HISTORIC VICTORY

Dominion, Volume 27, Issue 37, 7 November 1933, Page 6

HISTORIC VICTORY

The Battle of Trafalgar HOW THE BRITISH WON (To the Editor.) Sir—While rejoicing in the victory of Trafalgar and) incidentally, honouring the memory of Nelson, there is one aspect of that memorable battle about which our historians are strangely, si lent. While stressing the numerical superiority of the enemy—33 ships of the line against our 27—they fail to mention that the victory was rendered comparatively easy by reason of the fact that in every other single respect the advantages were overwhelmingly in favour of the British. Trafalgar was won before, it was fought. The enemy had no chance of success, none whatever Nelson was absolutely certain of victory and so was every officer and sailor in his fleet. Southey tells us—and on this point there is perfect unanimity amongst our historians that when going into action Nelson asked Blackwood what he should consider a victory. That officer answered that in view of the handsome way in which battle was offered-by the enemy, he thought it would be a glorious result if fourteen were captured. Nelson replied: “I shall not be satisfied with less than twenty.” Twenty of the enemy ships struck. Only a few escaped. The same amazing coiihdence filled tfie hearts of the sailors. They were not a bit concerned about the victory, it was a question of how many ships they would capture. Southey also informs us that when the British tars caught sight of the enemy ships, far. from being perturbed, by their formidable appearance, “they; only admired the beauty and the splendour of the spectacle, and in full confidence of winning what they saw, remarked to each other what a fine sight yonder ships would make at Spithead. ’ The British fleet had never been in a better state of efficiency, and had at its head the greatest sea captain of all time—Nelson, whose very name inspired terror in the hearts of his enemies, and whose-exploits had already fired and dazzled the imagination of his countrymen. What was the condition of the allied fleets? They were in a deplorable state of inefficiency. Writing to Deeres. Minister of Marine, a few months prior to Trafalgar, Villeneuve, who had slipped out of Toulon, said: “My fleet looked well at Toulon, but when the storm came on things changed at once. The sailors were not used to storms; they were lost among •the mass of soldiers; those from sealsickness lay in heaps upon the. decks. It was impossible to work the ships, hence yard-arms were broken and sails carried away.” As for the Spaniards, Deeres had warned Napoleon time and; again of the terrible risk of burdening Villeneuve with the unseaWorthy vessels of Spain. The Spanish ships were big and cumbersome, difficult to manoeuvre and useless in battle. One of them’was the huge four-decker, Sau- : tissima Trinidad, the largest ship in the The crews of the Spanish fleet had been recruited from the riffraff of the maritime towns of the Fen insula. They were slow and indolent, and as seamen absolutely worthless. Their officers, for the most part, were not much better.- The crews of both the French and Spanish ships were badly lacking in gunnery practice. The British gunners fired twice or thrice as fast as their adversaries, and in close action discharged three broad sides to the enemy’s one. By dint of incessant practice Collingwood had brought Ids men to such a state of gunnery perfection that they could fire three broadsides in three apd a ‘ half minutes. To give some idea of the: weakness of the enemy’s fire it may be. mentioned that Collingwood’s ship, the Royal .Sovereign, owing to her superior sailing qualities, was in close touch with the enemy for some fifteen minutes (some historians say twenty), and bore the brunt of fighting singlehanded before another vessel came to her assistance, and the destruction—annihilation is the word—of the enemy shins was accomplished by some twelve or fourteen of the British vessels which first got into action. James says: “The total loss of the British was 1690, of which 1452 belonged to fourteen out of twenty-seven of the fleet. With few exceptions the ships so suffering were in the van of their respective columns.” Villeneuve, safe in the harbour of Cadiz, dreaded meeting Nelson. He convened a council of war, and. it was unanimously decided that it would be rash and imprudent in the highest degree to give battle. The result of the deliberations of the officers was sent to Paris, Villeneuve adding hjs own opinion, which was strongly opposed! to accepting battle, ’ and the French admiral was no coward. Napoleon, pacing the cliffs at Boulogne, waiting for the appearance of the combined French and Spanish fleets which were to convoy his flotilla across the Channel, stormed and raved. He upbraided Deeres and said: “Tell your friend that he is probably too cowardly to leave Cadiz. Send Admiral Rosily to take command of the squadron and order Villeneuve to come to Paris and render an account of his conduct.” : When Villeneuve was apprised by Deeres that Admiral Rosily was on his way to supersede him his mind was filled with despair. He bitterly resented the imputation of cowardice and resolved to give battle, if only to show how right he had been in avoiding an encounter. He told his officers they must fight; the emperor wished it They bowed their heads in cence. Napoleon had pin-pricked Villeneuve to certain’ destruction. But before Trafalgar was fought Napoleon bad “wheeled his legions for the conquest of Austria, with front unabashed and a mind presaging certain triumphs.” Thiers, while paying a compliment to the victors, has justly observed, “'The French had the glory of an heroic defeat, unequalled perhaps in history for the devotedness of the vanquished.”—l am, etc., „ , . . J- A. WALSH. Pahiatua.