The Dominion. FRiDAY, JUNE 11, 1920. tRADE1 WITH RUSSIA

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 220, 11 June 1920, Page 6

The Dominion. FRiDAY, JUNE 11, 1920. tRADE 1 WITH RUSSIA

In what he had to say a day or two ago about opening up trade relations with Russia, Mit._ Lloyd George was no doubt making the best of a bad job. At the same time thcro is great force in his contention that military • measures against the Bolsheviki aro impracand that peace and the economic reconstruction of tho world will be better served by opening up trade with Russia than by the merely negative policy which seems to be the only alternative. Owing to the chaotic disorganisation of Russia, however, the resumption of trade is likely to be impeded by somewhat serious difficulties. Sound objections have been raised to accepting the gold which the Soviet authorities at first offered in payment for imports on tho ground that in the hands of those who now hold it, it represents stolen 3 roper,ty. In the early days of his mission, M. Kpassin himself stated.that the Soviet Government had captured large amounts of gold coin from Admiral Kolchak's forces, and in any case Russia is heavily in default in respect of payments due to foreign _ Governments and investors. Dealing with these objections, Mil. Lloyd Geokge affirmed that there are-considerable stocks of wheat and other commodities in Russia awaiting export. _ At a time when the world ■ is imminently threatened with aiWheat famine, this, of course, raises a very important consideration. j3o far as Russian export trade in the immediate future is concerned, the British Primo Minister is probably taking rather an optimistic view. At Stockholm, when on his way to England, Keassin stated that . . tho main object of tho Soviet deleRation is to make arrangements for obtaining from abroad Russia's most pressing requirements—namely, railway roKtng stock and agricultural and indus- • trial machinery, besides wearing apparel and other primary necessities of file Russia is prepared to pay for these in gold, as tho transport oT her agricultural produce from the outlying centres of production in exchange, for these goods' is at present impossible owing to the dilapidated state oMhe means of communication.' The Soviet Government has of late been' making _ great efforts to remedy tlieso difficulties, but is hindered by the great dearth of railway materials and locomotives. . . . Within the last six months no fewer than 2500 railway bridges have been restored ... and over 3000 miles of_ railway hayo been repaired; but •ailway material is not procumblo in Russia, and without it the rich produce of Siberia—wheat, leather, . hemp, fats, and minerals—cannot be transported. If this is i anything like an accurate presentation of the facts it will be no _ easy r matter to re-establish a satisfactory basis of trade with Russia even if her co-operative associations have been able in great part to maintain .their organisation. An energetic attack upon all difficulties standing in the way is warranted, however, not only in the interests of general economic restorabut in tho hope that trading relations with the outer world will do something to stimulate the progress of internal regeneration in Russia. One objection that has been raised to resuming trade relations with Russia is that the Bolsheviki would thus be afforded additional scope for mischievous propaganda. It is doubtful, however, whether they could enlarge seriously upon what they arc already "attempting in this direction, and it seems highly probable that the best antidote to their propaganda, would be found in throwing all possible light upon their internal .administration and tho conditions it has created. What these conditions arc is disclosed not only in the stories of refugees, but in official Bolshevik utterances, notably in a circular letter concerning the militarisation of labour which was addressed recently to all branches of the Russian Communist Party by its central , committee. This document declares that the "monster of economic disorganisation now strangling our country" cannot_ be overcome "without iron discipline, without compulsion, and without certain self-imposed limitations." If, it is added, "we hesitate for a jsinglc moment as to the necessity of establishing labour conscription, and of militarising labour (in the beginning at least in the form of labour armies) . . . the cause of communist reconstruction will be gravely menaccd." Another passage states that "the Party of tho Proletariat" understands tho distrust in which the old bourgeois experts aro held by tho workmen who "know them as their exploiters and oppressors in the days of the Tsar." "But," it continues, "the Party of the Proletariat knows equally woll that it is impossible successfully to build the system of communism unless all the ' efficient elements of the scientific and technical professions inherited by us*

from the bourgeois system arc employed in that work. . . . Everybody who doubts the necessity of enlisting the specialists for our work declares war on our party programme." The circular letter is interesting also in its refusal to recognise as valid the principle of freedom of labour, or "the vague opposition to the growing centralisation in t.ho sphere of industrial management," but what has been may stand as an addition to the cvidenco already in hand that there is little enough in the political and economic condition of Russia to arouse the emulation of the proletariat even in countries which, in comparison with those inhabited by people of British stock, are backward. A dictatorship which is doing its utmost to impose a grindmg tyranny on tho working masses, and even so is driven to confess itself incapable of constructive achievement except through the agency of those elements in the social system it has done its best to destroy, is abovo all things an example of, what to avoid. From this standpoint nothing but good should result from bringing Soviet activities under the searchlight of publicity. At the same time it is reasonable to hope that open trade with the outer world will do something, if only gradually, to reinvigoratc the Russian masses and'enable them to develop a mind of their own. In spite of the collapse of anti-Bolshevik revolts there is convincing evidence that the active supporters of the Soviet regime represent a very small minority of the total population. The vast majority of the people are probably in a condition akin to that of tho Ukrainian peasants who, on being asked whether they would rather belong to Poland or the Ukrainian Republic, replied, "Give us boots." Though it is at present faring well, it is doubtful whether the Polish campaign will do much more than earlier anti-Bolshevik enterprises to promote sound political and economic conditions in Russia. In the narrow limits that are set, a trading policy which may in Borne degree help the Russian masses to improve their lot commends itself despite the fact that it entails some recognition fo:i the time being of an irresoonsible tyranny founded on murder and outrage.