U.S. Withdrawals Possible

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 31936, 13 March 1969, Page 13

U.S. Withdrawals Possible

(N.Z. Press Assn.—Copyright) WASHINGTON, March 12. i The Defence Secretary (Mr Melvin R. Laird) is reported to be considering a withdrawal of 40,000 to 50,000 American combat and support troops from South Vietnam this year, according to Administration sources, writes William Beecher, of the New York Times News Sendee.

Mr Laird will report to President Nixon after returning to the capital tonight 'after an inspection trip to 'Vietnam.

j On leaving Saigon, he said it would be both “desirable (and possible” to make some j force reductions as the South Vietnamese Army increased its own combat proficiency. But he declined to say how many American soldiers might be taken out, or when that might occur. However, Administration sources said planning in the Defence Department was focusing on the possibility of pulling out most of the 9th Infantry Division and many of its supporting units. Two of the division’s brigades now work in the Mekong River delta area of South

Vietnam and the third in the Saigon area. Under this plan, complete responsibility for combat in the southern-mqst region of the country would be transferred to the three South Vietnamese divisions now there. If the experiment worked well, consideration would be given to the subsequent withdrawal of additional American combat units. Mr Laird is said by officials

to be eager to enhance both the strength and the selfreliance of the Saigon Government by substantially bolstering the equipment of its military forces and by demonstrating confidence in its growing ability to handle the enemy.

During his Vietnam trip, he spoke of plans to ask for s7om in additional funds to speed the modernisation of equipment in the hands of the one million South Vietnamese under arms. One of the aims of a modest American troop withdrawal and transfer of fighting responsibility to South Vietnam, officials said, would be to increase pressure on North Vietnam to come to

terms at the Paris peace talks |on both military and political matters or face the prospect ;of having to deal with a I much stronger Saigon Government, which would be less likely to compromise.