THE SUPER POWERS THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NUCLEAR BALANCE EXAMINED

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31543, 4 December 1967, Page 12

THE SUPER POWERS THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NUCLEAR BALANCE EXAMINED

IBy Brigadier

W. F. K. THOMPSON

in life "Daily Telegraph." London. 1

I Reprinted by arrangement. I

No sooner has the chorus of protest died down against Mr McNamara’s announcement that the United States is to set up a thin A.B.M. (anti-ballistic missile) defence, at the cost of £1785 million, than Russia parades a F. 0.8.5. (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System), expected to be in service next year.

A F. 0.8.5. (the “fractional” implies that the bomb is not intended to make a complete orbit, which would be contrary to the space agreement) is less effective than a ballistic missile system except for one characteristic. This is that, being put into orbit at an altitude of 100 miles instead of ascending to 800 miles like an inter-continental missile, it reduces the warning time given America by the present Ballistic Missile Early Warning System from 15 minutes to three. The time factor would be of great significance to America's 500-600-strong strategic bomber force were It not that by February the United States will have in operation an over-the-horizon early warning system which will restore the 15 minutes’ warning time against an attack by F. 0.8.5. Militarily, therefore, Russia’s deployment of F. 0.8.5. will have little significance. Psychologically it will make it difficult for the Administration not to over-react to this new type of threat. Mutual Destruction The main grounds on which the A.B.M. plan is criticised are that: it would make a nonproliferation agreement more difficult; it would escalate in cost absorbing American resources which could be put to better purposes in promoting international peace and welfare; It is provocative to the Russians; and it would mark the start of a new arms race. How valid are these criticisms? All raise highly complex questions, but a cool look at what the United States Government proposes and a brief consideration of the present state of the art, if art it is, of strategic nuclear deterrence should at least enable the layman to approach the question on a rational and commonsense basis. First the state of the art The strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia can mutually destroy each other’s civilisation, regafdless of who strikes first. Against China either of them by striking first could render her incapable of retaliation Neither the deployment of A.B.M.S nor the progressive development of China’s strategic nuclear capability can. within the foreseeable future, change this state of affairs. No Simple Yardstick Therj is no simple yard; stick by which to compare potency of the strategic

nuclear forces of the two super-Powers; neither counting missiles nor adding up megatons produces the answer. This depends on the size, number and nature of the targets presented by each country in relation to the number of separately targetable warheads available—of which America has at present some 4000 against about 1000 held by Russia. Both Powers have arsenals in excess of what they need for an “assured destruction capability” vis a vis the other. The large American excess came about through a miscalculation of Russian capabilities at the begining of the decade. Such mistakes illustrate the problem of planners. who in making recommendations not only have to estimate the present capability of a potential enemy but, more important, his intentions and capabilities 10 years ahead. In matters so literally vital they cannot be expected to base their recommendations on wishful thinking. To suggest that the decision to deploy an A.B.M. system in America will start a new arms race is to assume, erroneously, that the present one has reached some sort of plateau. This is far from true. In the past year the Russians have increased their intercontinental ballistic missiles by about 50 per cent above their 1966 figure, and are expected to develop F. 0.8.5. Accuracy Increased The Americans have greatly increased the accuracy of their missiles and targeting. By replacing their intercontinental Minuteman I and II missiles with Minuteman 111 and Polaris by Poseidon, they will much increase the number of targetable warheads for the same number of boosters. The new boosters will each carry M.I.R.V.S (Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles); in other words a number of separate nuclear warheads each capable of being aimed at separate targets. It must be assumed that the Russians are also developing M.I.R.V.s, for which their generally larger boosters are particularly well suited. Research and development have been going on in the A.B.M. field since the 19505. The Russians have been the first to deploy an A.B.M. system, based on a missile known to N.A.T.O. as Golosh. The system should be in service next year.

Now the Americans are to deploy a system that is technically well in advance of Russia's. It will be based on two types of radar and two types of missile: a very-long-range “over the horizon" acquisition radar and a multifunctional tactical radar; the Spartan missile for destroying incoming warheads in space through the emission of “soft" X-rays and without hazard of fall-out, and the very - high - velocity Sprint missile for destroying in the atmosphere any warhead that eludes the Spartan net, with negligible danger to the population below. Blackmail Danger Spartan missiles are to be deployed to give area protection to the whole United States against a light ballistic missile attack such as might be mounted in error or be within China’s capacity in the 19705. It is assumed that in this period an irrational nuclear first strike by China might inflict between five million and 10 million fatalities on an undefended United States; it is claimed that A.B.M. deployment would reduce this to under one million. Sprint is a "point defence” missile which will be deployed for defence of radars and Minuteman sites. The arguments in favour of having an A.B.M. system effective against a light nuclear attack are that in any future crisis with China the American Government would be in a stronger position to resist demands for making a first nuclear strike and that the credibility of America's guarantee to her friends and allies against Chinese nuclear blackmail would be enhanced. Consequently the decision to deploy an A.BJd. system, far from encouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons, has the opposite effect—an argument that can be reinforced if these developments are seen to preclude, in the long term, the possibility of France and Britain being able to maintain strategic nuclear forces capable of penetrating the defences of the superpowers. As to the annual coal this will be only half of what until recently the Americans were spending on early warning and air defence and a quarter of their expenditure in this field some years ago. Pressure To Thicken The real significance of Russia developing F. 0.8.5. is that it will greatly increase pressure in America to thicken the system so as to give protection against Russia. This could lead to very great, and ill-considered, expenditure without providing any worthwhile defence. With regard to the criticism that the decision is provocative to the Russians, genuinely they are far too well informed to believe that the Spartan screen can significantly reduce their “assured destruction capability,” while the deployment of Sprint in defence of missile sites and not of cities cannot affect their secondstrike capability, on which mutual deterrence rests. Within the foreseeable future no means can be discerned which would give effective defence against ballistic missiles on the scale that America and Russia now deploy. On the other hand, no problem can safely be counted as beyond the ability of future technology to solve With any weapons system it is necessary at some stage to go into production and get equipment into service as a firm base from which to develop more effective systems. Overall the American decision seems to me to be a reasonable precaution made inevitable by the continuation of the arms race. While thia continues, Russia and America will plan against the “worst plausible case” and. because each will have incomplete knowledge of the future intentions and capabilities of the other, both will continue to over-estimate what is required to retain their position. The Russians could fairly claim that they were a lot further from having a first-strike capability J than the Americans, but it in fact remains far from the reach of either. A “Mad Momentum” This action-reaction rhythm gives to the nuclear arms race a kind of mad momentum of its own, resulting in a futile and deplorable waste of resources. There is, however, no way of stopping the race other than by the two super-Powers arriving at, in the words of Mr McNamara, "a realistic and reasonably riskless agreement.” This the United States Government has proclaimed it is ready to do. It is up to the Russians to reciprocate Nor can the Vietnam war be considered an excuse for not doing so.