EASTER MANOEUVRES

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 178, 23 April 1908, Page 4

EASTER MANOEUVRES

IDE OPERATIONS CRITICISES. INTERESTING COMMENTS. >: INTERVIEW. WITH A GENERAL FIELD-] OFFICER 1 :In: our issuo of TuoscLiy last- thoro ap-. ; poarcd; • in our. report', of tho Easter v manoeuvres, a short criticism, ontitlcd, "Tho Artillery: Some/Criticism," in which,whilo. , tho merits, of'-;the pi, th 0..1) Battery generally was .recogniscd,; its ,w'caknQs4 Jtoji • tho-occasion under reviow was commented on. Tho gist of tho articlo was to tho effcct that appnrently;;tlier'/Red'?--Artil]ery ■ • did not succeed in carrying out. a,- swift-and •. advantageous deployment of tho guns at • tho very beginning of, tho 'fight. - Our..correspondent's comments. havo been , taken in. ■■ some quarters:to suggost:the inference..that ■ Captain Petherick was lacking in initiative. No such suggestion was either expressed or implied. The fact was simply stated that the artillery did not properly exerpiso its ' function as a'fighting unit —and, neither it, 1 did. What was not stated, however, ~ w as the reason for tho Battery's inactivity. AN EX-ARTILLERYMAN'S VIEW. r "Ex-Artilleryman," in ..tho , subjoined v; letter,/fputs i veiy- clearly 'tho ■ ' Battery. Ho'says:-—':•-.••• • In your criticism of the artillery, your report conveys the impression to tho --minds, of. the public that tho artillery... ;' .. offiw.rs wore not . alive to ,tho fact that — their-position. was m tho front lino of :■ attack, and that they did not, there- ; . fore,- carry out their part, of . the pro-. " i. . gramme as, an- o?port-would .have done, v;.:';f. I should like to point out that tho officer! commanding tho--artillory-was... . : under, .tho control of the officer com••i / .■/ i mandmg tho forces/ . thoi-. : ( . case, <tho artillery would .bo ordered to • take-up a position,which, in tho opinion ■ ; of the officer. commanding the iorceo, was I'bo'st* suited' for? his'<'defohceV.or?' , alHV'.,;.\ ;fL'r>;tack; . r, i lory aro quite aware, that tho-success of' • defenco is attack, 1 and tho ■ success- of attack is 'the support the artillery can offer the infantry.-The officer-' commanding tho forces receives all. the mforma- ; tion 'as regards of .tho enemy, and his scheme'.- of . operation : . cannot, therefore,' bo upset by the officer, commanding tho artillery , advancing-and v -~ taking up a position • that - he thinks } • ■ most; suitable for his battory ; ho must • take .his orders from his superior, as . the following will show:— The officer commanding artillery, Red Force, received orders that tho Battery ■ ■■■■ was to bo ready to march tiff- at 6'a.m.' on. Saturday, and at that hour was : hooked in and ready. No further or- . , dots wero received for some'hours; when 1 -a further- order. camo that they would ' not be required until -.12 o'clock. At ,;tho timo ordered, the Battery was again .ready-to march off. After again-wait-' c: ing for somo time further orders came -~ to bo in readiness to march, but-noth-ing further was received up, till 'p.rrt J , whon.- the -lofficor'- commanding.. ■ . lory -ordered jhis Battqryc back 'to* camp Sri \ (they wore on the road:ready to march). So .much for Saturday (the rainy day) ; Tho orders .received .for Sunday.i-wcro:'-'-5•" to-turn..out 4.15. a.m.. and-.take up aposition- at. the foot of Totara Ridge, -half a-mile from camp, by 6 am At ■ the hour ordered the-battery was.therew-;, . It -w-as 2 p.m. before further orders were ■ ; received, when word came, along to take up a position, on tho Ridgo and come into action, : . This was done, a*nd a few v- rounds were fired off; ' Thoy wero then ordered, to return-to camp. On Monday ' < ' ig;;;, prders- camo' to'"advance;to . the . front line '.' , . of attack, 'and;.they:Wre on tlio march 1 ; ' at G «a.m., but before the first miio of ' v the march ■ was covered, catno tq 1 return 'td' Totara' Ridge Thu was done, •and'the battery again came into action. ■ < ..This is 'not a- on the officer i " . commanding the, forces. . • He, is.. play-.