The Dominion. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1914. CALAIS—AND THEN ?

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2294, 30 October 1914, Page 4

The Dominion. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1914. CALAIS—AND THEN ?

What would happen if the Germans should capture Calais 'I The Kaiser has issued peremptory orders to his troops to seize this French seaport at all costs, and people are naturally wondering why he has Set his heart so strongly on this particular project. It is a comparatively easy matter for the Kaiser to tell his armies to do this or that —to'capture Calais, to take possession of Paris, or oven to sack London;'but tho Allied ' troops and the British Navy do not take their orders from Berlin. The Germans have already paid a great price for the discovery that it is a far' longer way to Paris than they were led to believe, and they are now finding out that they will have to make even heavier sacrifices if they persist in their' attempt to march on Calais. Judging by present appearances they are not likely to get there, but even if they should attain their object it is very doubtful if the advantages secured' would be worth the cost.. One German military authority is reported to have stated that tho Germans intend to utilise Calais as a base for torpedo craft and submarines and to use 17-inch howitzers and rows of mines to protect the place from attack by sea. They would also scatter mines to Portsmouth and into the North Sea. However much or littlo truth there may be in this story, it is clear enough that the taking of Calais is part of tho Kaiser's plan for intimidating Britain. Tho British public should be getting quite accustomed to wild threats of Zeppelin raids, unexpected naval attacks, and sudden invasions. They are well aware that tho unexpected may at any time happen in war; but they also know'that eve'ry precaution is being taken to frustrate the machinations of, the enemy, and- show no signs of being intimidated by the threats held over them. The description—made in Germany—of the enemy's new gun, 68 feet long with a range of 27 miles, is not going to strike terror into their hearts, nor would they bo thrown into a state of panic evon if the Kaiser's troops should march into Calais.

It is of course quite obvious that Britain's safety would be seriously endangered if the Germans should ever become the permanent possessors of the coast from Antwerp to Calais, for they might then establish impregnable naval bases which would be a constant menace, But the necessary works could hot be completed in a month or a year, and could hardly be commenced in the middle of a great war. The question of immediate interest is whether Germany could make use of Calais, for instance, in order to strike • an effective blow at England at the present time or in the near .future. Some people seem to think that great guns could be mounted in positions from which they might destroy passing vessels, and that submarines and destroyers could be sent out to play havoc' with British shipping in the Channel., It should, however, be borne in mind that the range and power of even the best modern guns are'not unlimited, nor-has perfect accuracy yet been attained, in spite of all the help _ that gunnery has received from science and invention. It is extremely difficult to hit vessels at long and unknown ranges, travelling at unknown speeds ancl free to alter their speed and course at any moment. After discussing various aspects of this problem the naval correspondent of the Westminster Gazette expresses the conviction that_ the danger' of the French coast being used as an artillery base for bombarding ships in the Channel is "purely chimerical." As regards submarines and torpedoboats the first problem would be to get them, say, from Kiel to Calais. In spite of the vigilanoo of the British Fleet it is conceivable that the difficulty might bo overcome in the dark, or in thick weather; but the risk would be very great. The authority already, referred to is of opinion that if Germany were to .send a 1 flotilla of destroyers to a base in which they could have no supporting force behind them "their position would be much the same as that of a few desperadoes in a back street." They mighfc commit a few isolated acts of aggression, but they would swiftly come to the end of their resources, and bo overwhelmed. This view of the matter may. be un.Aul* cuj.timietic, for the .Germans

have proved thomsolves to bo a daring and resourceful enemy; but the progress of tho war has shown that our own seamen are more than able to hold their own in all tho arts and wiles of naval strategy, and that their skill and bravery are more than a match for their adversaries. It should also be remembered that however plausible theso plots and plans for invading or crippling England may look oil paper, the difficulties of putting them into actual operation are enormous. The great .Napoleon found that the obstacles were insuperable, and nothing has so far happened to justify tho belief that Kaiser William II is at all likely to succeed where Napoleon failed.