The Dominion SATURDAY, APRIL 27, 1918. UNITY OF COMMAND

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 187, 27 April 1918, Page 6

The Dominion SATURDAY, APRIL 27, 1918. UNITY OF COMMAND

One result of the embittered controversy .which arose in Great. Britain prior to and in connection with the retirement ofSiR Williau llobertsok from- the.post of Chief of the' Imperial General Staff was to'.-largely.' divert attention from the main'question .at stake and to concentrate it upon questions so far subsidiary that they may fairly bo called side issues; Prior--to thfl public disclosure in England of the. fact that the Versailles Council had . been invested -with-.executive authority, Colonel Ekpington and other critics of the Government relied principally upon a. charge that politicians were intriguing to narrow the functions of the British High Command, notably by transferring the control ofereserves to a central authority. Much 'emphasis was laid upon an alleged injustice to the British military chiefs, and little attention was paid, at all events by the critics in question, to the essential merits or demerits of the vitally important development in Allied military organisation to which the' variation in the'status of the British High Command (in common with-that of corresponding authorities in other Allied countries) was •incidental. The impassioned: defenders of Sir William Robertson and.Sir..Douglas Haig maintained in effect'that the separate.and supreme- authority of the British High Command over the Imperial armies must he preserved intact, and must on no account be modified for any reason whatsoever. This attitude, chiefly remarkable for insular prejudice, has not been supported by any convincing evidence or argument; and while the institution of a united Allied command must bo finally tested by time and events, there does not seem at present any .reason to doubt that the Allied political and military authorities who co-operated in creating the new organisation wore right,' and that the British critics who sought in this matter to arrest the wheels of progress were wrong. While the futile controversy over\ the treatment of our commanders Vas. in full progress, impartial authorities like Lord Sydenham were pointing out that proper co-ordination of the operations in the Western theatre' could be attained in no other way than by .'the creation of a central authority, and that to meet such an attack as t-ho Germans were preparing under any other scheme of organisation would be to inivtc disaster. . . . ■

•No serious attempt seems to have been made to directly rebut these contentions, and it is so much more a matter of congratulation that the Allies are unreservedly committed to an arrangement under which their armies have become virtually a single united force. Tho fact that the appointment of General Foch as Generalissimo was not announced until the German offensive was in full swing may have givenrise to some misconceptions in regard to the Allied decision in this matter and what it involves. It might be supposed, for instance, thiat the Allies, by their decision, created an entirely new situation so far as the control of their forces was concerned. Such a view would be misleading. There is no doubt that the Allies made the arrangement for a unified command deliberately and with due forethought, and that it had taken definite shape long before the. German offensive was launched. It is true that they had not then'committed themselves to tho appointment of a Generalissimo, but all tho plans for a unified command had been made. Evidence on the point first came to light in England when Colonel Hupington and the editor of the Muniini/ Post were tried on a charge of publishing information useful to the enemy, but the revelations at tho trial wore no more than a recapitulation of statements published many weeks previously in various European countries, including Germany. At the trial prominence was given to extracts from, articles, published in Continental uewsnapers early in February, which stated, amongst other things, that the Allies were engaged in forming a manoeuvring or reserve- army which would be composed of troops of all the Allied Powvs, including the United .States. The Italian Stftmpn, in dealing with the matter, remarked that "the French Press dwells with special emphasis on the energy of General Foch, so that it may be taken for granted that he will be the commander of future operations." The. new turn given to the Allied organisation and to the Western campaign was outlined with remarkable prevision in an article contributed to the New York Evcuinu I'nnt by its military critic on March 12, more than a week before the Germans opened their of-

fensive. Ho pictured conditions in which the Allies would meet .1 powerful German onslaught in their existing formations, but with a great reserve army "keeping goal" behind them. The reserve army •would in the first place play a defensive role, stopping any breaches the enemy might contrive to make in the line. But, the critic added, it was by no means certain that the nflw Allied plans called only for the defensive. The idea of an army of manoeuvre was an essential part of French strategic theory.

It was witTi two armies of manoeuvre (ho continued) that JolTro.won the brittle of the Marne. ITe threw Manoury's army against Yon Kluek's flank when (lie latter had exposed himself in ins rapid swing away from. Paris, and. .ho threw n second army against the German centre when Kluck's retort to Manoury opened up a hole around ].a I'ere Champenoise. Jt v.ns Toch who commanded this second army of. manoeuvre which. Wasted, the Gerniim hopes on the Manic, and w;e can understand how to L-'oeli would commend itself the idea of a vastly magnified, manoeuvring; army under cireiiinstnncps analogous to the kittle of the Marne; that is to say, for guarding against any break in a defensive lino from the North Pea to the Adriatic and for taking advantage of any opportunity which offered for.a great counter-stroke. That the Allies had elected to meet the enemy onslaught \\\ relatively light force while holding a considerable part of their strength in reserve became plain, almost in the first days of the struggle which is now well advanced in its fifth week. But.the evidence which has been touched upon was needed to show the real magnitude of the Allied plan and the vast pooling of resources .upon which it is based. It counts for-much and very greatly improves the outlook that before General Foch was formally '■ appointed as Generalissimo the organisation of the Allied armies as a united force, backed by one great reserve army, was already far advanced. It is clearly established that the Allies pooled their armies under a single command not in sudden concession to an emergency, but because they concluded in their joint deliberations that by this plan they would best meet and defeat the German offensive and carry the war to a successful conclusion. Matters being so ordered, we are amply justified in believing that the enemy has made no such progress towards his .foal as his progress on the map would in itself imply. His apparent success and the dangers his offensive has, created are alike heavily discounted by the fact that the Allies have deliberately elected to engage him. in an exhausting battle, while themselves holding a great army in reserve under-such conditions that it/can be thrown instantly into the scale when an emergency or an opportunity appears.