The A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty Examined

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31327, 25 March 1967, Page 4

The A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty Examined

The A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty Alliance. By J. G. Starke. Melbourne University Press. 294 pp. Bibliography and Index. Treaty making is partly an art, partly a technique—as an art it consists in achieving the limits of what is possible, and as a technique in giving accurate expression to political and legal realities. Judged in this way the A.N.Z.U.S. security treaty signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States on September 1, 1951, is a significant example Of negotiating skill. It reached the limits of possibility in that the three signatories, each with different conceptions of the need, extent and scope of security commitments in the Pacific area, eventually agreed on terms for the treaty. And in technique it gave form and substance to a political reality of long-standing—-the de facto alliance of the three countries in the Pacific. In this first extensive study of what must be New Zealand’s most important military treaty, an authority on international law surveys and analyses the document’s text, historical background and purposes. Mr Starke compares it with other regional security treaties entered into by the United States, and with N.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O, and suggests possible revisions to meet modern developments. Mr Starke’s final analysis is that the A.N.Z.U.S. alliance has worked reasonably well so far, and ought to continue in the same way in the future. It is a durable alliance, and much more significant for Australia and New Zealand than the S.E.A.T.O. treaty which some commentators suggest has superseded it’ S.E.A.T.O. is a specifically anti-Communist alliance, but the scope of A.N.Z.U.S., formulated at the time of the peace treaty with Japan, is much wider. The essential paragraph (Article IV) reads: “Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accord with its constitutional processes.” This extract should also emphasise two other important aspects of the treaty—its simplicity (it is very short, consisting of a preamble and 11 articles) and at the same time a certain lack of clarity of definition. There is, for example, no automatic assumption that an attack upon one party will be taken as an attack upon all, as in the N.A.T.O. treaty. Nor is there any attempt to specify exactly the limits of the “Pacific Area” though certain de facto limits are suggested by the failure of the United States to invoke A.N.Z.U.S. after its warships were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin. Mr Starke’s careful scrutiny of the origins of the treaty, and the motives of the three parties in finally signing, deserves close reading. These events took place in the

period when New Zealand and Australia were for the first time developing a foreign policy position and machinery distinct from that of Britain. A.N.Z.U.S. was an exercise in the emergence of national consciousness in the South Pacific, as well as a recognition of the realities of power in the area. The declaratory nature of the treaty makes clear that it was the desire of the parties “to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity”—it is a formalisation of existing relationships. But A.N.Z.U.S. is more than that, for it does impose new obligations on the parties, including that of developing and maintaining their individual capacity of self-defence. Mr Starke shows that John Foster Dulles, as chief negotiator for President Truman, saw A.N.Z.U.S. as one of a series of interlocking defensive treaties covering the Asian off-shore island chain from the Aleutians through Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines and Australia to New Zealand. Mr Starke calls this: “A unique westward extension of the Monroe Doctrine.” While not an apologist for A.N.Z.U.S., or for any aspects of the parties to the treaty, the author is generally in favour, within the limitations of his careful legalistic language. His one great criticism is of the relative lack of publicity A.N.Z.U.S. has received. He states, quite rightly, that people must know about the treaty if they are to support it, and that they must be informed not only of its aspirations but also of its achievements. His book is a painstaking attempt to fulfil this task, but its very thoroughness and scholarship may partly defeat the purpose. What is needed now is a more “popular” account derived from the extensive material Mr Starke has brought together. In considering certain more general issues associated with the treaty Mr Starke finds little prospect for widening

A.N.Z.U.S. into a comprehensive Pacific pact. An essential condition, that the countries concerned should wish to substitute such a treaty for their existing arrangements, is lacking. New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines are still reluctant to participate with Japan in a regional security organisation where joint military planning might become necessary; there is a reluctance to become involved with China; and the chequered career of S.E.A.T.O. has revealed the difficulties of even a limited general security system in the area. A.N.Z.U.S. in its present form, because of its simplicity, has provided its members with machinery for co-opera-tion which is integrated, inexpensive and smoothly working. It should survive, ■regardless of the future of S.E.A.T.O. One final issue remains—the role of the American nuclear deterrent in A.N.Z.U.S. The United States is entitled to use the deterrent, but not bound to do so. As in N.A.T.0., the matter remains one for its judgment and in any given situation it may see its own survival as the principal objective. Mr Starke rightly warns that: “Foreign affairs analysts do not these days assess the ‘credibility’ of American mutual defence commitments only according to nuances of interpretation of the relevant treaty of alliance. They apply the simple, rugged ‘what-will-happen-when-the-chips-are-down’ criterion.” He therefore examines unsentimentally the stake America has in maintaining the security and independence of Australia and New Zealand. There are many factors working in favour of the junior partners in the alliance—their unlimited disposal as base territories for the United States, their pool of highly trained scientific and technological manpower, and

such recent developments as the North West Cape naval communications station in Australia which forms an essential part of the United States Polaris deterrent network. The final conclusion—“any default by the United States in the performance of its covenants under A.N.Z.U.S. is not only improbable, but unthinkable.”

On the often-debated issue of the power of Australia or New Zealand to influence American behaviour through the alliance Mr Starke points out that A.N.Z.U.S. is only one, and far from the most important, of American defence alliances. That nation cannot give primacy to any one regional commitment. Under A.N.Z.U.S. there is smooth and continuous consultation between the parties which reduces mutual irritations and at worst has created an atmosphere in which the members may “agree to disagree.” New Zealand and Australia chose freely to join A.N.Z.U.S. and they must accept its burdens as well as its bounties. Just what is involved in this process, and why, can be found in Mr Starke’s thorough and excellent book.