- ' . . ■' ing. ; the game, and s '.where'.he wnnts 'them, but rtrnst;it..wi]l.: clear the impression your report conveya that,'.thovartillory vdid not *khow : . tneir position.". _ : ; ' ■ AN .ARTILLERY OFFICER'S OPINION. • i •. "The wholo point can:bo summed up m a 1 «nglo sentence,"; obsorved an artillery ' officer to a representatives of'Tiibt Dominion: 1 • " There, should have been an artillery officer ] ; : ; on'-.the" brigade staff.For : thojgreater ;piirfc: * of the time the Red artillery' was kept'in : We ; '' ; dark.both as to the movements of the encmv and also tho dispositions of tho Red forces." A C E N E R A L FIE L D 0 F FID E R 'S VIE V: B.' ' THE LITTLE RAID \ : ' A' general*' field.: officer', was: 'in,ten;icwe<l; by, : . ; . a . Dominion.' .reporter, yesterday -with - refer-; ; • enco to two points:— . : ' i (1) The Dominion's . criticism.-of : the field- U artillery. • - • (2) .As. to-wliether thire.was any real'dilfor- "> .j.yenco-of. competent military'fiDpirpoii'aboutrthe- t -.'..non-auccoss of the V raid"' which ■ was" sup- t posed, to havo captured " tho City of Wei- 1 . lington.. . - 'i -Your report - on bothVhiatiers;" osaid tie i officer in .question,-. 11 hit tho nail on the head I .. .exactly, and .1 can tell you' that it lias ex- i .citcd very favourablo coinmont from most of ( :, :i :-US.- ■ - ". : Let us take:.tl|e;;fuhny; }i : Your report, all along, took - tlio --.view,'. r. that;those people f« , v sense. But' now ';1 "... ground.' . .-They say ; ;'{sj^¥(S. ; and wo wore aftei |jlili^d.^^:®e^ .. so. -Do they.^^.st-op.:t6^consider '(i "Vapproaching a :siece.',;of<"bhfceßb 'iir ? 'a'Hrap iss -'i also a raider after. 'IkxrEy?But when the. i trap, hac killed tlio mouse booty becoincs a yory. indeed. Dead i .y raiders', cannot carry "off booty, ..-and : booty,. : i - ceases to bo booty when, it eanhofc lxi ; carried ■( oil. It has been said, too^.ithat.theijbi jj<jo'ple »1 . might have dono much damage to ftho 'sliV. 'i ; ping ; , : the lied . Foroo came back on ( : them.This is .almost- v sis• ludicrons 'as tho 'i • booty' argument. In tiio event qf real v/ar, f / and had there , been the slightest chance of i any body;, of. troops,; trajpped or .1 ■ . getting through into.'tho city, every steamer' 1 • ; at the wharf would ■ havo /been lying' witlr 'i . ; :ffteam up, ,; and "every . sailing . vessel.-,'would " < '. have had its arrangbmen'ts for towing/ At the first sig'ti of danger (and;.it would have i V- been..tho"iirst .care■.of the Defence, head-,. • . quarters to ,have notified -tho harbcur autho-' "I . nties) all would havo .moved- outs -into-the- ■! stream; • • ; •■■■rr':- - -- ■; - " It'has also b'e«n:: st-fed: ; if.ftOO'm.en' 5 ■ could: got..-.through.' -tlio"-lines - unobserved, ( 30,000 men: inight; havo; done /tho -san:e thing. •■- , It is not an,-argument .that Jogicallv.' ~ but, in any casej; bveti - the j-nicl the.. 3QO. = ■ ..was known to-Liout.-Colcnel.D'uthio,..and ho could have ciit ,thorn':ofri it Kaiwarra^htf<r'lio- ; - : . boon so minded.. But ho ,know-hotter i he ;-T Played the game.'lf .they' Wer&' bsiit on self-'' .■-. destruction it, clearly, wasn't his to- • - stop them." In fact, tliero .is-not. ctlo a-rgu- - i - ; ment for "the ; success of tlio raid, which could , i .V .not bo.knreltcd tp-,pieces iiftliroa sentonces,. 1 - :Tho>whole thing e'arric-a with. itVa-certain i -clomeni' of sadness; .because' tho. fact that "l -■ ;sonie favour'the', view..; t-liat: tlio'. raid - was a ] ~, successiai'gues an 'astonishing, want of uiili- .< ' Vtary'education. ! ,Tho. attackers had not s . .. captured.--.Wellington;", but, they, ".had, dono 1 . . something miich more serious: -they; had 1 .. .'mado the mistako-rlaid.down in all tho ixiolcs i , ~ --of di viding. thejr, force, in"'tho!'prcsenco of < i,t> an ac.tivo'6nemy..' It; was .;tbisvrcryoraistak«r ] ■V; which enabled both'.'Napoleon- aud .'Storiowall >i ' Jackson to -assert thb"whip hand over their I .. opponents time and timo again...'