Jury finds “Hair” not indecent

Press, Volume CXII, Issue 32874, 24 March 1972, Page 2

Jury finds “Hair” not indecent

(New Zealand Press Association)

AUCKLAND, March 23. A jury today found that the show, “Hair,” was not indecent. f • •

The hearing had lasted more than three days in the Supreme Court at Auckland.

After considering thercase for an hour, the jury of 10 men and two women returned a verdict of not guilty. The Crown had alleged that the opening-night performance of "Hair” in Auckland was indecent. The company, Harry „ M. Miller Attractions, Ltd, pleaded not guilty. Mr L. W. Brown, Q.C., and Mr M. B. Williams appeared for the defence, and Mr D. S. Morris for the Crown. INTEREST NOTED Summing up, Mr Justice McMullin said it was evident from die very full galleries at court that the matter had generated a good deal of interest. He told the jury that before the show could be found indecent, it must be shown to have a corrosive action on the morals of society. To some extent the jury would be setting the standards of New Zealand theatre, said his Honour. There was not so much a conflict of fact, but a conflict of inferences and what could be read into the show. The jury’s approach should be to ask whether the show was indecent in the sense that it was contrary to, and offending against, the present standards of society.

AVERAGE PERSON An objective standard had to be applied—not that of young girls and callow youths, of whom Mr Morris had spoken, nor indeed by the standards of the sophisticated theatre-goer. “You must approach it in a way not unduly restrictive on me public, who wish legitimately to be entertained,” said his Honour. “On the other side, you don’t necessarily accept the standards or lack of them of people who welcome all forms of entertainment, even though they may be plainly pornographic.” The Crimes Act did not define indecency in terms of the standards of 1961. Case law had defined indecency in a way which was elastic, and took into account changing standards of society.

The jury did not have to define where the line of the standards should be drawn, but it had to say on which side this particular case fell.

“NOT TO HAMPER” <lt had to apply standards which reflected the attitude of society in general—those

of the ordinary representative citizen of 1972. j The standards Applied must not be such as to hamper legitimate theatre, but at the same time, the jury must not let in, under the guise of legitimate theatre, anything indecent and obscene. f

His Honour said the jury had to look at the whole show, and not juit isolated parts: the alleged indecencies must be looked at agajnst the whole background of the play.

The banners must be looked at in the light that they were paraded on stage and not in the street. Returning to the question of the public good, he said it might be served if the show’s presentation was justified by the promotion of learning, good theatre, or other matters of public concern. It might also be served if the over-riding effect was to draw society’s attention to matters to which it should be rightly awakened. EXPERTS’ ROLE “Hair” was said to have been seen by 10.5 m people—this was relevant in so far as it showed the production was bona fide theatre, but the jury was not concerned with the law in other countries. The place of experts in the trial was to give evidence to assist in the question of the public good. “Don’t be mesmerised by their number or their eminence,” said his Honour. Cheers and applause came from about 200 persons in the public galleries, including

some of the cast of “Hair,” after the jury declared the show was not indecent. Mr Miller said he was not surprised by the verdict; he would have been bitterly disappointed if it had gone the other way—“not just for myself but for what I believe it would have meant in terms of the social climate in New Zealand” In the Southem hemisphere New Zealand had' pioneered a sensible liberal attitude toward censorship. Had tile case gone the other way it would have been a confusing, retrograde step.

The decision, he said, upheld the right of the individual to exercise his own moral judgment.