The Press MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1961. Syrian Revolt

Press, Volume C, Issue 29633, 2 October 1961, Page 10

The Press MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1961. Syrian Revolt

Arab unity of the sort desired in Cairo appears to have been downed by Syria’s withdrawal from the United Arab Republic. Because President Nasser has suffered hist wont reverse, the prophets of unity must now seek a new master, under whose guidance a, more acceptable formula may be found. Yet, when all the obstacles and difficulties are recalled, how did the UA..R. survive so long? How, indeed, was it ever formed? Only the revolutionary dynamism of the Egyptian President inverted with hope the fusion of Egypt and Syria—countries without a common frontier, dissimilar in size and population, and handicapped by the political instability of their past. Historically, Syria, with its large Christian minority, is more akin to the IraqL and the Lebanese than to the Egyptians. Such considerations were forgotten while the Egyptian revolution retained its initial appeal to the Syrian masses.

Many influences quickly combined to arouse Syrian dislike of the federal yoke. Prolonged drought and economic stringency aggravated President Nasser’s problems of reorganising the Syrian administration ■nd of introducing the social reforms to which he was committed. More and more the Syrians were conscious of tlie overwhelming dominance of Egypt in their common affairs. Syria’s former political organisations were suppressed in favour of the cumbersome one-party system of National Union; and disaffection was thrust underground. Antagonism to Egypt was fomented most actively by Jordan, which consistently advocated the concept of the “ Fertile “ Crescent ” —an association of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon—as a stronger basis for Arab unity than President Nasser’s U.A.R. iraqi support for the ** Fertile Crescent" ideal added economic force to Jordan’s argument. Egyptian, nervousness about attempts to split the U.A.R. maniferted itself in pressure to prevent Lebanon being

used as a base for espionage i and terrorism. A major cause of friction between the two regions of the U.A.R. was the progressive centralisation of aJ government agencies in ’ Cairo. In September, 1960, Colonel Abdel Hamid Serraj, a Syrian national, became chairman of the Syrian Council of Ministers, and replaced President Nasser’s Egyptian confidant Marshal Amer, as the effective dictator of Syria. Since then, because of Colonel Serraj’s ascendancy over the Syrian police and Army. President Nasser has depended increasingly upon him to restrain outbursts of Syrian nationalism. Colonel Serraj’s recent transfer to Cairo was a futile attempt to tighten administrative bonds with Syria. At no stage, however, could President Nasser rely indefinitely upon Colonel Serraj’s loyalty to the U.A.R. It is probably not too much to say that Colonel Serraj’s defection decided the time of the Syrian revolt; but the origins of the revolt were far more complex. President Nasser’s brand of socialism was never likely to please conservative elements in Syria; it was opposed also by many Leftist groups. On July 19, the ninth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, President Nasser announced steps to give the State control over most of the major industrial and financial concerns in the U.A.R Nationalisation of banks and insurance companies was to be extended to Syria; the State was to participate in many more industrial activities; and. landholdings were to be further subdivided. To facilitate the process the status of the regional administrations was reduced, and the headquarters of the Syrian administration (led by Colonel Serraj) was moved from Damascus co Cairo. Thus President Nasser sought to give fresh revolutionary momentum to hjs united republic. The result appears to have been to antagonise more sections of the Syrian people, and finally to provoke a breach with Egypt.