.Our.-officers, .-.j • are supposed to bo rc-ading ' Jackson's Valley i •- Campaign,' by Colonel. .Henderson. ,Why- ' . don't they, learn .to apjiljr ill precfiifio tho .'very. '] : lessons which that book inculcates? 1 ; Th'oro is! ) only one side to tlio-wholo question:' Colonel 1 - Robin's viow, which, has already appeafa<d in- I The Dominion. 1 t : THE BATTERY;, THAT; DIDN'T. J- " Your criticism of the lied artillory; was ' . ' thoroughly sound, and' all tlio sounder bo- j cause yon'-did not attempt to indicate j , whothor tho rcaponsibility lay with the com-r. j inander of tho battery or tho'-comniaJidor of : 1 ■; tho brigade. ;I think you will find that there I was a want of intimate touch between-the 1

■baftisry .foommandca's, and for cburso, Gfotlih Petherick is not to SM*-'. t'i %: • ■' It is'to discover,.and rectify such weak links in tho chain that manoeuvres have their very raison d'etre, and if. tlio' manoouvres hnyo tiiiiglit\iio other lesson they have taught"this'' one.''Next year you may bo sure that the connection between brigade . and..'.battoiy,,commandoKs.: will bp of a .more is not trno that an artillery commander is tied hand and foot to headquarters, and must wait till definite ortltSrs; come. _ If '.the artillery- commanders m South Africa had always waited for tho ■column com'munders to'giro tho word to open firo, things would .havo oft-en been disastrous ;i.,Thero is, I may say, an • Sotion that tho- artillerist should [generally tfait forjjtho orders of the general commander, but tins is based ;on somo mi - oonceptions, whicly.'.aro too intricate to enter - ■into ,hero. At the first deployment it may sometimes be wise" for tho artillery of the defence not to disclose its position prematurely, and this, 'may hare influenced .Atho Reds commander during the' I think that two things .ar'o.;cl<2jif about of the _ Red artillery 1 'lire 'on- Sunday*:—; .-j'i " (1) Tho battery commander did not got ; orders..:'...'.:*; - ••" (2) The.' officer' commanding tho < Reds should have sent those'orders, because, long befor;o,they, did open fire, there wer-o,targets yisible" from theiri.front' large enough to intitb' successful artillery action; : ." A ! regrettable?.' feature about tho man-, oeuv'res' also was ithat, owing to this hitch, tho mobility of tlyo Red artillery was not : snitably ;i teßted. i : could give- at least one occasion, where tl«s had a splendid opportunity to jiush. forward ' at top,' but did not move; ' , I '. "There is; nothing in the argument that shortness'of ammunition caused the late action; oftho.artillery on Sunday, :or that am-', immitionle-ss guns' Scan get credit from umpires for merely . laying on targets without firing.. , The is .entitled to hear a rewould be'very wonderful things .indeed.,. . ;.. . . ' " Tlio whole"; country -on; which: tho man-' was .essentially infantiyv(no^'fflbnn^)^&n^,''andvtliat'..'was all the more reason why the artillery should havo. given tlio infantry early and constant support.:.-1 may mention, 'as a pleasant yari4ti'on'to:tliis above," thai"when the Red force knoeked .at r thoi Bluo .back door on Monday morning, 7 lieutenant. "Glendiniihig had his two guSs'ih a'ctibiV'.infthe really astonishing time of !2 J minutes,. ; and the mounted men iivth'e sa'iiio forfce were'in'the saddle.and gallop.ing -upftbe,road, ill JO minuteq.' That, I Wiougli't, was very cleVbr indeed!" / , WHAT AHjOLD SOLDIER THIWKS. v-.-Ai-correspondent.'''.who. signs l himself "Old Soldier," thus discusses tho much-debated " capture "'•.o'f.ttho: City!.'-by the Blue raiders on Sunday evoning last: - "A few words,, from ono who has been twelve .years .a soldier and who took spine pains :?td'-;lie".