DEFENCE NOTES.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 282, 22 August 1908, Page 9

DEFENCE NOTES.

(By Echelon.) THE ATTACK ON WELLINGTON. EASTER 1908. PART IV. THE CARRISOM ARTILLERY. (Criticism by Captain G. S. Richardson.) Tho objects of tlio manoeuvres wero: —(1) To test tho ability of tho garrison to repel probable forms of attack by a raiding force; (2) to test the local scheme of defence; (3) to carry out night-firing. As will bo seen by tho preliminary instructions, the scheme was arranged so as to introduce, as far as tho local conditions would permit, of as much reality into tho proceedings as possible. In previous years, the examination service has not been thoroughly carried out, and although night attacks havo been made, they have not been conducted with service ammunition, and consoquetly many valuable lessons have been lost. On this occasion, however, thero was an almost entire absenco of pretension, and service conditions wero observed as closely as possible. Tho attendance was only 65 per cent, of tho total. This was very unsatisfactory as compared with the musters recorded at the annual training camps, when nearly 100 per cent, was tho average attendance in this district. From reports that I have received from O.C. units I understand that if future Easter camps are to be conducted in as practical a manner as this one was, there will be no difficulty wbatovor in getting full attendances. Mobilisation. — Tho mobilisation of tho Division was not satisfactory. There were too few men to man all the works. .The R.N.Z.A. men were detailed for other duty; only 60 per cent, of the strengths of Nos. 1 and 2, G.A.V. Companies mobilised; while No. 3 Company had more than sufficient men. There were no officers other than the medical officers on the divisional staff, with the result that an officer of the R.N.Z.A. was detailed as staff officer to practically perform adjutant's duty. This would not stand tho test of war, nor was it satisfactory during the manoeuvres, as tho R.N.Z.A. officers cannot be spared from their own technical duties. The Wellington G.A.V. Divisional Staff requires organising before the next manoeuvres or mobilisation test.

Manning Details. — There were plenty of men to man tho most important works with one relief, but an attempt was raade to divide the details into two reliefs, and this resulted in tho detachments being weakened. It is very necessary to have two reliefs for C.B. guns, .but not essential for "6" and "6" B.L. guns on H.P. mountings. With the latter tjTpo of gun, 0110 relief plus 50 per cent, spare men should suffico. It would have been far better had one complete relief been told off with a full supply of ammunition, details, etc., instead of two weak reliefs. One important lesson learnt from the manoeuvres is the necessity for a stronger force of garrison artillery. In some cases companies were allotted too big a task, and could not supply tho men for all their guns. No volunteer company should bo allotted moro guns on mobilisation than it can supply details for, as under:—

D.R.F. Instruments, 2 reliefs; signallers/ 8; B.L. guns, one relief, plus 50 per cent, spare men; heavy and light Q.F., 2 reliefs, including full ammunition supply, plus 25 per cent, to allow for casualties, etc. During the carup thero was some very bad weather, but service conditions wero observed throughout, and men were kept on look out duty continually; the Q.F. detachments remained' closo to their guns ready for emergency —some men were not supplied with overcoats, and had to borrow from their comrades. Tho ammunition supply detail was in no case complete. Insufficient importance was apparently attached to this subject. On tho first night, recesses were not filled, nor shells fused as they should have been;, gun groups were consequently uot prepared for maintaining a high rate of fire for any length of time. vSignalling by lamps was satisfactory, when signallers took caro ro the trimming burning of their lamps. Being on duty from dark till dawn, signallers, when required to send or reccive messages, forgot to look to the condition of their lamps, which might have been burning for hours, and therefore not in good condition, the result being unsatisfactory signalling. The necessity for frequent signalling by night with some tactical object was clearly shown; every quarter at least, the whole of the works should be manned by night by the district signallers, and tactical schemes rehearsed. Telephones.—Telephones were not entirely satisfactory from tho following causes:— (1) The wet weather, which no doubt caused considerable leakage and short circuiting; (2) Absence of properly trained operators. For years it has been pointed out that nono but signallers or well-trained men should be employed as telephone operators, but one still sees a recruit, or a young bugler detailed for this import-ant duty, and sometimes men whoso dialcct renders tho correct transmission of messages impossible. Thero was absolutely no communication between tho Firo Commander and his section commander, in fact, ho did not know who his section commander was. This was a very serious matter, and one-which would causo disaster in war.

