The Cost Of Goa

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29791, 6 April 1962, Page 10

The Cost Of Goa

With India's General Election out of the way, a start can be made on casting up the accounts for the Goa affair of last December. The results are likely to become more and more disquieting for Mr Nehru and the Congress Party. For weeks the interests of those most immediately affected by India’s aggression—the Goans themselves were forgotten in the outburst of international dismay that India should thus have diminished its stature among the uncommitted nations of the world. Among the reasons suggested for ’ Mr Nehru’s astonishing betrayal of Gandhian principles were a desire to impress upon likeminded countries—principally the Communist bloc— India’s devotion to the anticolonial cause, and the Congress Party’s resolve to demonstrate before Pakistani eyes its unequivocal firmness in asserting territorial claims. As an expression of Indian nationhood the Goa campaign served to release popular hysteria, from which the less moderate sections of the Congress Party stood to profit at the elections. One consequence appears to have been increased power for politicians such as the vitriolic Mr Menon, to whom ideologies loom larger than practical economics. Already Mr Nehru may rue his concurrence in the Goa affair. W’ithout the exercise of force, the alienation of friends, or the loss of international prestige, India might well have waited for time alone to perfect an acceptable association with Goa. In the event. India, by its resort to violence, invalidated its most powerful moral argument against Communist China’s incursions on the northern frontier.

Economically, the accession of Goa has proved far worse than embarrassing. Long before a date was fixed for the General Election. India was in grave

economic difficulties. Its plight has been worsened by the Goan operation. Because half the Indian railway system was tied up moving troops for the first 10 days of December, critical fuel shortages were

created. In Ahmedabad alone, the Manchester of India, 130,000 factory workers were made idle through lack of coal. Moreover, since Goa was seized the sources of external aid

for India have noticeably contracted. Holland, for i instance, has refused longi term credits because of the incitement that Mr Nehru’s 1 action afforded President Soekarno over West New Guinea. The so-called “Aid “India Club” thus reaches a crisis in its attempts to foster sound, democratic growth. Russian help to make good the outstanding requirements of India’s third five-year plan appears improbable. Mr Nehru may therefore be forced toi modify his Government’s programme in accordance! with Western desires,; merely to maintain his! economic schedule. There remain Goa’s internal problems. To compare this territory as it was before the Indian assault with Angola or any other ‘ Portuguese domain would 'be not only unfair to Portugal but unjust to the Goans. Goa could have been declared an independent nation; if it had gone the way of Brazil, neither Portuguese pride nor Goan aspirations would have been offended against. Goa ; was Portugal’s show-piece ' in Asia. Many of its inhabi- ' cants are Christians; most ■ are Portuguese in all but race. Admittedly, after 1947. links with India became; more appealing to some! 1 Goans. From 1955, however,; the Portuguese organised! 1 intensive exploitation of the iron and manganese ore industries. Last December Goa was virtually selfsupporting; Portugal and 1 other Portuguese territories were taking only 10 per cent, of its exports, and supplied only 3 per cent, of its imports. The 450-year evolution of Goa as an outpost; of Europe should dictate : special treatment of its; social and constitutional; problems. Mr Nehru seems determined to break down Goan self-sufficiency and communal separateness.; This is a dangerous course! which, if recklessly’ pur-! sued, could damage further; India’s international repute.