Iran poised between coup and civil war

Press, 7 September 1981, Page 18

Iran poised between coup and civil war

By

RALPH JOSEPH

in Athens

Iranians are playing a grim guessing game: how long will it be before the regime of Ayatollah Riihollah Khomeiny collapses under the weight of the opposition it has aroused in the last two years and a half? A former President, Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, now living in self-exile In paris, says it is only a “matter of months.” The clandestine “Free Voice of Iran” radio which backs the former Shah’s' son, Reza Pahlavi, assures its listeners that the regime is “on the verge of collapse.” General Bahram Aryana, who heads a mysterious “Iran Liberation Army,” says the fireworks against the regime will begin this month. But Khomeiny himself pooh-poohs it all as a lot of nonsense. Entering blithely into the game myself, I ventured to express to an Iranian friend in Teheran before leaving recently: “The maximum that this regime can last is another two years.” He looked at me in horror. “You mean we are going to have the mullahs for another two years?” he said. ■ His reaction was not surprising. The regime of Ayatollah Khomeiny has aroused more disgust and hatred against itself in two years and a half than the Shah did in 25. As one Iranian said: “Khomeiny’s regime is the worst Iran has had since the Mongols invaded this country.” That was about a thousand years ago. Another part of the guessing game is that if the regime does go, how will this happen? The three possibilities are a military coup, a general uprising, and a civil war.

The idea of a military’ coup was being discussed in the second half of June when BaniSadr was dismissed from office by Khomeiny. It was believed that military officers loyal to him, but opposed to, the mullahs, would step in to sweep the clergy frbm power and restore the President. The army officers and lower ranks did, in fact appear to be unhappy about the former president’s removal, but they were pinned down on the border with Iraq where a war is still going on. and made no move. / One junior officer in the semi-besieged city of Abadan told his brother by telephone: "The entire garrison here is unhappy. If we weren’t facing the enemy we would have come out against the mullahs.” Another source suggested this prospect to me: as soon as the war with Iraq is ended a large number of junior officers and other ranks would joint forces , with the Mujahedeen-e- . Khalq guerrilla organisation to launch a civil war against the mullahs and, the. revolutionary guards ‘ who keep them in power ' ' • A Mujahedeenguerrla I spoke to shortly afterwards told me that a large number of • officers had already joined the Mujahedeen. He said these officers had supplied the guerrillas with arms, ammunition and equipment. A few days later more proof was provided of co-operation between the Mujahedeen and the military officers when Colonel Behzad Mo’ezi flew Bani-Sadr and the Mujahedeen leader Massoud Rajavi out of

Iran in a Boeing 707 fuel tanker. Mo’ezi is described as a “supporter” of the Mujahedeen. A large number of-other Mujahedeen supporters within the air force were said to have been involved in the operation. Shortly afterwards General Aryana was reported to have entered Iran to organise his forces from a base near the border with Turkey. He called on officers and other ranks in the military to be ready to join his “Liberation Army.” He also asked Iranians living in the north-western parts of Iran , to stay indoors at night, indicating that some kind of after dark operations were being planned against the regime. Just before leaving Teheran I was told that General Aryana had held a meeting, probably in Paris, with a former navy chief," Rear Admiral Ahmad Madani, and the former Prime Minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar, However, my informant said that Bani-Sadr had not been present in the meeting. In fact Bakhtiar had quite plainly said on July 29, the day Bani-Sadr flew to Paris, that there was no possibility bf him joining forces with the former president. What it adds up to is that there are two separate forces preparing to seize power from Khomeiny, either by toppling him in a coup or by launching a civil war or general uprising against him. There seems little likelihood that the two forces will unite. When the Bakhtiar group tried to stage a military coup in Iran in July last year, it was

Bani-Sadr and the Mujahedeen who scuttled the plan, after officers involved disclosed the plot to the Mujahedeen in the hope of getting them to join. The Mujahedeen reported the plan to Bani-Sadr, then president, and top-ranking figures involved in the plot, were arrested and executed. Bakhtiar has apparently not forgiven Bani-Sadr or the Mujahedeen for this. But it did bring the Mujahedeen and

Bani-Sadr closer together. What has happened in the last two months’ is that the Mujahedeen have taken the removal of Bani-Sadr as the signal for the start of a guerrilla war against Khomeiny and the mullahs. Bani-Sadr has meanwhile been attempting to use his political skills to have the other political parties suppressed by Khomeiny to join him, and to have the mullahs removed in a general uprising.

He has told several interviewers that he is attempting to oust the mullahs before Khomeiny dies, because if the Imam passes away while Iran is in its current uncertain state, a civil war may break out and the country could then disintegrate. Considering the various political forces now operating in Iran, each pulling in a different direction, his analysis at least appears to be correct.