No heir-apparent to Nasser in confused Arab world

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32460, 21 November 1970, Page 17

No heir-apparent to Nasser in confused Arab world

(By

PAUL MARTIN,

CAIRO, Nov. 20. Arab nationalists had long said that once President Nasser had gone, the Arab wheel would be deprived of its axle. And, indeed, hardly have the customary 40 days mourning passed than another coup has shaken Syria, and no fewer than eight other Arab countries—including Egypt herself—have experienced political upheaval or important reshuffles in their power structures. In Syria, the accession of General Hafez al-Assad promises to have far-reach-ing effects, not only on a pan-Arab scale but in relation to the crisis with Israel. It is undoubtedly the most overwhelming of all Arab experiences since the death of Colonel Nasser. Its real importance lies in its relation to the new 'Egyptian order, part of the massive realignment through which the entire Arab world is now passing. President Nasser’s death posed four important ques-

tions for the Arab world: who would fill the political vacuum he left; would it lead to a period of disengagement, and thus open the door for the emergence of a variety of Arab nationalism on a regional basis; would Nasserism die with Nasser; and what effect would all of this have on the Middle East crisis situation and the prospects of peace with Israel? The political superstructure created by President Nasser in Egypt allowed a smooth transition, but no heir-apparent exists on the pan-Arab scale. The role of the Ba’ath Party has always been retricted to that of agent provocateur, or at best, the catalyst of Arab politics. And although in the last year of his life President Nasser saw the Palestinian guerrillas grow to the proportions of an uncontrollable force in the Middle East, their chances of accession were frustrated by the Jordanian civil war, which dealt a critical blow to their power and prestige. The upheavals throughout the Arab world, which are more widespread and far more intense than after the

1967 Arab defeat, are part of the quest to fill the vacuum. While President Nasser lived, he carried the load on behalf of revolutionary and conservative alike. Now that he is dead, the burden of individual responsibility has returned. The situation is made more cqmplex by the fact that the Arab world, which fell into line behind President Nasser’s banner in the challenge against Israel, now has to shoulder responsibility in the middle of a process aimed at peace with Israel —a process which the dead leader himself began. For those now in power in Egypt, this is far better than inheriting a country committed to war. Indeed, since the Rabat summit conference last December, when President Nasser gave notice that he would chart his own course, regardless of the rest, Egypt’s eyes have gradually turned inwards. The problems of President Sadat and his regime are the problems of Egypt. The struggle against Israel may be foremost among them, but that is because circumstances

of "The Times," through N.Z.P.A.)

so dictate, not because it is a pan-Arab cause. A well-placed Egyptian told me “A solution to the Middle East crisis has become more urgent for us than ever before. Whereas in the past the sheer weight of Nasser’s presence could overshadow serious internal problems, like economy, the same cannot be said for his successors. "That is not to say that Egypt will disappear from the forefront of the Arab stage. Egypt is the Arab world. But, unlike Colonel Nasser, who gave the idea meaning, his successors are no longer prisoners of pan-Arabism.” One of the first acts of the new regime was to move a step closer to a unity with Libya and the Sudan through the declaration-of-intent to bring the three countries together in a West of Suez federation. But this was more important for the political motives of all involved, rather than for its significance as a step towards the realisation of Arab unity. It served as tangible evidence of President Sadat’s Arabism, and provided the new regime with some politi-

cal acceleration, while in both Libya and Sudan—where the regimes are far from stable—it served to stave off violent change. However, whereas such a move under President Nasser may have been expected to win popular support, the opposite has been true in the present circumstances. . Both Colonel Kaddafi, of Libya, and General Numery, the Sudanese Head of State, have run into serious opposition. The former has an increasing number inside his regime who are beginning to find “Libya for the Libyans” a more appealing prospect than absorption into Egypt; the latter is confronted by an opposition no longer intimidated by the stature of President Nasser and using the unity moves as a rallying point for its political activity. The tripartite alliance has always been an alliance of political convenience, but now that the father is no longer in the scene to guide the family, there is increasing unrest among its members. Neither Libya nor Sudan was anxious to take such a

bold step at the moment, as the accounts now filtering out of the three capitals show, but both realised that it was the lesser of two evils. Reshuffles inside the two Revolutionary Command Councils since the death of President Nasser are ample proof that serious differences are beginning to afflict the leaderships. All noises outside Egypt calling for a war of popular liberation against Israel ring hollow, and so it is well that such popular cry has, for the present at least, been silenced. Even the lips of the outspoken Ba’ath are sealed. The roles played by both Iraq and Syria, two political champions of the Palestinian guerrillas, in the Jordanian civil war were less than distinguished. Indeed, even if President Nasser had lived, the power struggles through which the two countries are now passing would certainly have been witnessed sooner or later. Certainly the Egyptians regard General Assad as a much more reliable personality, and one on whom they can depend should a peaceful solution emerge. In the first statements of

his regime, there has been an absence of the determination characteristic of General Jadid. His references to “the battle” and support for the Palestinian guerrillas have been vague, and his enthusiasm for the tripartite alliance of Egypt, Libya and Sudan could have been interpreted as a declaration of support for the Egyptiandirected foreign policy of the three. What is of extreme importance is the coup de force executed by General Assad against the extremist civilian wing inside the Ba’athist regime in Damascus. Even since President Nasser accepted the American peace initiative, Syria has maintained,, on the official level, a diplomatic silence. But the fact is that this differed from the attitude revealed in the State-controlled information media, and was at variance with the civilian extremists’ absolute support for the Palestinian guerrillas. Thus it is clear that the winds could blow in the opposite direction, with the stakes for Arab leadership raised so high* by President Nasser’s death.