The Dominion FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1929. RISKY CONCESSIONS TO RUSSIA

Dominion, Volume 23, Issue 8, 4 October 1929, Page 6

The Dominion FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1929. RISKY CONCESSIONS TO RUSSIA

Prior to the fall of the previous British Labour-Socialist Government negotiations were in train for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia. During the regime of the Conservative Government which followed, relations were further strained by the events connected with the Arcos Raid and an intensification of the Moscow Internationale’s Communist campaign of subversive propaganda. In line with Labour-Socialist policy the return of the MacDonald Party to the Treasury benches meant the resumption of negotiations. As the result of a series of conversations between Mr. Arthur Henderson, the British Foreign Secretary, and M. Dovgalevsky, 'the delegate appointed by the Soviet Government to treat with the British Government in the matter, it has been announced that Pailiament will be asked to sanction an exchange of ambassadors between the two countries as a condition precedent to the settlement of questions at issue between them. Contrasted with the policy of the Conservative Government, this procedure means putting the cart before the horse. Sir Austen Chamberlain’s Russian policy laid down certain principles of action. Before Russia could be admitted to full diplomatic status in her dealings with Great Britain, her Government must agree, first, to an acknowledgment of her pre-revolution debt obligations and, second, to the suppression of the Communistic propaganda in British countries. The Russian attitude on this question has. been that equality of treatment must be unconditional. In agreeing to. this Mr. Henderson has reversed the policy of Sir Austen Chamberlain. The Russian Government has been for some time past extremely anxious to secure equality of diplomatic status with the Governments of Great Britain and the United States. The reason is largely economic. Russia’s international credit is practically exhausted. Until she can compose her differences with these two great moneylending countries she has but a slender hope of recuperating her economic strength. Under present conditions British and American commercial institutions trade with Russia at their own risk. . If these countries restore her diplomatic status the risk will be materially reduced, and credit will flow more freely in the direction of Russian industry and trade. Russia’s economic extremity hitherto has been regarded as a strong card in the hands of British and American diplomacy. In effect it would have compelled the Russian Government in course of time to agree to the conditions of her diplomatic rehabilitation. Mr. Henderson’s policy implies that the card has been surrendered. In view of the issues at stake, the comment of the London Daily Telegraph that Mr. Henderson “has hopelessly blackened the Government’s hitherto creditable diplomatic record” does not seem too strong. There js no doubt that the admittance of Russia into respectable international society would be a very good thing for the economic stability and social peace of the world. As long as she is condemned by international attitude to be a pariah nation she must continue to be a menace. The record of the Soviet Government, however, is not such as would justify her admittance without some guarantees of good behaviour. That has been the simple sum and substance of British Conservative policy. . Now Mr. Henderson, on behalf of the Labour-Socialist Government, proposes to take Russia, as he has already agreed to take Egypt and Iraq, on trust and risk the consequences. The trouble about such adventures in foreign policy is that whatever mischief is done by such altruistic concessions will be very difficult to undo. This especially true of a political power which has not only been founded upon Communistic aspirations, but is propelled by a Communistic organisation which could destroy it to-morrow if it defied its behests.