THE RUSSIAN SCENE THE MARSHALS SPEAK UP IN THE KREMLIN

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 31984, 10 May 1969, Page 12

THE RUSSIAN SCENE THE MARSHALS SPEAK UP IN THE KREMLIN

(Reprinted from the by arrangement)

Special Interest in this article derives from the announcement on May 7 of the fourth death among Russian generals in 11 days. Observers in Moscow have been surprised by the remarkable coincidence of so many deaths in sueh an unusually short period.

A relatively mild May Day speech from Mr Brezhnev, preaching peace to all, may or may notvmean something. But May Day in Moscow without a military parade is a significant break with precedent. Paradoxically, this departure follows a spate of rumours about the growing influence of the military commanders within the Soviet establishment. But the two trends are not necessarily contradictory. You only try to cut somebody down to size if he is threatening to grow too big. But how real is this threat of Bonapartism in Russia?

For Communists brought up on the Marxist classic—- “ The eighteenth of Brumaire of Louis Napoleon”—the concept is very familiar. Stalin used it as a bogey against Trotsky in the 1920 s and was haunted by its ghost in the late 1930 s when he exterminated Marshal Tukhachevsky and the elite of the Red Army. He still did not feel safe and at the end of the Second World War rapidly down-graded Marshal Zhukov by sending the hero of the fighting marshals to command the garrison of Odessa. (It was like sending Lord Montgomery to command a garrison at Perth.) Zhukov Rides Again Not surprisingly; Marshal Zhukov rode again when Stalin’s successors were fighting among themselves for the heritage. Indeed, in June, 1957, he helped Nikita Khrushchev to win the tense battle against his rivals from the

“anti-party group.” Four months later, having served his purpose, he was once again discarded. Can Marshal Grechko, the present Minister of Defence, his deputy, Marshal Yakubovsky, and their fellow soldiers exercise a more lasting influence on Russian politics?

One theory can already be dismissed, namely that the Russian military have gained in prestige and power because with the replacement of Mr Dubcek by Dr Husak they have now “succeeded” in Czechoslovakia, after the civilians had “failed.”

This theory ignores the “salami tactics” applied to the Czechoslovaks and the effect of the passage of time. By

the time Marshal Grechko arrived in Prague, early last month, it did not need any top brass to secure the removal of Mr Dubcek.

On the other hand, this does not mean that the military intervention in Czechoslovakia—or, for that matter, the trouble on the Chinese frontier—do not strengthen the political hand of the milltap' commanders. They certainly do. But what gives the military their real leverage, as during the struggle for Stalin’s succession, is the division within the party leadership. With the Kremlin clearly divided and uncertain on all vital issues, the soldiers can throw their weight into the scales, though it is not always certain on which side.

Large Battalion The fighting soldiers in Russia have always been keen on large battalions. They have been less committed to the nuclear effort and are, therefore, not necessarily opposed to atomic talks with the United States. In any case, they were strong enough to prevent the appointment of a civilian as Marshal Malinovsky’s successor as Minister of Defence; this is how Marshal Grechko got his present job, for which at the time a prominent party technical expert, Mr Dmitri Ustinov, was being tipped. The Khrushchev precedent shows, however, the limits of military influence. It is strong only when the factions within the political leadership are fairly evenly balanced. Once a group, or a man, clearly gains the upper hand, it can deal with the soldiers. But the stalemate can be social as well as political. Looking at their own environment through the prism of the Bonapartist situation described by Marx, the Soviet leaders for a long time feared the emergence of a military hero as a potential “emperor of the peasants.” Before and after collectivisation they were afraid that a military commander might ride tp power pn a wave of genuine discontent among the peasant masses, which used to form the bulk of the nation. But the peasants no longer do, and each year reduces their social and political weight. Czech Warning The stalemate may also result from an absence of perspective and this is where the Czech affair carries a warning for Russia. Czechoslovakia under Dubcek showed the Russians their own potential future, one possible way out of the postStalinist deadlock. But it also showed that a reform inaugurated from above has its own momentum, that you start by giving more powers to the managers, to the technocrats, only to discover that trade unions, intellectuals and students are getting involved in the process; in short, that a “managerial revolution" may lead to a “workers’ democracy.” When they saw the shadow of the Soviets, of real workers’ councils, in Czechoslovakia the Russian leaders sent In their tanks. By the same token, however, they blocked their own future, their, own,chance of breaking the stalmnate. The real, though not immediate, threat of Bonapartism lies in the utter inability of the Russian leadership to find an outlet for the social tensions slowly building up in their country. The men in the Kremlin press on without being able to glimpse the end of the road.