the Independence and integrity of Czechoslovakia. Arguing that both involved the removal of the final issue of peace and war from the discretion of the British Goverhment, he said: “The position is not one His Majesty’s Government could see its way to accept in relation to an area where its vital interests are not concerned in the same degree as they are in the case of France and Belgium. It is certainly* not a position that results from the Covenant. For these reasons His Majesty’s Government feels itself unable to give the prior guarantee suggested.” Mr. Chamberlain added, before leaving' this subject:— “While plainly stating this decision, I would observe this: where peace and war are concerned, legal obligations are not alone involved, and if war broke out it would be unlikely to be confined to those ■who have assumed such obligations. It would be quite impossible to say where it might end and what Government might become involved. “inexorable pressure of facts might well prove more powerful than formal pronouncements, and in that event ib would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries besides those which were parties to the original dispute would almost entirely be involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with Interests closely interwoven, devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty, and determined to uphold them. TALKS WITH ITALY Juit before the Anglo-Italian conversations had opened Italy informed the British Government of her acceptance of the formula for the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain and the granting of belligerent rights to the two parties in Spain. Mr. Chamberlain said he had impressed upon the Italian Government the necessity, if the conversations were to succeed, not only that it should lend whatever help it could in bringing into operation the withdrawal plan, but that in the meantime the situation in Spain should not be materially altered by Italy sending fresh reinforcements. The Italian Government had now

again asserted its willingness loyally to assist in the execution of the British plan, and what was perhaps more important, it had repeated the declaration which it made some time ago that Italy had no territorial, political, or economic aims in Spain or in the Balearic Islands. , * “Hi s Majesty’s Government places full reliance upon the intention of the Italian Government to make good these assurances,” said the Prime Minister. “It believes that with the spirit of actual confidence in which both Governments are addressing themselves to the task it will be possible through the to reach a complete agreement.” SOVIET’S PROPOSAL Mr. Chamberlain defined the attitude of the Government to the Soviet proposal for an early coriference. He said it appeared to involve to a less extent consultation with a view to settlement than concerting of action against an eventuality which had not yet arisen, and its object appeared to be that they should be able to negotiate mutual undertakings in advance to resist aggression, such aS he had already stated His Majesty’s Government was unwilling to accept. The Soviet proposal also, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, would aggravate the tendency toward the establishment of exclusive groups of nations, which must be inimical to prospects for European peace. There were several references to Czechoslovakia in the Prime Minister’s statement, in addition to those in connection with commitments. Speaking of the,relations of the Czechoslovak Government and the German minority, he said that solution of this question, if it could be achieved, would go far to re-establish a more normal situation over an area wider than thati immediately concerned. Mr. Chamberlain stated: “His Majesty’s Government will at all times be ready to render any help in its power toward a solution between the German and Czechoslovak Governments. In the meantime, there is no need to assume use of force or indeed to talk about it. Such talk is to be strongly deprecated. Not only can it do no good; it is bound to do harm by interfering with the progress of diplomacy and increasing feelings of insecurity and uncertainty."' PRESERVATION OF PEACE Mr. Chamberlain said he could not Imagine that any events in Europe would change the fundamental basis of British policy—the maintenance of the preservation of peace and the establishment of a sense of confidence that peace would in fact be maintained. Peace was of the greatest interest to the Empire. “That does not mean that nothing will make us fight,” he added. “We are bound by certain treaty obligations which would entail upon us the necessity of fighting if occasion arose,'and I hope no one doubts that we should be prepared in such an event to fulfil those obligations. We will fight in defence of British territories and communications which are vital to our national interests. “So far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, it seems to us that now is a time for all the resources of diplomacy to be enlisted in the cause of peace. We are glad to note, and in nowise underrate, Germany’s definite assurances, and we have also observed with satisfaction the Czechs’ attempts to meet the reasonable wishes of the German minority. “If Britain is to make a substantial contribution to peace she must be strongly armed fo? defence or counteroffence. Our object must always be to preserve things that are essential, without recourse*™ war if possible, because we know that in war there arg no winners and there is nothing but suffering and ruin for those involved.”