Co-operation between Infantry and Artillery ' Forces.—There was absolutely no co-operation < between tho infantry and. tho artillery forces. A small force of infantry had been detailed for tho protection of the batteries, etc. This forco received no orders from the officer commanding tho troops, and its disposition and duties were left entirely to tho Fire Commandor, who was fully occupied in fighting his guns. Tho necessity tor combined tactical schemes, whereby all arms can learn to co-operatc and assist each other is therefore apparent.

Electric Lights.— The lights were usod_ as fighting lights, and although some oxccilent practice was carried out, tho actical uso of the lights was not good. A high rate of fire is impossible at night, with concentrated beams used as fighting lights, as the traversing of tho light is dependent upon thrco persons, and therefore not regular. A traversing motor is very necessary where dispersed beams aro not used. If tho traversing is not regular a gunlayer is unablo t-o follow the 'target properly. Night Firing.—Tho night firing was a pronounced success. It revealed many dofects, most of which, however, can bo remedied. Tho fire discipline, wais good, excepting at night practice, when there was a tendency shown by tho battery commanders to interfere unnecessarily with tho gun group commanders.

Look Outs. —Look out duties woro divided up as much as possible in order to give all men an opportunity to carry out this im-port-ant duty. A- very large number of the men, however, knew but little of tho work. I recommend that squads bo taken during tho year at tho weekly drills, and specially trained in tho same way that men are trained for guard and sentry duties. The catechisms on this subject in tho gunners' " Questions and Answers " book could be enlarged with advantage. Twelve - pounder Quick Firers. — Errors of tho day rounds woro not fired, and tido tables wero not kept available for use; this result in raugo being necessary after a target appeared. . Reliefs—Reliefs wero on duty for twelvo hours, and in some cases kept unnecessarily closo to tho guns. The question as to whether detachments should remain m closo proximity to tho guns or bo allowed to go to their tents and sleep in comfort is entirely governed by the position of the battery with referonco to tho harbour entrance, and tho lon"th of timo it would take a torpedo boat to got within rango after being discovered by the search lights, or after passing through tho outer sentry beam. Detachments at tho outer defences must always bo kept quito closo to their guns, but it is quito unnecessary to observo tho samo precautions for tho inner defences. ' There wero several casualties to dials and communications during-the four days; this points to tho necessity of thorough training in fire discipline and rehearsal of service conditions such as are Jikoly to occur in , action, at ordinary drills. ;

Battle Practice—Nearly tlio wholo of the battle practice was carried out by night, and and whilo excellent results were obtained as regards accuracy, the experience gained goes to show that night manning and night practices should be carried out more frequently. It would be advisable to have the whole of the defences manned four times per year (independent of tho training camps and manoeuvres) viz., onco per quarter. Tho following are tho results (marks per cent.) _ of tho battle practice of tho Wellington Division:—

i • si, 6pr. 12pr. Gin. .2 Q.F. Q.F. B.L. H ft R.N.Z.A. ... _ 80 - 80 90.170 No. 2 Co. G.A.V. 70 — 90 80 83.165 No. 1. Co. G.A.V. 75 70 100 82 70.152 The best records wore as under:— „„ No 1 Co - 2-6 13.L. guns—7 hits, 4min. oOsec. No. 2. Co. 2-6 B.L. guns—9 hits, 6min. 30sec. No. 3 Company is composed of engine drivers and electricians for electric lighting, with the aid of the R.N.Z.A. men. It did oiccllont work during the camp in running the lights, which wero worked from' dark to dawn for the whole period without any hitch or casualty. The signallers of this company were, however, not sufficiently trained to be of uso during the manoeuvres. In conclusion, I would emphasise the importance of tho training carried out during tho manoeuvres, and the necessity for similar manoeuvres to be carried out every year at Easter; but if we are. to get the utmost value out of these coast defence manoeuvres, tho following must receive special consideration:— . (1) Arrangements for co-operation, to a greater extent than formerly, between H.M. ships and the land forces. (2) The necessity for all artillery officers on tho unattached list mobilising and having allotted to them definite duties in the defence scheme. (3) Organisation and mobilisation of all artillery reserves, to permit of the complete manning of every portion of the defences, thus enabling reservists to be kept in training. (4) Moro training in night-firing to be. carried out at intervals throughout the .year, instead of concentrating all night firing practice into a four days' mobilisation "period at Easter. (5) More co-operation between the artillery defence and the infantry garrison; it is only by co-operation that success in war is assured.