THE RULE OF THE ROAD.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 208, 27 May 1908, Page 3

THE RULE OF THE ROAD.

• : —<h—• —— ' MOTOR-CAR v. HORSE. . AN INTERESTING JUDGMENT. A judgment of special interest to motorists was delivered yesterday, by Dr. A; M'Arthur, S.M., in the case of Edward Bloomfield (Mr. D. M. Findlay). v. Inglis Brothers (Mr. Von Haast). Plaintiff ■ claimed . that lie suffered damage from tho n'egligenco of defendant's servant in tho management and driving of defendant's motor-car on tho Queen's Drive, on April 16, whereby the car was driven against plaintiff's horse, which was so injured as to be of no service or value. Plaintiff therefore claimed the sum of £18, alleging further that defendant's servant caused .tho injuries to tho horse by driving at a speed, and in a manner which was dangerous to tho public. Defendants'counterclaimed for £26 4s. on the ground that negligent and unskilful riding and managing of plaintiff's horse forced the horso against the car, 'and consequently damaged the car. As a further cause of action, defendant claimed that tho damage was caused by the rider of the horse riding on tho wrong side of tho road, riding at an excessive speed and. failing to keep a proper look-out for approaching vehicles. When the collision took place- in the early morning defendant's servant was driving the motor-car towards Wellington, having been delivering nowspapers, and servant, who had been delivering milk, was riding a horse in the opposite direction. The accident happened just after the car turned a corner in the road,, and neither driver nor rider'could see each other before turning the corner. The motor-car driver and his companion said the horn was'tooted some sixty yards: before reaching the corner, which was turned at a speed of eight miles an hour, but the horseman heard no horn tooting, neither did a resident who lived just opposite the scene of the collision. His Worship considered . the horn should havo beon sounded closer to the corner than sixty yards. After going into the evidence as to the speed on each side, His Worship remarked that he had ascertained from tho civic authorities that the distance travelled by the ■ motor in sixty-five minutes was twelve miles. Tlie driver stopped at eleven different places en route, and assuming the stoppages to total twenty minutes in all, which was well within the estimates given in evidence, the - car would have travelled twelve niiles in fortyfive minutes, giving an average speed of sixteen miles an hour. Consequently, if the driver slowed down at the corners as he said ho.did, lie must have exceeded sixteen miles on some parts of the journey. In tho opinion of tho Court the driver came rouna the corner at a greater rate'of speed than he stated—in fact, at a speed which was dangerous to. tho public. Tho Motor Regulation Act, 1906, provided that it 'wa an offence to drive a car recklessly or-negligently or at a speed, or in a manner, dangerous to the public, having regard to all 'the circumstances of tho ■ case, including tho nature, condition,, and use of tho highway and the amount of traffic which actually is at the time oi" which' might reasonably 'be expected to be on the highway. The circumstances to be considered would bo such as width of road, number of side roads, arid gates opening into tho road, ' frequency of traffic, straightness or otherwise of the road, time of driving, ' and - sometimes "tho ' state of the weather. If tho road was winding, or ran through a town, Magistrates might, and do, find that, these circumstances, made driving dangorous, oven at so low a speed as, say, eight miles an- hour. Tho words, "which might reasonably bo expected to be on tho highway,";' were . worthy" of : attention." ' A driver was not to assume that no one would bo on . the road."ln the .district'where tho accident took plaeo the inhabitants, mostly working men, wero early risers, aprl thero were also carts about, delivering milk. A driver must hot assume that his course would bo perfectly clear, and must bo specially careful when turning'corners. In., His Worship's, opinion, plaintiff's servant .was;.,on' his wrong side of tho road when'the collision took placo, but lie said that he pulled over there when the car came round tho corner,, as, if ho had/pulled over to his proper, side, tho injury would have been worse,', and the car would have como under the. horse. • _Non-observance of thojrulo of tho road' at the utmost appeared to bo tho only prima facio evidenco of negligence, and the fact of a person being on his wrong side .would not, justify another in doing liim a ;wanton injury. Though a person might be on his wrong side of.thoroad, if:the road was of . sufficient breadth so that there was full and ample .room for the party to pass, he was bound to take that course' which', would carry him clear of the person who was on his wrong side, and if an injury happened by running against such a person lie-would be answerable. Tho rule of the road' was not' to bo considered inflexible and imperatively governing cases where negligence was in question. Contributory negligence on tho. part of. tho plaintiff afforded a good defence in many cases, and it frequently arose in cases of collision. His Worship did not consider that there was, negligence on the part of plaintiff, but, oven* assuming that there was, he, was of opinion that defendant could, by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, in turning the corner, have avoided the collision and the consequent mischief which happoned. In tho opinion of tho Oourt, thorG wis no want of care on the part of plaintiff, and it i must bo remembered that the burden of proving; the contributory' negligence of the plaintiff _ laid upon defendant. It was not for maintiff to prove as part of his own case that he used due care, but for the defendant to prove that^ plaintiff did not. Judgment would be for plaintiff on both the claim and the counterclaim,' with costs £4 19s.