ORIGINS OF WAR

Dominion, Volume 23, Issue 218, 11 June 1930, Page 11

ORIGINS OF WAR

REVELATIONS OF BRITISH DOCUMENTS ATTITUDE OF KAISER EFFORTS TO ENSURE ENGLISH NEUTRALITY Dominion Special Service. London, May 1. There are piquant personal touches in the sixth volume of British documents on the “Origins of the War,” issued this week by H.M'. Stationery Office. The new volume covers the period from 1907 to 1912, and, therefore, deals with the ever-growing competition In naval building and the increasing strain of relations between Germany on the one hand and Britain, France, and Russia on the other. All attempts to reach some agreement on naval construction were foiled by Germany’s demand for a political understanding ensuring British neutrality in case of war. • Such an agreement the British Government could not enter into in the light of its entente with France and Russia. Many times did the Kaiser assert his friendship for England and desire for a good understanding, but he had generally an object in view. One of the grievances he ventilated in 1911 was that when he wanted a coaling station in the Far East and Inquired where it would be least inconvenient to England, Lord Salisbury said “He would see me damned first 1”

For the greater part of the period the late King Edward VII was in close touch with the negotiations between the Foreign Office and Germany, and illuminating accounts are given of his visits to Cronstadt and Berlin and also of his meeting with the Kaiser in 1907. At this meeting the aged Emperor of Austria was also present, and Sir Charles (now Viscount) Hardinge reported that while there was no real Intimacy between King Edward and the Kaiser, the relations between the former and the Emperor of Austria were most friendly and Intimate. “They seemed to delight in each other’s company and were practically inseparable.” The attitude of the Kaiser, bellicose and blustering as a rule, but occasionally pacific and persuasive, is told In the dispatches of the ambassadors. At one time he suggested to a, French statesman an understanding between France and Germany against England, “who was a menace to Europe.” And all through this period German efforts were directed toward breaking up the Entente, to Isolating England, and to securing for herself a virtual domination of Europe.

Sir Eyre Crbwe’s View. ‘ The international situation was clearly visualised by Sir Eyre (then Mr.) the senior clerk at the Foreign Office, whose minutes are one of the most startling features of the volume. “Germany earnestly desires a conflict between Japan and the United States, with a secret reservation that, while both should be exhausted, Japan, should win, he wrote on one occasion in 1908. King Edward asked for the grounds of this statement, and Crowe gave them with a lucidity and knowledge of German mentality and design that were remarkable. Crowe was particularly frank in his comments on the actions of members of the Cabinet. All the facts concerning the Kaisers letter to Lord Tweedmouth, then First Lord of the Admiralty, and the latter ; reply, are given in this, volume. it seems curious,” Crowe writes, that. Lord Tweedmouth should have communicated the naval estimates to the Emperor before they were laid before the House or Commons. One naturally wonders what would be said in the House if this fact became known.” Sir Edward Grey had agreed to the estimates being sent, but everyone was very anxious that the whole incident should remain secret, and when it leaked out Sir Edward was “much annoyed.” When the Government was receding from its original position that a naval agreement must precede any political agreement, Crowe wrote a long minute warning the Cabinet that any negotiations with the German Government are bound to be indecisive, vacillating, and highly dangerous?* “At present., he concludes, “it is exceedingly, puzzling to understand what exactly his Majesty,s Government is aiming at, and why it considers that the kaleidoscopic nature of the constantly changing stages in the negotiations carried on through many divers channels at the same time may be expected to bring them nearer to the object so aimed at.”' , t I By this time, France had become nervous of the Anglo-German negotiations, and eventually, in April. 1912 Mr. Asquith confessed to Sir Edward Grey that he, too, was “becoming more and more doubtful as to the wisdom of prolonging these discussions. . . . Nothing. I believe, will meet the purpose which falls short of a promise on our part of neutrality , a promise we cannot give. And she makes no firm or solid offer, even m exchange for that.” Needless to say, Germany got no promise of neutrality, and when a few years later she embarked on war, she did so with her eyes open.