Vietnam

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30677, 17 February 1965, Page 12

Vietnam

Sir, —In answer to “F.W.P.F.” I quote Senator Wayne Morse: “. . . The U.S refused to sign the Geneva Accord of 1954, which ended the war. And we prevailed upon a new government we had chosen to back in South Vietnam not to sign it either. We began to send military aid early in 1955. . . .” This, coupled with the conspiracy to prevent free elections promised under the accords in 1956, marked the first giant strides made by the United States to violate the accords which it never signed, yet consistently accused North Vietnam of violating. As Morse says, “It has never been explained why we have any business enforcing by force of arms an agreement to which neither we nor our client country is a signatory.” 1939 is different from 1965 in that we now support imposition of a dictatorship upon another people, whereas then we opposed such things.—Yours, etc., L. F. J. ROSS. February 15, 1965.

Sir,—Are “F.W.P.F.’s” bifocals so blurred with stars and stripes that he cannot see the difference between peace negotiations and appeasement? The Governments of Japan, India, Burma, and France, to mention only a few, are calling for negotiation. Surely he does not suggest that they do this through weakness, or any wish to appease an aggressor. If any appeasement exists it lies in the failure of the New Zealand Government to have an independent foreign policy not committed to follow the United States right or wrong. —Yours, etc., COLIN M. CURTIS. February 16, 1965.

Sir, —What do these worthy people who flourish banners or slogans outside embassies and consulates know of what is actually going on, except what they read, which is probably more than half propaganda, one way or the other? —Yours, etc., M.T. February 16, 1965.

Sir, —Your correspondent, L. F. J. Ross, is to be congratulated on his sober and realistic survey of the situation in Vietnam. Massive intervention in South-east Asia by Western forces will not solve any of the problems that beset that area; rather, they could aggravate even further the already explosive situation. I would think that the logical thing would be for the Powers concerned to sit down at the conference table before the fighting starts. —Yours, etc., CRITICUS. February 15, 1965.