LOSS OF EXPECTATION OF LIFE

Dominion, Volume 31, Issue 144, 15 March 1938, Page 10

LOSS OF EXPECTATION OF LIFE

Amendment To Present Law PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO DECEASED ESTATES The promised removal of the “expectation of life” clause dealing with damages recoverable by the estates of persons killed iu accidents is effected by means of new clauses which were added to the Statutes Amendment Bill m the House of Representatives yesterday. Difficulties which were experienced by the Attorney-General, Hon. H. G. It. Mason, in making this change have'apparently been removed. The relevant clause in the Bill states that, where, by virtue of the Law Re- « form Act, 1936. a cause of action survives for the benefit of the estate ot a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of the estate shall not include any damages for his pain or suffering, for any bodily or mental harm suffered, or for the curtailment of his expectation of life. These provisions will apply whether the cause of action arose before or after the date of the passing of the new legislation, but Will not affect the rights of any person under a final judgment given by anv court before that date. At the same time the Deaths by Accidents Compensation Act is amended so that damages may be awarded for expected pecuniary loss and for medical expenses. It is provided that in any action under this Act, damages may be awarded in respect of the amount ot actual pecuniary benefit which the person* for whose benefit the action is brought might reasonably have expected to' enjov if the deceased person had not been 'killed, notwithstanding the fact that they may not have been either wholly or partially dependent or. the deceased person before his death. Provision is also made for damages to be awarded covering medical expenses. The amendments will apply whether the cause of action arises before or after the date when they are brought into force, but final judgments already given will not be affected. "This provision will make the legal position in this respect vastly more rational,” said Mr. Mason, when the amendment was introduced. ‘‘When, in 1936, we passed an Act removing anv source of injustice resulting from the deaths of parties, we went rather beyond what was anticipated, and this rectifies that position by eliminating damages for pain and suffering, bodily or mental harm, or the curtailment of any expectation of life from causes of action.” Mr. Mason said that the amendment made clearer and extended slightly the Death by Accident Compensation Act. The point about that Act was that any damages in such cases were now limited to persons who might be described as near relatives and were based on the necessities of the claims rather than on the condition of the deceased person.