Powers of arrest opposed

Press, 6 August 1981, Page 1

Powers of arrest opposed

Parliamentary reporter

Citizens should not have powers of arrest, the director •: of criminology at Victoria University, Mr W. Young, told a parliamentary select : committee on the Summary Offences Bill yesterday. Mr Young, who is also a lecturer in law, said, “We live in turbulent times: it is risky to let anyone but a professional handle powers of arrest.”

The private citizen would

retain powers in the bill to arrest any person whom he found committing offences of common assault; assault on a policeman, traffic officer, or a prison officer; wilful damage; being on property without lawful excuse; and

peeping into a dwelling house.

Submissions on the bill said that an attempt by a private citizen to arrest another was likely to lead to violence. The police were trained to deal with violence

but the private citizen was an amateur whose enthusiasm or anger might make him misjudge the situation. The offender would be more likely to retaliate towards a private citizen than a policeman.

The bill would give power of arrest to security guards,

who were not equipped by' training or experience to handle it. This was .at variance with the Crimes Act, under which citizens had no power of arrest. ■J The submissions sought to limit police powers of arrest •: in the minor offences with : which the bill deals. The submissions said that the law should encourage the police to use less coercive options, such as the summons. Arrests should be made only to establish the identity of the person arrested; to secure or preserve evidence of, or relating to, an offence; to prevent the continuation or repetition of an offence or the commission of another offence; or to ensure the appearance of the person arrested before a court. This step had been taken in Canada and in a number of American jurisdictions.

Some had gone further and had introduced an alternative procedure to the summons, such as “the notice to appear”. These were like traffic tickets which were issued on the spot by policemen. , Of a policeman’s powers to arrest without warrant where a person “within his view” committed certain offences, the submissions said that the arrest became illegal in the event of a reasonable mistake having been made by the policeman. In this event the person arrested had the right to resist with reasonable force and this could create unnecessary violence between the police and citizens. The right to resist should be removed where the policeman had made a reasonable mistake of fact. Association with convicted thieves, which the bill would make a criminal offence, was an “iniquitous” provision, although it was better than the consorting provisions it would replace.

The clause was at odds with one of the basic tenets of a free society: that a person should be entitled to associate with any person he

or she chose. It indicated that an offence would arise merely as a result of a subjective belief by the police or others that an association might, in the circumstances, lead to crimes of dishonesty. Much of this behaviour was already covered by the crime of conspiracy. Of resisting a policeman, a prison officer, or a traffic officer in the course of his duty, the submissions said that the clause was meant clearly to punish people who deliberately flouted the authority of the police. As it stood it would also punish people who genuinely but mistakenly stood up for their rights, believing that the person concerned was not a policeman or was acting outside his duty. The bill was impressive in its recognition of the limits of police powers and the removal of imprisonment as a maximum penalty. Fines would be properly increased to cover inflation.

The submissions sought a thorough review of the level of imprisonable offences in all statutes and replacement where appropriate with noncustodial sentences.