THE HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATION IN JAPAN

Dominion, Volume 29, Issue 202, 23 May 1936, Page 6

THE HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATION IN JAPAN

The author of this article—the first ot a scries ol three on current Japanese affairs—is a master at Wellington College. Last New Zealand summer he visited Japan as manager of the New Zealand Universities Rugby football team.

(By

P. MARTIN SMITH.

M.A., LL.B.)

Fur the full understanding of the recent outrages in Japan, one lias to be familiar with the recent history of the country, both in its social and economic aspects, for the existence of this young and very untionalistically-miuded group owes its origin to Hie modern westernisation of Japan that can be dated back to the Meiji Restoration of 1868. It was from this time, too, that the industrialisation of Japan can be said to have started. Now the course of industrialisation in Japan was very different from the course it took in other countries, where it grew up under a policy of ‘ Jaissez faire” or free individual enterprise. When Japan entered the field, the other countries had a good start on her. To Japan, her industrialisation was a matter of national concern, ami not something to be left to a haphazard development under the spur of private profitmaking. Hence, from the start industry developed very much under Hie care and direction of the State. Everyone knows of the rapid strides that industrialisation made, and how especially during the period of the war Japan was able to gain new markets and enter upon a period of great industrial prosperity. During tills period of prosperity there had beeu to some extent a relaxing of Government control, as so many of the industries were able to stand on their feet and desired to reap the full benefits for themselves of prosperous times. During these times a great accumulation of industrial power into the hands of a few took place, until today 70 per cent, of all Japanese trade and industry is in the bands of fifteen great houses. Indeed, it can be said that the country is in the grip of a financial oligarchy that wields great political power: 22.65 per cent, of the banking capital is in the hands of three companies, and five more companies account for an additional 30 per cent. Thus, eight companies account for over half the country’s banking capital. It can easily be imagined how these wealthy houses have obtained a grip over most industrial concerns. The coming of tlie depression only served to consolidate the position of these big firms, and to get the smaller firms within their grip. The depression hit Japan early, and hit her severely, us in the normal course of events she could not hope to hold all the markets she had won during the war. The depression, too, had important psychological reactions among the people. Industrialisation meant westernisation, and there were many to whom the giving up of, the old national ways had never appealed. To them, Japan had her own divine way to go, and this westernisation represented a giving up of the destiny to lie the ruler of Asia. When the depression came and things were far from well witli Japan, it appeared to this group that Nemesis had come to Japan for deserting her ancient gods, and the foreigner, by closing markets to Japan, was playing the part of the villain and the traitor. Thus, this movement has always been extremely nationalist and anti-foreign. Army and Farmer v. Business. There is also another aspect. Government control had gradually been relaxed in industry as things became prosperous. »When Hie economic blizzard came, industry desired once more to come under Government protection, as it has done in other countries on the principle of the “socialisation of losses.” This the Government largely did, with the consequence that Government policy has tended more than ever to be under the influence of “big business,” and big business means western and foreign ways. There are several reasons why this should call forth the antagonism of Hie young extremely nationalist military party. First of all, policies that suited the industrialist did not help, and indeed, frequently injured, i lie cause of the farmer. And the farming section of the community in Japan is in it most desperate plight. Recent statistics show Hutt over 00 ix* r cent, of Hie farmers, are carrying on at a loss. Now. the army is recruited to the extent of about 80 per cent, from the farming section of Hie community, and naturally, there is an affinity between them. In addition, it is in the farming section that the purity of Japanese life has been kept most free from foreign taint, and it is this purity and simplicity of ancient life that, to the young military party, must be restored.

