Rhodesia’s Neighbour DR. VERWOERD’S EQUIVOCAL ATTITUDE TO MR SMITH

Press, Volume CV, Issue 30983, 12 February 1966, Page 14

Rhodesia’s Neighbour DR. VERWOERD’S EQUIVOCAL ATTITUDE TO MR SMITH

[By the Johannesburg Correspondent oj the Financial Ti [Reprinted by arrangement.} Thirteen weeks after U.D.L, South African'remainsVtrondv are becoming clear. While public feeling in the Rep 4 blooii in favour of Mr Smith —in favour, even, of giving , . „ r. rnl „ n( i brothers to the North” open support. Dr Verwoerd The maim cool grip on the situation and on the emotions of hlb fol J° V erS -J h 'Su] tenance of South Africa’s neutrality is, perhaps, one of his most skilful achievements.

From the outset, his policy has been one of scrupulous correctness. At times, as with the petrol gifts decision, this neutrality has been bent in favour of Rhodesia. But Britain has apparently been aware of the great pressures upon Dr. Verwoerd, and has been careful to avoid taking any measures that would make his position untenable. No Commitments

Smith, without any doubt has been sadly disappointed at both the quantity and the quality of the aid he has received from Pretoria. The planning that preceded U.D.I. was pathetically inadequate. To a degree, perhaps this was because Salisbury thought it could depend fully on its friends in Pretoria and Lisbon. If this is so, it is just another example of the extent to which Smith miscalculated, for it is highly improbable that Pretoria made any firm commitments in advance. London, clearly, was better informed. In many of Whitehall’s actions (and in some of its lack of action, particularly over the Reserve Bank's affairs) there was a very real understanding of Dr. Verwoerd’s problems—as well as a very real desire not to embarrass him unduly in his solution of them. There is an impression here that relations between London and Pretoria are better at the moment than they have been for a very long time. But the next two months are critical. March Election Dr. Verwoerd has decided to have his General Election on March 30. The Rhodesian situation, and his handling of it so far, will be one of the main planks of the Opposition’s attack on Dr. Verwoerd. The United Party leader. Sir de Villiers Graaff, has continued strongly to advocate support for, and recognition of, Smith ever since his first outburst on U.D.1.-day. There is no doubt that this approach appeals to many of the Prime Minister’s supporters much more than does the Government’s own policy. Dr. Verwoerd’s manoeuvrability therefore looks like being heavily restricted in the next few weeks. There is no doubt that he will win the election, and probably with an enhanced majority, but no sensible political leader deliberately upsets his supporters during an election campaign. So Dr. Verwoerd will have to appear to be more favourably disposed to Smith from now until March 30. And Whitehall will have to continue to be very understanding. In his very few major speeches on Rhodesia, the South African Prime Minister has sat very heavily on the fence. Perhaps his most important policy declaration

was that contained in his New Year's message. This had all the ingredients necessary to make his seat on the fence as comfortable as possible. First there was support for Rhodesia: “The declaration of independence in Rhodesia, our closest neighbour, with whom bonds of friendship and economic ties have grown through the years, has created a situation from which the Republic cannot escape. We have blood relations over the border. However others may act or feel towards their kith and kin when their international interests are at stake, South Africans on the whole cannot cold shoulder theirs.” Participation Avoided

Next, there was the restatement of neutrality: “The Government carefully avoids participation in this domestic confrontation between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia by continuing regular relations with both.” Then came a warning to Whitehall: “It would be idle to hide, however, that most South Africans are convinced that it would neither be just, advantageous nor wise to White or Black in Rhodesia to seek to hasten Black Government, whether at the pace Rhodesia professes to support or at the somewhat slower rate to which the United

Kingdom Government and those enlisted in its service, seem to be committed.” He continued with a restatement of South African independence: “I feel compelled to point out these strong South African views because they clearly indicate that I may not remain silent on attempts bv the Prime Ministed of Great Britain, if reported correctly, to suggest that the South African Government is acting or will act in such a manner, or has even privately given certain assurances to Britain, which would be tantamount to secret support of certain measures or sanctions aimed at RhodesiaThis would in fact mean participating in them, and therefore actively choosing sides.” Election Material

Many of these words taken in or out of context —will be used by all political parties here in the next few weeks as evidence both for and against Dr. Verwoerd. It seems clear that mainly, but not solely, for electoral reasons that Dr. Verwoerd is likely to adopt a seemingly more pro-Smith line in the weeks ahead. It is unlikely that the words he may use will be backed by action, but the understanding and tolerance of Whitehall will be tested to the utmost between now and the end of March.