&?eseilt;:lind, observe tho rtfcpnt military manoeuvres,' may not come amiss. Por/a; soldier, to read, such, scare-lioad lilies iis..'(.Gaptur6'i.;6f. :; ]CWcllington,' . 'Tho City .Taken,' etc!, is amusing. ' _ ; : _ "No general who know anything of his sent such a flying column , awav from l'-is . base with a _ strong unconquered forco between the two divisions a mission. .'-.lt' meanfiho-mtjibxi ifoufeofAthe small fprce-which regained, "andunbeaten defence, loft to, ileal--with'the ■ iTho 'temptation, however, to a volunteer commander who knaWj liis public was-too, great. It was doubt[theatrical; i>oiht: of: view, a grand ioup, but tho' Bluo 'forco coiild no'' morbi be' said to . have reached Wellington in a- military ..sense ihan.j.t. cp.uld bo said that .the Frencli':'h'ad , 'i'cach'ccl'j:Berlin when', the first latch of prisoners arrived there in 1870.< ■ I ;an Quite- picture to myself the : remarks';o! ihe ..l\ed : forco. staff officers when. tho news reached, thpm,',.that a; large force of Blue r.fantry ha'd passed-through their lines, for ;lio information, was'siire'to ;rcach them sooner ir later. r.thihk , "l ;: hear Col. [Buthio say; Let; them; pass! they can. do little or no lariri; it will leave ao.many loss in our front; »<4nv<;loß !in-,tke a mornu\g," and in tlio ..alteT-aajn^r'-'A'^.^to'ti'eo''-'to' deal' - with . the •aiders.'.'., , . "fit was. a fohther out of the Red comso. largo a force got probably ho. was' rt|? v at'.his .command va's. 'JtobV !s'ma)l ;an)'.' engagement;' with ;heuij as every iii'An wa6 needed at dawn to naK(J"',siin£ Successful; issue his en-' sloping ..movement,. which, ' had' not dark- .. iesS-suporvoiied, .[would havo been completed in Sunday night. Another twenty-f our hours rould ji»V9 i.told -alvcxy-,different tale. . At loonion-tha Mon'iayi-'whe'n .operations ceased, .ho invaders 'cbiisisfed ,of about throa hunlii?d?!im^iiy!ondf^so^6^s? 'jaded and tired vith, forced -marches, three nights ;in the ipeli,'-'''without forage for the horses, short of far material, cooped,up in,a deep, narrow \-aley/yfith force in their front it*- the valley, ..a stroiig column in;..their,, .right rear,' and. another, on their eft rear occupying commanding .positions, tnd, -''further;;,' about" horsemen 40. comilete iriovoment.' by riding wiiid : 1)V 'arijv' of the many roiads. to the :eiitra.>bfc.tlieip; reais ;a>forco, moreover, four, rpfes' "In ' actual warfare,•. the, position and trength- of .tlie.;t>rq-forcc3 ivould have' meant' m unconditional surririfijsr of- tlio''Blues' by our o'clock. Tliq morale, of tho two fbrcos vould, in actual war, have to bo counted '/ith i the; BlueSjftlieirirt'Wo chief commanders irisonora ill tho defenders', hands, their Jiext ■wo in command away oil a wild-goose chase which for'aught .thoy-knew might be un-. (f^e^l)^n^B|^^^e^thi.rd:;' ; .bf their fcyeijiSek Ai';iis ; ebb'.-The, morale ' would' . io; ( confideiicb.'-iiV theirjust it; hftnS',-' tpiv'J. mbthoVsi';; sister's,'', theo-mbffient atTthb mercy'[of BjßanEf^f^dors^S^fipse.' would - Borvo to-' •aiso'their enthusiasm to.tho utmost., " As to tho [which, reached ,hp city: after'.haivirig'been somo ten or ;woWe. .hours, iiy tho; city, time- enough,' no a lofe ofc mischief, what. was 'to )ocdni'6.:)of J,\nyit';'was ; to. bo [the net. ■erfttlt J '6f^the Jirvaaib'u' 1 ? * Their cruisor, the inly., means, of their getting, out of the Do- ' ninionj® JVadstrnTi jTjy and a orpo'.;o|.,foiiP'|iinc!.i iiiieir strength' was. not noro-HSM-niivlfour With all that, 'as ihe, truo state jQtallaii's, : two .of the Wo)ington papers come, gukjvith' scare-headings, iwyin^' l '. ' Capture ifv.'Wellington'.?- •. . - ginning- or [losing 'in the natter;at"iill.' "Tlio"manoeuvres .were oxeriiso?, fp.iv,the, v inilitarjv.tri(ining of 'tho volun;cor force, -and, as ail old soldier, I was glad .o i soa l of' tho youths of tlio Dominion ■ !'YC ..up leisure, and expond so much 1 ihysical 'dnergy—the General Staff, lam told; lid not havo oil-, hour's sleep per night.":