Again, the commercial classes have shown a tendency to begrudge the demands the military party have been making on Hie Budget, because of the fear of additional taxation. Indeed, a recent innovation in Hie way of taxation lias been Hie excess profits tax. Last year tlie army and navy appropriations accounted for 46 per cent, of the Budget, but to such an extent was the Budget unbalanced, that the army and ■ navy appropriations actually amounted to over 70 per cent, of the actual income of the Budget , when borrowings are neglected. It must be remembered that in Japan Hie Cabinet is not chosen from the members of the

strongest party, but appointed frequently from outside the Diet altogether. The Minister of War lias to be a military man, and there can be no questioning of his financial demands. Of recent years, however, Hie late Min ister of Finance, Mr. Takahashi,, has uttered public warnings as to the State finances and Hie drain the military demands have been making on them; and it appears that lie lias been able to influence to some extent the older military heads to the consternation of the young military party. He was outspoken enough to warn the military party that he would not be responsible for the safety of the State finances if Hie military demands continued, and he also warned them that they would incur unpopularity among tho>people. The influence of this young military party is no new thing in Japanese life, and there have been a number of incidents in which it has figured, the most notable before the recent outrage being on May 15, 1932, when there was a plot to kill the Emperor’s advisers. Later there was a plot to kill the Premier and his Cabinet. The last unsuccessful plot to kill the Ministry was in July, 1934. It is interesting to note the names under which these bodies Lave operated, such as Showa Reconstruction, Great Japanism, Loyalty and Filial Piety, God Sent Troops, Death Defying Troops, Blood Brotherhood. The Military’s Following. There are several reasons why the military party finds a ready response to its appeals. The military establishments' have always been efficient, and a model to be followed. The Japanese have not been slow to see that international diplomacy is dependent on a strong and efficient military backing. Throughout the age of feudalism the warrior class enjoyed a high standing, and its code of ethics, or “Bushido,” plays a large part in the ethical equipment of the nation at large, while the traditional i-ffie of tae. Japanese in many of its pleasing aspects, such aU frugality and self-contrw, Lt.fe been very largely followed by Hie modern services. There is, too, no military swagger among the officers, either in its Prussian brute form or in its English socially snobbish form. In 1910 an organisation called the Imperial Reservists’ Association was founded, and membership was open to military and naval men. Its fundamental object was “to develop the-mili-tary spirit and to promote military efficiency, which in their turn will promote social welfare, encourage virtuous customs and habits, and guarantee the stability of national defence.” This organisation soon established a membership of three millions, and so successful was the movement that Young Men’s Leagues were established for the purpose of enlisting the youth of the country. Membership was open to young men between Hie ages of 13 and 25. Their activities consisted in holding meetings and wearing uniforms. It is cstimaled I hat these leagues also had a membership of three millions. These two organisations form tiie propaganda force of the military party.

In 1930, despite intense propaganda work on the part of these two organisations in strong opposition, the London Treaty was signed and the service leaders suffered a set-back. From that moment the military leaders have conducted a campaign of greater intensity, and frequent meetings in the rural districts have been held ami addressed in lire-eating maiiner on the ineptitude of party government and capitalist democracy. Tlie.se stirring lectures on the age's decay have tended to embrace modern dance halls, cafes, increasingly unsubmissive wives, foreign tailoring style, and other city ills. General Winanii, then Minister of War, came out in the open and said, “Some people hastily advocate limitation of armaments and engage in propaganda unfavourable to Hie nation and Hie army, while others take advantage of the present psychology of (be people witli a view to reducing the army for domestic reasons. I hope you will cooperate witii Hie War Ministry authorities to correct such mistakes.” In Hie autumn of 1934, to the consternation of Hie Cabinet the Ministry of War issued a manifesto which contained Hie following:—

“The present economic system lias been developed on the basis ot individualism. For this reason economic activities tend to serve only individual interests and fancies, and do not always harmonise with the general interests of the State.

“The extreme emphasis on free competition may be a danger, arousing antagonism among the classes. “Wealth accumulated by a minority causes misery among the masses, strikes, the failure of small industrial establishments, the ruin of agriculture; and all these factors upset the balance of our national life.

