THE FOOD WEAPON L.S. RELUCTANT TO EXPLOIT GROSS RUSSIAN WEAKNESS

Press, Volume CXVI, Issue 34042, 5 January 1976, Page 12

THE FOOD WEAPON L.S. RELUCTANT TO EXPLOIT GROSS RUSSIAN WEAKNESS

(By

VICTOR ZORZA)

WASHINGTON.—The most formidable weapon in the international armoury to emerge in recent times is food. but. as with all new things, its nature remains imperfectly understood and statesmen are still groping for the most effective ways to use it.

“Food is a weapon," said the Secretary of Agriculture (.Mr Earl L. Butz) last year “It is now one of the principal negotiating tools in our kit. ” A C.I.A. study of the strategic aspects of the new weapon concluded that world gram shortages, which were likely to increase in the near future. “could give the United States a measure of power it never had before — possibly an economic and political dominance greater than that of the immediate post-World War II years.”

There is no denying that the refusal by the United States to provide food in famine situations could cause thousands and perhaps millions of deaths. The famines of recent years in the area bordering the Sahara and in Bangladesh, to name only two. have provided powerful reminders of how dependent man still is on the vagaries of nature.

But the C.l.A.’s conclusions are not limited to the more backward countries of Africa and Asia. “Without indulging in blackmail in any sense.” it says, “the United States would gain extraordinary political and economic influence. For not only the poor, less-developed countries but also the major Powers would be at least partially dependent on food imports from the United States.” More moderate ; The C.I.A. is supposed to confine itself to analysis — i not to make policy recomimendations. and its food (study left it to policy makers Ito draw their own conclusions. When the sales of

(grain to Russia were chal’lenged bv the administraition’s critics, Mr Butz drew | the conclusion that the . Kremlin's more moderate (conduct in the Middle East 'last summer might be be;cause “they want more grain from us — as long as you i extend that kind of trade, [you are promoting the basis [of the kind of thing Henry Kissinger is getting done in the Middle East.”

: But has the agreement under which the United States has since contracted to let Russia buy eight million tons of grain a year removed the weapon from the administration's hands? This year’s disastrous Soviet harvest means that the Soviet Union needs much more than eight million tons, but (any additional amounts can [be bought only with the adjministration's consent, which (was easily obtained this year But the Soviet Union is [short this year of perhaps 10 | limes as much, for it aimed lat 215 million tons, gathered jin a harvest of little more than 130 million tons, and is left with a shortfall of some thing like 80 million. Even if (it were able to buy this (amount — which is obviously [out of the question — its [transportation and storage [facilities can handle only 'about 25 million tons of [grain,< most of which it has [already bought. i What, then, has happened i to the food weapon? Like any other strategic weapon, once the missile has been fired, it (cannot be used again. Per[haps the Soviet Union's moderation in the Middle East I was dictated by its grain needs. We do not know. But ; its present conduct in Angola shows no concern about pos-i i sible American use of the [ food weapon. Capital for farms There is little the United States can do until the next harvest — and then only if the harvest is so bad that the eight million tons already guaranteed, and the additional amounts the Kremlin could buy outside the United States, would be inj sufficient to meet Soviet needs. The Kremlin is certainly j [doing all it can to avert har-( (vest failures, not only be-| [cause it wants to knock the new weapon out of American hands, but also because the economic and political health of the Soviet Union requires a sound agricultural ; base.

This year’s agricultural setback has greatly slowed down the rate of growth of, the economy as a whole and has combined with other factors to make the targets for the whole new five-year plan much less ambitious than in the past. The Russian people may not starve, but even if everything goes well, the amount of meat their farms produce will on the average remain the same for the next five years as it was this year.

The main purpose of Mr I Brezhnev’s agricultural pro-! gramme has been to increase the meat output in order to; improve the Soviet diet — and the heavy purchases of foreign grain have been| mainly intended for this pur-i pose. The average Russian; eats only a third of the meat! consumed by the average' American, and he is making his demand for a better diet; politically effective — as did,

the Polish workers whose food riots caused the downfall of the Gomulka administration.

There is a clear connection between the Polish riots and the accelerated Soviet meat production drive which led the Kremlin into huge foreign grain purchases. at first spasmodic and now. under the agreement with the United States, providing for a fixed annual minimum.

The Kremlin agreed to the five-year contract only reluctantly, because it would have preferred to spend its scarce foreign currency only when the harvest was really bad, but the United States was able to use the Soviet Union’s great need this year to force it into a more regular arrangement. Next harvest

Some Washington policymakers hope that if this regular annual "fix” causes the Soviet Union to get "hooked” on U.S. grain, then the food weapon might become a permanent component of the American strategic arsenal. The Soviet Union, aware of this possibility, is investing huge amounts of capital into its own agriculture. at least partly in order .to defend itself against the possible uses of this weapon in the future.

| This is a gamble, because it still remains to be proved that Soviet agriculture can be rescued by money alone. The Brezhnev leadership has refused to contemplate the .institutional changes, the Triform of the collective farm which must accompany the infusion of monev (into Soviet agriculture if it is to be made more efficient. But the reform of the collective farm system, which is (such a basic part of the [Soviet system as a whole, [would have to be part of a 'wider economic and political [reform programme which the (Kremlin fears like the plague And so long as it refuses to make the reforms, it will remain exposed to the U.S. [food weapon — but only if American strategists devise effective ways to use it. j (Copyright, 1975, Victor Zorza)