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Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32635, 17 June 1971, Page 1

W.Z.P.A.-Reuier—Copyripht)

NEW YORK, June 15.

The Johnson Administration decided to press Australia and New Zealand for support in the Vietnam war as early as the end of November, 1964, according to documents published by the “New York Times.”

The papers are part of a secret study by the Pentagon as a background to United States involvement in Vietnam.

[ln July, 1965, a New Zealand artillery battery was sent to South Vietnam and in May, 1967, it was joined by a reinforced infantry company drawn largely from the battalion in Malaysia.]

A draft position paper on South-East Asia circulated to top-level officials on November 29, 1964, refers to United States objectives in South Vietnam and includes a reference to “key allies.” Under this heading it said, “We will consult immediately with the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.’’ Enlarging on this, it continued: “(1) United Kingdom. The President will explain the concept and proposed actions fully to Prime Minister Wilson, seeking full British support, but without asking for any additional

British contribution In view of the British role in Malaysia. “(2) Australia and New Zealand will be pressed through their ambassadors, not only for support but for additional contributions. “(3) The Philippines will be particularly pressed for contributions along the lines of the programme for approximately 1800 men already submitted to President Macapagal. . . ." Another document, dated April 6, 1965, and signed by Mr McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson’s special assistant for national security affairs, outlined plans for an expansion of the American role in Vietnam and an increase in the troop strength there. Key document This key document was designated National Security Action Memorandum 328 and referred, among other things, to proposals for deploying combat troops from Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Paragraph 8 of the document said, "The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel, with the additional marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.” Paragraph 6 of the same document referred to President Johnson’s approval of the deployment in Vietnam of two additional United States Marine battalions and one Marine air squadron and associated headquarters and support elements. The document also recorded Presidential approval of an 18,000 to 20,000-man increase in the size of United States military support forces. Tank unit The United States believed in April of 1965 that New Zealand would supply a tank unit for use by the Allied Military Command in South Vietnam, according to the N.Z.P.A. staff correspondent in Washington, Bruce Kohn. General Maxwell D. Taylor then United States Ambassador in Saigon, told the Administration on April 17 that year that he believed it entirely possible to obtain from New Zealand one artillery battery and . one company of tanks.

General Taylor’s view, as expressed that day to the White House, was quoted today by the “New York Times” article-

General Taylor in a cable, to the Secretary of State (Mr Dean Rusk), with a copy to the White House, said he left Washington for Saigon on April 1 with the understanding that the State Department was to explore with

the New Zealand, Australian and Korean Governments the rapid deployment of combat elements. On April 8 he received a directive to approach the Government of South Vietnam, suggesting a request to the Australian Government for an infantry battalion for use in South Vietnam. “While waiting for a propitious moment to raise the matter, I received a message directing the approach be delayed until further orders. Nothing has been received since.” Third country The Joint Chiefs of Staff, said General Taylor, had reviewed the situation in the south and considered that if the war was not to drag on into 1966, and even beyond, it was necessary to reinforce South Vietnamese ground forces with about 23 battalions equivalents . . . “They must inevitably come from third country sources.” In stating this, the Ambassador was suggesting to Washington the type of instructions he would find most useful in presenting to the South Vietnamese Government what he took to be a new policy of third country participation in ground combat. The then Under-Secretary of State, Mr George Ball, in a memorandum to the President said:

“Australia and New Zealand are, of course, special cases since they feel lonely in the far reaches of the Pacific. Yet even their concern is far greater with Malaysia than with South Vietnam, and the degree of their anxiety would be conditioned largely by expressions of our Support for Malaysia."