LACK OF CRUISERS

Dominion, Volume 27, Issue 15, 12 October 1933, Page 9

LACK OF CRUISERS

British Manoeuvres

A VALUABLE LESSON

Cancellation of Exercises

By Telegraph.—Press Assn.—Copyright.

(Received October 11, 7.30 p.m.)

London, October 10.

The special correspondent of the “Daily Mail” with the Fleet reports that the cancellation of the manoeuvres owing to a gale contains a most valuable lesson, already apparent to naval men which they consider the public should learn —namely the shortage of cruisers.

The proposed attack on a convoy on October 5 would in wartime have depended for success on sufficient cruisers of 5000 tons or thereabouts, but they were unavailable, consequently it was necessary to substitute destroyers. The cruisers could have carried out. the exercises, but with shams this was impossible in such weather. v Sensational rumours are current at Portsmouth of insubordination on the battleship Hood, but exhaustive inquiries have failed to substantiate them. The Hftod at present is in Cromarty Firth, with the Renown. Members of the crew were ashore at Invergorden on October 9. There was no sign of trouble or discontent. CRUISER WEAKNESS Effect of Recent “Gestures” ANXIOUS PROBLEM There is an increasing belief in wellinformed. circles that one of the first duties of the Cabinet, after the reassembly of Parliament in November, will be to consider the grave weakness of our naval forces, both from the point of view of national and Empire defence, and the protection of the sea-borne trade which is the life-blood of the country, wrote the naval correspondent of the “Morning Post” on September 5. Our weakness in this respect is causing the gravest anxiety to those on whom rests the responsibility of ensuring defence and the maintenance of food and raw materials in. the event of hostilities. The enormous naval building programmes recently announced by both the United States of America and Japan naturally lend additional point to our weakness. But it is in no competitive spirit that there must be a reconsideration of the needs of our navy. The problem is pressing and demands immediate attention in the light of the vast commitments of our naval forces throughout the world. The oceans of the world are bounded to a large extent by the coast lines of the Empire, and they are crossed and recrossed by trade routes. Interruption of trade would spell rapid starvation to England ;”it la therefore upon the defence of these distant outpost® that the safety of our homes must chiefly depend. Needed Replacements. The following figures show the relation between treaty limitations and otl> naval strength, and where replacements can be undertaken without delay:— Cruisers Armed with Guns above 6.lin. Tons. London Treaty maximum .... 146,800 Ships in service 183,396 Ships under age limit on December 31, 1936 143,600 Building Nil. Projected Nil. These figures show that this country can build no more ships in this category so long as t.be treaties remain in force. Cruisers Aimed with Guns 6.lin. and Below.

Tons. London Treaty maximum .... 192,200 Ships in service (not including one minelayer) 157,875 Ships under age limit on December 31, 1936 39,980 Building (apnrox.) 52,400 Projected (1933) programme. 4 ships, tonnage uncertain. The figures for ships under age on December 31, 1926, show clearly how great is the average age of our cruisers in this category. It would appear from these figures that we are entitled by treaty to replace 152,220 tons of these cruisers.

But Article 20 (a) of the London Naval Treaty states that, in the case of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the total replacement tonnage of cruisers n> be completed before December 31. 1936. shall not exceed 91,000. The ships building and projected under the 1933 programme, together with the Leander, just completed, make up this tonnage, so that we are not allowed by treaty to replace any further obsolete tonnage in this category. “Gestures.” This clause aptly demonstrates the lengths to which this country went in “gestures” in order to achieve an agreement. It applies only to the_ British Commonwealth of Nations, and, in effect, it ensures that we alone shall enter upon the period sifter 1936 with a cruiser fleet in which obsolete tonnage plays a large part. Flotilla Leaders and Destroyers. Tons. London Treaty maximum .... 150,000 Ships in service 180,374 Ships under age on December 31. 1936 48,040 Building 3 flotilla leaders 16 destroyers Projected (1933 programme) 1 flotilla leader 8 destroyers Here again it is obvious that the majority of our ships are old. The figures show that we are entitled to replace no less than 100,000 tons of obsolete destroyers (including ships in this category already under construction). Submarines. Tong. London Treaty maximum 52,700 Submarines in service 52,159 Submarines under age on December 31, 1936 35,524 Building 6,810 Projected (1933 programme) 3 submarines These figures show that this country still has about 10,000 tons of submarine tonnage which will be obsolete before December, 1936. and which can, therefore, be replaced before that date. Destroyer Tonnage. The fact that the further replacement of obsolete cruisers is denied to us under the terms of the London Naval Treaty is all the more reason for concentration on keeping our destroyer and submarine tonnage modern and up to our requirements. In war a measure of' trade protection can be consigned, if necessary, to destroyers detached from the Fleet for convoy duties. Since our cruiser shortage is such that very few of these craft can be spared for trade route work, much of this taskmust fall upon destroyers. It is a shortsighted policy indeed which countenances a weakening of a first line of defence and at the same time makes inadequate provision for a second line. Submarines, too. we can and should build. True, we have advocated their abolition often enough, but since such craft" have not been, and apparently will not be abolished, we should make use of them —again to lighten the burden of our inadequate cruiser forces. Another reason for replacing obsolete destroyer and submarine tonnage at once is that, in 1937, even if the Treaties stand as they do now, we shall not only be faced with the necessity of replacing 14 obsolete six-inch gun cruisers, but also of building two more heaviliy armed cruisers to replace the Frobisher and Effingham.