“State control is now barely felt, and for this reason it is Impossible to mobilise all the forces which would fully exploit all our resources, develop our Industries, stimulate our foreign trade, and direct our economic activities towards a common aim. At the same time tlie Government Budget is limited, and measures urgently needed in connection witli national defence cannot be carried out easily. “Various opinions are current concerning I he policies necessary in order to improve economic conditions. From tlie point ot’ national defence the following alms must be kept in mind:— “Tlie new economic system must be Inspired by 1-lie idea of justice for all. It must insure to everyone a financial return commensurate with his labour, for only thus

can personal activity be stimulated and the lite of the nation stabilized. "Finance and industry should be coordinated so that we can derive the full benefit from our national resources, our industrial development, our foreign trade, and from the measutes adopted for national defence. ' “ It is desirable that the people should abandon their individualistic economic conceptions; instead, they should recognise the importance of a collective economy; they should work towards the creation of an economic system which will rapidly realise the Empire’s ideal. “The State should rigidly control the entire national economy.” Patriotism Tn Political Crime. To us, a remarkable feature of these outrages is the way they are regarded by the Japanese people and, in particular, toy the law. The principle seems to be that when a man commits a political crime, Hie most important tiling is the motive that lay behind his action. If lie lias done it from what lie considers patriotic motives, no matter how vile the deed, or how mistaken lie may have been, lie is worthy of Hie greatest: consideration, ami very often veneration. There have been eases where tlie assassin, having committed suicide, has been given a funeral on a more grand scale Ilian Hie victim himself. This Idea of Hie patriotic motive behind Hie crime has recently been Illustrated in the trial of a military officer by the name of Aizawa, for Hie murder some seven months ago of General Yamagata. I believe tlie trial is not yet over. As far as one could gather, Hie whole trial focussed round the degree of patriotism motivating Hie murderer. Tlie general consensus of opinion was that lie would gel; a sentence of anything up to ten years. There is a big section of the Japanese public that is getting tired of this form of justice, and is demanding severer punishments. These people feel, too, that this display of brutality is degrading to Japan in the eyes of the foreigner. Certainly, violence is not a normal feature of Japanese life, and it will be interesting to see how these men that are responsible for the recent outrages will be treated. Certainly, the “paternal” way in which the affair has so far beeu dealt with, does not give evidence that there is a determination that this sort of thin" must stop. It is difficult to say what are the respective strengths of the followings of tlie two parties. The average Japanese has no very definite views on polities, and arguing on street corners, such as goes on witli us, is bad form with the Japanese; in fact, argument of any sort is bad form in Japan, and their educational system is certainly not designed to lead to any independence of thought and opinion. Thus, political issues are not things that concern the man in tlie street, but are rather the field of powerful interests. One might ask if there is any way out of this apparent dilemua of a selfish and very powerful commercial and financial oligarchy on Hie one hand, and a super-nationalist militaristic faction on tlie other. To those of a liberal turn of mind, to whom this question was put in Japan, tlie answer was somewhat pessimistic, tlie feeling being that until suppression of thought ceased and Hie intense regimentation of thought in the schools and educational institutions was done away with, there was little hope. And neither of tlie two parties who were striving for mastery showed any inclination to do this. In fact, it was the one strong point they had in common. Some went so far as t<> Hmi uo.hing short of a social upheaval coul<l bring tills about.

Possibly, t<> tbr ■■ of us who have no strong political opinions, the success of. the military party is I lie one Unit is fraught witii the greatest danger, and the one to be "••npl ( t.| ;1 t all costs, 'Vo those, it should be pointed out that the military party draws some of its greatest strength from the racial and commercial animosity displayed toward .taps’' t ,v """in foreign countries. Action that tends to give Japan the feeling that she is being isolated plays right into l’""ds of (he military party, who are not slow to capitalise the feeling of disappointment and resentment that, such neim-i calls forth. And it is to be remembered that over twenty countries have raised their tariffs against Japan since 1!'32.