How Preferential Voting Would Work

Dominion, Volume 28, Issue 287, 31 August 1935, Page 8

How Preferential Voting Would Work

MAKING SURE OF MAJORITY RULE IN POLITICS

(CONTRIBUTED BY THE NEW -ZEALAND Legion.)

TN making out our ease for a revision of the electoral system we stated in last Saturday’s article that 16 members were elected at the last, general elections on minority votes. We have since had our attention drawn to an official abstract which discloses an even more serious position.* A eloser analysis shows that: — (1) Of tlie 76 European members, four were returned unopposed. (2) Eighteen (or 25 per cent.) of the remaining 72 were elected on minority votes. (3) The supporters of unsuccessful candidates in 18 electorates numbered approximately 24,000 more than the supporters of successful candidates. The following extract is taken from the catalogue of a well-known firm of nurserymen:—“After listing the shrubs you have selected, please make a short additional list of substitutes, in case any varieties should be sold out . . . etc.” Quite an excellent idea, giving the selector a first and second preference, rather than forcing on him something he may detest. Preferential voting allows the elector to record his order of choice for any number of candidates, and clearly to value any one against any other. Our present obsolete system lias led, and always will lead, to minority rule: and yet, we cannot but think that the furnishing of a shrubbery is less important than the choice of our rulers. Virtually Disfranchised.

From tlie signing of Magna Ohartti onward, British people have been jealous of their civil rights, and disfranchisement of any large section by active means would lead to anarchy and revolution. Because it is imposed on them by a system they do not understand, because most of them suffer it in ignorance, a large percentage of the people, who record their votes under the present system, are virtually disfranchised.

The purpose of a general election is to allow the people to select their representatives to Parliament. In theory the result of the poll is an expression of the people’s will. We have proved that in practice it is not. The system is old. Why has it not beeu changed? Preferential voting does not suit political parties. There lias developed a most extraordinary convention surrounding Parliamentary elections and parties. For some abstruse reason the right to contest a seat is deemed the sacred prerogative of those who light under the banner of cither the Government party or the official Opposition. Notwithstanding consistent criticism of both parties by people and Press, any independent candidate, bo lie never so capable, and desirable, is immediately howled down by Press, public and, most particularly, by parties, as an interloper—a vote-splitter. The brand is almost approbrlous and is a valuable weapon to aid parties—too valuable to discard —and Preferential Voting, which would place the independent on an equal footing, is too dangerous to parties. This is a mechanical age. Women and children talk glibly of the works of tlie motorcar, and the great public gains some glimmering of the intricate mechanism of the party machine . . . Preferential Voting can only be introduced as a private members’ Bill. How Nanson System Works. A simple example of vote counting by the Nanson system was given last week. Any reader curious enough to check the working of the count must have been puzzled by an obvious error. This is explained by a transposition in group (a) of the names of Robertson and Jones.' '

Hereunder we give an example where there are five candidates, of whom one is to be elected, and that there are 400 voting papers. A typical voter, faced'with the five names set out below, might put his preferences against them iu this order: 3. A nderson 2. B lythe 1. C ampbell 4. D onald 5. E verett This means that of all the candidates his first choice is Campbell, his second Blythe, his third Anderson, and so on. He prefers Campbell to Blythe, Anderson. Donald and Everett. He prefers Blythe to Anderson, Donald and Everett. He prefers Anderson to Donald and Everett, and he prefers Donald to Everett. Taking initials only his order of preference is CBADE. Returning Officers’ Summaries. On a. scrutiny of all the papers the orders of preference are as follow:— 100 papers show ABODE 80 „ „ RACED .100 „ „ ' DECAB 60 „ „ EDCBA 10 . „ „ ACBED 40 „ ~ J CBADE 10 „ ~ BCADE

The officer constructs a trial table as follows: — TABLE 11.

In order to ascertain which should be rejected, Nanson constructs the trial table below, which is obtained from Table II by multiplying the first choices by 4 (one less than the number of candidates), the second choices by 3, the third by 2, the iourth by 1, and the fifth by 0. TABLE 111 (FIRST TRIAL TABLE).

Nanson then rejects all those whose trial totals are not greater than SOI), the average of all the trial totals. (He shows by a rigid process the soundness of this stop.) A new score-sheet similar to II is then made for the remaining candidates, A. B. C, disregarding votes given for D and E. It will be as follows:—

Multiplying tlie first choices by 2, the second by 1, and the third by 0, we get a trial table similar to Table 111, thus:—

The average of the totals is 400; he cuts out A and B, >who have totals not greater than the average, and C is accordingly elected. Assuming that the preferences are truly and rightly given, and that each voter exercises all his preferences, this method is infallible. In this instance the candidate who was lowest in the first-past-the-post system is mathematically proved to be the most preferred. If put up against any single one of the other candidates iu a straight-out contest he would win the election on each occasion. He is the only candidates who stands up to this test.

First choice. Second choice. Third choice. Fourth choice. Fifth choice A no SO 50 100 60 B 90 140 10 60 100 i * 40 ‘20 310 0 0 6 100 60 0 150 90 E 60 100 0 90 150

A 440+240 + 100+100+0=880 points B 3004-420 + 20 + 604-0= 860 „ ) w (j 1(10+ 60 + 680+ 0 + 0 = 000 „ '.a « D 400+180+ 0+1504-0 = 730 „ V2 o E 240 + 300+ o+ 90 + 0 = 630 „ '

TABLE IV. First Second Third choice. choice. choice. z \ .110 ISO 110 It mi 200 110 c 200 20 ISO

TABLE V (SECOND TRIAL TABLE). A 220 -1- 180 -U 0 — 400 pts. B 180 + 200 4. 0 — 380 „ kg 5 C 400 4- 20 -J- 0 = 420 „ J fig