A MODEL FOR ALL TIME

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1068, 6 March 1911, Page 6

A MODEL FOR ALL TIME

ITS ANNIVERSARY. THE BATTLE OP "BIT BY BIT.". r% Gyro.] Last week and the week before was tlio eleventh anniversary of the intricate series of movements which are known collectively as the battle of rioters. It is the only Ilritish battle which is accented in the Continental test books as a model, and is often therein referred to as "Britain's only battle." The menninK is not so derogatory as niieht be supposed. What is implied is that no English ecncral for nearly ICO years has been compelled to manoeuvre to much in the course of battle. It is, in fact, doubtful if anything like it has happened in the world's history. The followine is an attempt to present the "science" side of it in newspaper form. Slack Water and Dejection, The plan on this page? Does it look intricate? Perhaps. But if it puzzles the reader who, at least can plainly eeo (lie zig-zag lines of trenches—the Colenso position in front and tlio curving Pieters position behind it—how much ruoro must it have puzzled poor Buller! Through his telescope, the haze-hung hills, over which Death was at all times ready to wave his blue mesmeric hands, looked as quiet, and as softly vague as the hills on u Christmas picture-card. What was the key to it all? Where was the much-de-

sired flank? To tho west there seemed to bo no hope at all. To the east the landscape was swallowed up in scrub denser than our own manuka—scrub and rolling wilderness. Few generals have ever bad such a riddle thrust before them. And it is quite certain, though it seems a sweeping thing to say, that no general in the world's history has ever carried out such an intricate series of battle manoeuvres as Bullcr did in forcing the Colcnso and rioters positions. Tho Battle of Bit by Bit, as one might christen it, is a model that will live for ever.

But it was a poor, dejected Buller that set the army in motion. It is now known that, had this movement failed, it would have been the last that he would ever have been allowed to make, for bis superiors wero tiring of the way in which, so far, tho army in Natal had'been handled.

Of his last look through his telescope, and what it told him, he never said anything. All that the staff knew was that he lay for two hours in the grass on a little hill not far from the Chieveley camp, and gazed. Whether, two days later, tho army was moved in pursuance of a set plan, or merely by guesswork, is something which we shall never know now. But. as has been stated, the fourteen days' manoeuvring, and eight days of confused but fierco fighting, were wonderful in tho eyes of all who saw it, aud it still makes a wonderful anniversary story. The Tide Begins to Run. It began with tho Cingolo Hill. Sixtysix guns, including a proportion of howitzers, were sent eastward, and ranged in concentric arcs in the scrub. At the signal they opened on Cingolo, pounded it and scalped it, and the Beers who saw tho great leisurely bombs of the howitzers Hopping down'from heaven upon their very heads, resolved to quit Cingolo and return to it again when the storm was past.

Alas for Boer prescience! Whilo the just and lawful owners of tho Cingolo Hill were away temporarily, the guns were switched off as if by magic, and "Tommy Atkins," plugging and tearing forward through the wilderness of bush, mounted the hill and seized it. What to do next? Nobody had any idea, for though Cingolo was the key to tho whole thing, that fact was not at once suspected.

But the brigadiers, sorely out of breath as was natural in the case of corpulent gentlemen of easy habits in life, reformed the men, and wheeled to the west. That way lay a mile or two of trenches, running from Cingolo to the Green Hill. The Boers were soon shot out of that, and "Tommy," followed as swiftly as might be by his puffing brigadiers, mounted tho Green Hill. Once more it was correctly determined to wheel to the west, for, just as- Cingolo was the key to tho Green Hill, so, in turn, the latter was the l;ev to the Hlangwani Hill, and it fell too. From here the village of Colenso was eniiladed, and thus, in the coarse of a day or two, those terrible Boers had been'hustlod out of six miles of trenches— the whole of tho "Colenso position," in fact.

The Tide Dammed Back. Tho trouble, however, was only beginning. To bo sure no ono knew that such a thing as the Pieters position existed, for the maps were dreadful, and the Intelligence not brilliant, although Intelligence officers, all weaving the cock-sure look which marks the officer caste tho world over, were plentiful enough.

But when the army was gradually got up on to flic Hlangwani ridge, and the Irish regiments (none better in the world!) wero passed up fo ike head of tho columns, no one needed to bo told that a wild time was coming, and (hat Death would soon be tho chief actor on that crowded stage.

It is no doubt usually supposed that our generals are very silent, profound fellows, all agreed among themselves as to what the moves in the game are. Unfortunately, the reverse is the case. There is very little unanimity among tho Napoleons of England. Each is a "law unto himself," and it may be news to stato that, between tho English and Indian generals, there was at one time (and bo yet) very shnrp differences of opinion. The Indian Army has generally stuck more or loss by "the book," which is (lie accumulated wisdom of the ages, while the Home Army for at least (he "AVolseley school," of which Duller was one) made some sort of attempt to throw "the book" to the wind.

Now "the book" is exceedingly insistent on one thing—on keening out of (lie reentrants (the valleys) and slicking to the salients (the ridges). In pursuance of Home methods, Duller now turned a deaf ear on all this, built a pontoon bridge at A, brought the men down oft' the Iflangwani plateau, and committed them to an abominable re-entrant—the "low kopjes" (see plan) in the Tugcla Vallev. The sufferings of 'Jio Irishmen there must have been terrible. 'Millions of bullets were Hying, and there was no room, in that cramped giillcy, lo deploy a proper front of battle. But one good nnr-po<-e was served—the night firing lit" up the whole Pieters position, and showed Hie general, plainly enough, that he was on the wrong track. And he was quick to erase the hint (hat had fallen on his masterpiece battle. The men were brought hack, over, the liier on to the Hlaiissrani

platoaii, tlio artillery was run np on to tlio northern tin of the Monlo Christo ridge, and tho bridge A dismantled. The Flood Bursts Through. Slowly tho engineers got their boats and punts up to 11. They were warped out into the river and anchored. The road-bearers wcra laid on, tho chesses on to]) of them, and the ribands placed h> position and racked down. Then tho irishmen and others crossed once more —straight against the hills in tho Pieters position marked I, 11, and 111. What followed is perhaps the most interesting part, and territorial officers will no doubt find it illuminating. Duller was determined that this time at least those Boers who shot at his Irishmen should do so at their own risk, and so every gun on Monte Christo, and thousands of rifles as well, woro turned on the Jlill I. The Boers found that (hey could not so much as lift their heads above their basalt shelters, for tho head that was up one instant was down tho next, and the poor mouth frozen for ever in a stiff immovable gape. It was tho celebrated cabbage patch of Sedan all over again. Under cover of this tho troops across tho river rushed the crest. . . . Some wild work with tho bayonet and the hill was theirs. What followed need hardly 1» stated. It was ' tho seriueneo of Cingolo—Green Hill—Hlangwani again. Tho guns on Monte Christo turned successively on Hill II and Hill 111. and successively they were rushed. Tho very last incident was the spectacle of a Boer, ill a brown jersey, standing atop of his burrow and shaking his fist. Then he disappeared (as it in tho middle of the burst of a 501b. lyddite shell. Thus ended the intricate Battlo of Bit by Bit. Tho Engineers went down to

their bridge, and put up on a post a little signboard bearing just two words—"To Ladysmith."

The most wonderful pnrt of it all was the uso of the vast blizzard of unaimed rifle fire which covered the onslaught on the Hill I. It is the trump card in Continental tactics, but the importance of it is not yet quite realised either in English or colonial training. However, it will no doubt como in time.