Triumvirate Of Generals

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 32077, 27 August 1969, Page 12

Triumvirate Of Generals

When General Tran Thien Khiem succeeds Mr Tran Van Huong as Prime Minister of South Vietnam he will join two other former military men at the top of the political tree in South Vietnam. President Thieu was a lieutenant-general and Vice-President Ky was an air vice-marshal—equivalent to a major-

general—before taking political office. The. military background of all three top men in the South Vietnamese administration does not augur well for an

early transition from war-time to peace-time government General Khiem is no more likely than his President or Vice-President to be conciliatory towards Communists and other Left-wing elements in negotiations for a more representative government Mr Tran Van Huong, rightly or wrongly, bears the brunt of the criticism for the failure of his administration to grapple with the country’s economic problems. His successor’s most urgent task is to stave off a balance-of-payments crisis this year. General Khiem, an able administrator, should be as well fitted for this task as any civilian contender for his post The measures initiated by Mr Huong—mainly higher taxes on luxury imports—need to be reinforced by other fiscal and monetary measures; an appreciable devaluation of the inflated currency is widely advocated.

General Khiem has been described in the cable messages as a “hawk”, and he has been closely associated with President Thieu for at least five years. He has also, however, been an advocate of most of the policies of Mr Huong and is understood to have been Mr Huong’s chosen successor. There is no reason to expect any significant change in policy as a result of General Khiem’s appointment The National Liberation Front and the Hanoi Government will, no doubt assert that the appointment confirms the Right-wing militarism of the Saigon Government It would have suited their book better if a civilian had been appointed—either a civilian prepared to negotiate with them or a civilian lacking both General Khiem’s administrative ability and national prestige and therefore more likely to fail in the task of repairing the economy. General Khiem may turn out to be less of an embarrassment than the Americans fear. He will certainly be aware of the need to build up South Vietnam’s armed forces as American troops are withdrawn. This is one factor in the diplomatic or psychological warfare which must precede any settlement of the military conflict It will be weighed, in Hanoi and in Paris, with President Nixon’s delay in announcing further troop reductions. Neither a new Prime Minister in Saigon nor a suspension of American troop withdrawals is likely to weigh very heavily with Hanoi; either or both might help to persuade North Vietnam and its allies that a Communist victory in South Vietnam is no closer.