AUSTRALIA THE THINKING BEHIND LONG TERM DEFENCE POLICY

Press, Volume CV, Issue 30952, 7 January 1966, Page 8

AUSTRALIA THE THINKING BEHIND LONG TERM DEFENCE POLICY

IBy the Canberra correspondent of "The Times ') (Reprinted from "The Times")

When a country appears to be in danger its defence policy looks simple. “Get with your friends and beat your enemies, is the maxim, and all else flows from it—treaties, agreements, joint plans, even the character of the country’s own armed forces. In the last few years Australians have believed their country to be in such danger that they have doubled their defence vote, which is becoming respectable, and introduced conscription for service overseas. There arc more permanent servicemen under arms today, than there were during the Korean wai.

China is believed to be the great danger, with North Vietnam the immediate threat and Indonesia a nuisance. So the policy is to make Australia as useful as possible to her principal allies, Britain and the United States, in return for their protection under Seato, Anzus, and the Anzam Commonwealth connexion.

Seeking Security

The more useful we are now in theatres well away from Australia, the more we protect ourselves and the more we get protected by others and keep the wars away from Australia. So runs the reasonable argument of a government with which the people are happy. But what will happen to the argument when Sir Robert Menzies retires and the cauldron of politics boils, as is likely? Also, how stable are the instabilities of South-east Asia?

For the moment Australians are keen to spend and serve for their security. But the mood may well pass and with it the chance to make a viable, independent Australian defence capacity, to support national policy and protect national interests. “How can we integrate our forces with yours?” is a question too often asked in Washington on the assumption that, as a quid pro q"o, Australian forces will not have to provide all their own logistic support. And the irony is that the United States would prefer a self-reliant Australian military complex, able on its own to take care of its own backyard in Asia. This ideal is not incompatible with being a very useful ally. Australians will eat of the lotus again, and when danger returns it may have to be faced alone. When important allies are preoccupied, they interpret treaties rather bleakly and there is nothing one can do about it.

No-one living in Canberra can fail to be aware of the ideas which ebb and flow beneath the still waters of official defence policy. To write about these ideas now is not to imply that they will soon be affecting the policy of this or any other Australian Government. But they will, I think, become influential, as events begin to make them relevant.

British Presence For the moment, however, the dominant view in Canberra is that Indonesia’s “confrontation” of Malaysia will gradually come to an end. The British forces in the area will be reduced, but a useful, stabilising British presence will remain. It will probably come to be accepted by a different sort of Indonesian Government, more concerned with economic and social justice at home than adventures abroad. Australia will continue to help Malaysia, but the bulk of her forces overseas will be gathered together under an Australian commander and committed to the cause of South Vietnam. Within a year this Australian contribution will be big enough to impress even the United States. As for China, she will be locked up at home by America’s superiority in nuclear firepower. The Indian Ocean will be made safe by a joint British American commitment, supported by Australia and based on Singapore and the Chagos islands.

It is a reassuring assessment and it may be accurate over the next few years. But defence programmes have to be planned for decades, and another school of thought here sees no end to “confrontation” until all British forces are withdrawn from the area —which might eventually make this an Australian interest, too. If Australia goes on supporting actively a continued British presence, then she will also be “confronted," in Papua and New Guinea and possibly m northern Australia too. What then of the Anzus pact? And what of the Anzam arrangement? This school of thought believes that once the British have reduced their forces substantially in South-east Asia

thev will not come back again in strength. The British reaction, and the American reaction, will be: “Against Indonesia, the Australians ought to be able to look after themselves and help Malaysia too.” Indeed they should. But will they have by then a balanced, viable national strength to do the job? Will Australia, still lacking offensive power, be forced to slog it out for ages on the ground in Papua-New Guinea and in her own north?

The danger is that the Australian Army, expended to meet the needs of its allies, will have swallowed up the money which should have been spent on its Navy and Air Force; and the Army itself will still be too dependent upon the logistic support of its allies. How, for example, do you fight a long jungle war without heavy-lift helicopters? If Australia were able to sustain even a limited offensive on her own, Indonesia would be much less likely to “confront” her. Perhaps more important, the United States, fearing a violent Australian reaction to Indonesia border forays and the spread of a local war, would be much more likely to use her diplomatic power to dissuade the Indonesians from “confrontation.”

All this presupposes a hostile Indonesia. Another contingency is a friendly Indonesia, linked by some agreement to Australia and no longer “confronting” Malaysia. If the central Government in Jakarta were threatened by disaffection in Sumatra or the Celebes and appealed to Australia for help, what could Australia do without viable forces of her own? It might be that Britain and the United States would prefer to see a weak, divided Indonesia. If Australia could do nothing positive by herself, then her policy would count for less in London and Washington. It has to be accepted that within 10 years the vital interests of Australia may not always be acceptable to her allies. Suppose, for example, that the Malaysian federation broke up. Would all the parts still be defended by Australia? I cannot see Australia accepting this commitment. Much more likely would be

an Australian rapprochement with Indonesia. If Britain objected privately to this (as she did to the Anzus pact), which people in the long term will be the most natural allies of Australia—loo million neighbouring Indonesians or 50 million British on the other side of the world? It is wise to expect the unexpected. Japan, for example, might well begin to dominate and try to divide the Indo nesian archipelago, by trade and aid and other pressures not unconnected with her very adequate “self-defence" forces. Would Australia want this? Britain and the United States, with trading interests different from Australia's and no vital strategic interest in the area, might not mind. Australia would have to sustain by herself her own particular policy.

Need For Decision In two or three years she will be quite close to being able to do just this. Extra decisions taken now, which would not demand an effort out of proportion to her growth, could give Australia the viable, self-reliant forces she needs. The Army will soon have eight battalions and conscription gives it the power to increase quickly. In three years the Navy will have its existing carrier, three guided missile destroyers, six type 12 escorts, 20 patrol vessels, four Oberon class submarines, mine-sweepers, and a range of ships in support and reserve. In three years the Air Force will have 24 FIIIA bombers, 100 Mirage fighters, and a modern range of transport and reconnaissance aircraft and light helicopters, in addition to its obsolescent but useful Sabres and Canberras. But the Australian forces will still be unable to transport and sustain by air one whole division or to mount an amphibious operation of the same size. The Air Force will have only two mobile radar systems, instead of three or four. The Navy will have no replacement coming along for the carrier Melbourne. Finally, it seems that the only new defence base in Australia will be one for submarines at ■Albany in the extreme southwest. A replacement here for Singapore is not being considered in practical terms.