SOUTH ARABIA DIVIDED FACTIONS UNABLE TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31449, 16 August 1967, Page 16

SOUTH ARABIA DIVIDED FACTIONS UNABLE TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP

(By

RICHARD BEESTON,

. writing to the "Daily Telegraph”, London, from Aden)

(Reprinted from the “Daily Telegraph" by arrangement) “What does it matter to you what happens after Britain leaves South Arabia?” a puzzled French diplomat here recently asked me. It was a good question.

We no longer have any strategic, and hardly any commercial interests in this area. Nor have we any friends, as was made only too clear at the time of the Arab-Israeli war.

But being British we do worry about moral obligations to a region which has been under our influence for over 120 years. And, unlike France, we worry desperately about world opinion and of the disgrace of leaving behind chaos and anarchy when we finally depart on January 9. Britain has certainly made mistakes in the past and probably started far too late in the day to attempt to create a South Arabian Federation. But as of now it is hard to see what more Britain can do in its efforts to discharge its obligations to our last Middle East possession and leave behind a strong and stable State. We have provided a defence commitment and generous economic aid that we can ill afford and offered to share power with people who have been methodically murdering British soldiers and civilians for the last four years. But if we fail to reach a political settlement it is because we are dealing with parties and groups hopelessly divided among themselves and unable to provide any responsible or positive leadership. Official Gloom

Events of the last two months have brought to light some important new factors affecting the problem. Since Egypt’s defeat by Israel and the withdrawal of about half Egypt’s forces from the Yemen the threat of Egyptian invasion of South Arabia has much diminished. Egypt now appears to have more than she can contend with in the Yemen. Her main weapon therefore is subversion, against which British aircraft carriers and Vulcan bombers can do nothing. The extent of anti-British feeling in South Arabia during the Arab-Israel war, the failure of attempts to form a broadly-based Government and the mutiny in the Federal forces have all contributed to the air of despondency felt among British officials here. By strikes, boycotts, and terrorism the Adems are committing economic suicide while world shipping, on which they depend, is giving Aden a wide berth. The mutinies of June 20, which resulted in the death of 22 British soldiers, have destroyed any prospects of trust and co-operation between the British and Federal forces. The strongest political influence in the South Arabian Army today is that of the terrorist National Liberation Front. Tribal Divisions The South Arabian forces are obviously going to be the key factor for the future, and

mutinies—which mainly occurred among the South Arabian police and to a much lesser extent in the Armyrevealed the existence of profound tribal divisions. The forces which are costing Britain £l2 million a year can hold together only if there is a political settlement and if they have acceptable military leadership. The mutinies were a direct result of the appointment by the Supreme Council—against the advice of Britain—of Colonel Nasser Bureik as senior Arab officer. It was a petition by 12 colonels against Bureik’s habit of promoting members of his own tribe to senior positions that led to the suspension of four colonels and the disorders which followed. The events of June 20 confirmed the fears of the British High Commission that the Federal Government, composed mainly of sheikhs and sultans, neither controlled the Army nor had any popular backing. The mutinies and violence also gave the Federal Government a nasty fright. So under strong British pressure the Supreme Council agreed to let the Information Minister, Mr Hussain Bayoomi, try to form a broadly-based caretaker Government with which to attract nationalist elements from the N.L.F. and F.L.O.S.Y. Once Bayoomi, as Prime Minister-designate, had formed the nucleus of his new administration the Supreme Council undertook to step down. Customary Fiasco The whole exercise—as things seem to have a habit of doing in South Arabia—now appears to have ended in fiasco. Both the N.L.F. and F.L.O.S.Y. announced they would kill anyone joining the Bayoomi administration, so that he was unable even to reveal publicly the names of the eight candidates who had agreed to join. Some of the names, however, did leak out and two future Ministers received death threats and promptly withdrew. The Supreme Council then refused to approve the remainder of Bayoomi’s candidates on the grounds that they were not of the right calibre or sufficiently representative. Some members of the Supreme Council were also reported to be reluctant to give up their £350-a-month jobs with car, house and bodyguard thrown in. The whole operation has therefore served only further to weaken and discredit the authority of the Federal Government and the sultans. Britain is also trying another line of approach to break the political deadlock.

This is through direct contacts between Britain and the two terrorist groups to try to persuade them to give up violence and co-operate in a coalition Government. The visit of the British High Commissioner, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, to New York, was directed towards this end. The U.N. Mission Britain still considers that the United Nations mission to Aden—in spite of its disastrous past record—can play a constructive role in all this. One of the few rays of hope in the last month has been a statement by the N.L.F. that it Would be prepared to send a delegation to New York for talks with the United Nations, for this is the first time the N.L.F. has offered to come into the open and talk. The rivalry between the two organisations presents one of the major problems. Another is that in South Arabia there is no single strong and popular leader—no Makarios and no Kenyatta with whom to deal.

In the last few months the N.L.F. has become the stronger of the two terrorist groups and has taken a savage toll of F.L.O.S.Y. supporters. Most of the 50 known victims of gang murders—and there are many more unrecorded—are F.L.O.S.Y. members. Others, like the mayor of Crater, have been kidnapped by the N.L.F., and hundreds of F.L.O.S.Y. sympathisers have fled the country. Those that remain are now looking forward with diminishing enthusiasm to the prospect of being left to their fate after the British withdraws! Unlike F.L.0.5.Y., which is Egyptian-sponsored and financed, the N.L.F. is a more genuine nationalist movement opposed to Britain, the sultans and Egyptian influence. The Strongest Force Because their philosophy is basically negative and destructive they are not the easiest people for Britain to negotiate with. But they are probably the strongest single political force in the country. F.L.0.5.Y., on the other hand, is growing weaker and is repoted to be getting considerably less aid from Egypt since the Egyptian defeat.

With the 9000 British families back in England and the shops and beaches deserted British security forces are now planning the last phase of their withdrawal. Within the next two months the paratroops are to be withdrawn from Sheikh Othman township and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from Crater, and will be replaced by troops of the South Arabian Army. The parachute regiment will then defend an 8000-yard perimeter from Khormaksar airfield—the maximum estimated range of hostile mortars. The sooner the British troops can be removed from the thankless and dangerous task of maintaining security in Arab towns the better. It remains to be seen how the Federal troops will cope, but one encouraging sign has been the fact that the upcountry States have been comparatively quiet since the British troops handed over to the Federal Army.

Realism Needed The one hope now is that a new sense of realism may emerge among the political factions as the deadline draws nearer for the British departure. But in fairness to the people of South Arabia and to ourselves Britain should now state clearly that if chaos comes we can no longer be held responsible. The fate of South Arabia is now in its own hands. It should also be made quite plain—especially to the South Arabian Army—that the £6O million of British economic and military aid will not be poured into a vacuum or given to a Government hostile to British interests. “Nothing concentrates a man’s mind so wonderfully as the prospect of being hanged on the morrow.” It is to be hoped that the minds of South Arabia’s leaders may now give up the diversions of internal feuds and concentrate on January 9, 1968.