U.S. Unenthusiastic On Peace Mission

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30783, 22 June 1965, Page 15

U.S. Unenthusiastic On Peace Mission

IBy FRANK OLIVER, Special Correspondent N Z.P.A.]

WASHINGTON.

Although President Johnson gave his instantaneous blessing to the idea of the Wilson peace mission the idea has not aroused any great enthusiasm in the United States.

People remember the Chinese snub to the Gordon Walker mission and the general feeling is that no-one who has given official support to the Johnson policies has much chance as an arbitrator between Washington and Peking or even between Washington and Moscow.

Everybody recognises that at this point at least the most important factory in this tangled and, to some, fright-

ening situation in Vietnam is Peking and no-one can find any sign that Peking really wants to talk to Washington or any arbitrator speaking for peace between Washington and Peking. Indeed all reliable reports coming from the Far East seem to reiterate that Peking feels Hanoi is winning the war, or at least that the United States is defeating itself and its aims there, and is content to let the situation ride, being under no compulsion to do anything at this stage. ‘Willing To Talk’

It is becoming increasingly obvious that although the Administration has not the remotest intention of withdrawing it is willing and even anxious to talk peace. It is a little ironic that just as the public opinion polls show that Mr Johnson has regained the small degree of public approval he lost a little while ago he stands in danger of losing some of the Republican support he has enjoyed for his policies in South-east Asia. There are rumbles in Congress as some Republicans say rather frankly they feel their support is being treated in a cavalier way if the Fulbright suggestion for a holding action in Vietnam reflects a change in Administration policy.

Fulbright’s Speech

They are well aware that the President has been seeing a good deal of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee lately and feel that the Fulbright speech was either a trial balloon or reflected a change of policy already decided upon. The very definite impression has grown up in conservative Republican circles that the President and Defence Secretary were on what might be called the Goldwater policy and recent reports of possible further growth in the war and commitment of many more American troops to the fray caused them no disquiet. Now they have doubts about the Johnson intention of having a bigger and better war and they are disgruntled and feel they have been let down, even let down badly. Some Republican leaders make it plain they want total victory with main reliance on heavier and heavier aerial

bombardment with sanctuary withdrawn from both Hanoi and Haiphong. Yet another ironic factor for the President is that just as conservative Republicans begin to say they feel he is letting them down by softening up, the President’s critics on the Democratic side of Congress, who have been almost silent since his Baltimore speech, announce they are about to resume the barrage of criticism from their side. The general belief in Washington seems to be that the Fulbright speech is either a completely independent statement by a man who thinks deeply about foreign affairs and knows a great deal about them or it is a trial balloon the President wanted hoisted and he got Fulbright to release it because of his authority and the fact that it fitted in with Fulbright thinking. There is, at this stage, great debate in both Congressional and official circles about military strategy in Vietnam. The only part of the debate one hears about, of course, is in the Congress. The Conservatives feel and seem to feel strongly that the idea of bombing to force Hanoi to the conference table was a pretty good idea but that it has rot achieved its purpose it should be stepped up. They call for “more significant targets” because this would avoid the needless waste of American lives in ground fighting. James Reston indicates that there is a lot of support for this policy in the Pentagon.