One Germany Or Two ?

Press, Volume C, Issue 29633, 2 October 1961, Page 10

One Germany Or Two ?

General Lucius D. Clay caused a stir by his remarks in Berlin about “the “ reality of two Germanies”; but he only put into words what many prominent persons have been thinking for years. Their thought has been given fresh intensity since Mr Khrushchev moved against Berlin and made it clear that the only alternative, short of war, to “two “ Germanies ” was reunification under communism. West Berlin is not the prize for which Mr Khrushchev is risking nuclear war. He believes he can leave it to withe* on the vine now that its tap root to East Germany has been severed. While the Western allies strive, as they must, to preserve the independence of West Berlin, Mr Khrushchev is looking further afield. He has no occasion to tear a united Germany tut grounds for real hope of a united Germany as a salient thrust deep into the capitalist West. He might achieve his end if he cculd show the people of West Germany that they must look to Russia if they wish to rebuild a single nation. As long tu Germans are still distressed by the brutal division of Berlin they are not likely to pay much heed. But what will happen when tempers cool? After all Russia and Germany have been in alliance before, and as recently as 20 years ago. The Germans naturally hanker after being one people again, with Berlin restored to its old greatness. By reunion they mean more than the linking of the occupation zones. Their maps show the territory east of the Oder-Neisse Line marked as “Polfch “ administration " and East Prussia as divided into two segments—" Soviet admin- “ istration " and * Polish * administration ". When the time seems ripe Mr Khrushchev will have some valuable hostages for ransom.

If the Western alliance will not go to war to unify Germany—and it avoided doing so in 1953—the only alternative it can contemplate is the existence of two Germanies. Its leaders refrain from saying so for fear of admitting defeat and driving West Germany into Russian arms. Mr Khrushchev’s successful investment of Berlin makes it difficult for the alliance to maintain the pretence.*, and imperative to strengthen the relationship between West Germany and the rest of Western Europe. The choice is between a free, united Western Europe and a .Communist, united Germany; and Dr. Adenauer and other far-sighted Germans have long since made their election, with the help of far-sighted Europeans. The commitment is not complete. Politically, Western Europe has been drawing doser together through the European Economic Community; but politics in West Germany are beginning to take a new course. Possibly, the one decisive action that could keep West Germany safe would be the admission of Britain to the E.E.C. with the new impetus that would give to the confederation. This would call for concessions from the original Six, but also for concessions from Britain (and the Commonwealth). The situation is too complicated for Mr Macmillan to make such a grand, simple gesture as Sir Winston Churchill’s offer of organic union to France. On the other hand, events are not moving quite as quickly as they were in 1940, though we may have little enough time to prevent a united Germany from again threatening the* peace of the world.