MOSCOW AND NEW DELHI INDIA SHOCKED BY RUSSIA’S ARMS DEAL WITH PAKISTAN

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31764, 22 August 1968, Page 14

MOSCOW AND NEW DELHI INDIA SHOCKED BY RUSSIA’S ARMS DEAL WITH PAKISTAN

(By HAROLD SIEVE in the “Daily Telegraph”, London) (Reprinted by arrangement)

. le intimation to the Indian public that their staunch allv, Russia, was to supply their bitter enemy, Pakistan, with arms came in a Delhi newspaper story, inspired by a Government leak, beginning with the startling phrase “Moscow had better be cautious.” It is hardly like! v that this presumption sent any ripples of fear through the Kremlin. In India, however, it set the tone for a prolonged bout of breast-beating, soul-searching, recrimination and denunciation.

The furore has now died down, thanks to Mrs Gandhi's Parliamentary and party performances and to the efforts of a few cooler heads who introduced reason and perspective into the national debate. But things will never be quite the same again. Revealed starkly when the smoke cleared were the three basic weaknesses of Indian foreign policy—it reacts rather than acts: it is founded largely on illusions and wishful thinking: it is centred almost exclusively on Pakistan.

The first can and does result in injured pride, the second in chagrin and disappointment, the third in fear or hatred. All three combined* in the emotional outburst over the arms deal and what was analysed as a shift in Soviet policy. Cosy Image Ever since the famous Khrushchev visit to India in 1954, Russia has been regarded as the first ally. She supported India on Kashmir with her Security Council vetoes: her economic assistance, ostensibly without strings, increased annually; they fought together on all the anti-colonialist, antiimperialist fronts.The 1962 Chinese invasion, the Moscow-Peking rift, the American arming of Pakistan: they all served to build up Delhi’s cosy image of a special relationship. What successive Prime Ministers forgot was that the men in the Kremlin rarely confuse ideology with diplomacy. Russia's policy towards the subcontinent is little changed from 100 years ago. The object then, as now, is the security of her southern flank. The arrival of more hardheaded leaders like Mr Kosygin should have made this more apparent to anyone looking close enough. The 1966 Tashkent Agreement, for which he was responsible, was already clear proof that Moscow’s interests must embrace both the major and minor components of the sub-conti-nent. Not Taking Sides Her call to both India and Pakistan to negotiate directly on Kashmir meant that she was no longer taking sides.

With her massive investment, Moscow will always give priority to India. The Pakistanis admit this as a fact of life. But it was becoming apparent that Indo-Soviet friendship would not be at the neglect of Pakistan. As long as seven months ago, Mr Kosygin informed Mrs Gandhi of Russia's need to wean Pakistan away from Peking, and that this would require a substantial gesture such as arms deliveries. The Prime Minister should not have been surprised to hear that this \ was actually about to happen. The public shock stemmed not so much from Moscovite treachery but from Mrs Gandhi’s failure to take the country into her confidence.

Perhaps she felt that her own position as leader of the ruling Congress party was at stake. Her strength lies main : ly on the Left wing of that amorphous grouping and had derived in large part from her success in consolidating the Russian link. Defeat Averted By exploiting opposition differences with unusual skill and exhibiting more Leftwing sentiment than she probably really feels, she managed to stave off defeat. The Russians kindly assisted with all kinds of assurances. But the final accounting has still to be made. No-one knows exactly- what arms President Ayub of Pakistan is to get. Will it seriously disturb the balance of power between the two hostile neighbours? Will it lead to a dangerous arms race? Will India have to turn to China again as a counterweight? Ayub has said that Russia is only helping “to fill a few gaps” in Pakistan's defence requirements. Until 1965 he depended on Washington for his supplies: since then Peking. Today, however, the Americans send only spare parts, while the Chinese have insufficient spares for the MiGs and tanks already delivered. Long-range Guns While spare parts will figure in Pakistan’s shopping list, probably the main items are 200 135-mm guns—for the simple reason that India already has some 400 of these

Russian artillery pieces, which outrange Pakistan's American 155-mm’s by two miles.

Pakistan would also like, though it is not yet certain she will get, 200 tanks to add to the 200 Chinese-built mediums and heavies received since the 1965 war. During the same period, India has been supplied with 600 Russian tanks to supplement her annual domestic production of 250.

These figures leave no doubt as to who holds the military advantage. And the mere fact that the Indian population outnumbers Pakistan’s by five to one should allay any military anxieties Yet the anxieties do exist and are very real. Some high Indian officials claim that their army, now close to the one million mark, has only a two-to-one edge over Pakistan yet must also guard the long Chinese front. Odds Disputed In Islamabad this is described as pure nonsense. How could Pakistan maintain half-a-million men under arms? The odds, they say, are more like four-to-one in India’s favour, though I believe it | may be only five-to-three in {the air. i In the overcharged atmo- : sphere on both sides that surrounds any discussion of : Indo-Pakistani relations, the truth is hard to come by. Logic, however, flies right oul of the window when one enters the realm of motivation. What, after all, is this war material for?

For the Indians it is a deterrent against any repetition of the Pakistani or Chinese aggressions of the past. Peking, with her internal problems, might have become less of a threat. But Pakistan poses a permanent one: the accretion of her military capacity with Russian arms will only increase her natural bellicosity. There are intelligent I Indians who hold that even if the Kashmir problem is | resolved, Pakistan’s aggressive appetite will not be asI suaged. A nation consisting of two wings, 1000 miles apart, cannot be a lasting proposition. Pakistan, they say, will have to try to fill part of the gap by land grabs from India. Weird Theories Fanciful as this ma, sound some equally weird theories are expounded in Islamabad Government offices. India’s build-up is aimed solely at Pakistan. China is no menace and, with their close contact with Peking, they should know India has never reconciled herself to partition. She has expansionist dreams of bringing Nepal, Burma, Ceylon and, of course, Pakistan into her “orbit” It would be cheering to conclude that the one brand of fantasy cancels out the other. Unhappily, real explosive issues do exist. First and always foremost is Kashmir. Shunned by Delhi, Sheikh Abdulla is unable to hold out any hope to his people of an early settlement. To avoid losing his leadership to the young, pro-Pakistani extremists, he might be eventually forced into an outright anti-Indian posture. Should this land him back in prison, the consequences in the valley could be disastrous and the temptation for Pakistani intervention almost irresistible. Second, the Pakistanis are genuinely concerned over the slaughter of their fellowMoslems in India’s communal riots. They accuse Delhi of doing nothing to protect them apart from passing pious resolutions. Ganges Water Third, the Farakka Dam, which India is building to harness the Ganges above Calcutta, provides another potential “casus belli.” East Pakistan needs a share of the waters during the dry winters for her projected irrigation schemes. With the failure of technical experts to agree on the division, Pakistan insists that the two Governments must now try to break the deadlock. India, however, is hedging. Finally, the anns race itself. India’s Defence Minister, Swaran Singh, has been invited to Moscow. It could be merely to reassure him of the relatively harmless nature of the Pakistani deal. But again it could be to consider the increased supplies India feels she now requires. The Kremlin must suspect that Mrs Gandhi is today in a mood to make it up with China. It would certainly be a strange historical paradox if Russia, by weakening Pakistan’s links with China, drives India into the arms of her ideological foe.