Review Of U.S. Military Intelligence

Press, Volume C, Issue 29604, 29 August 1961, Page 14

Review Of U.S. Military Intelligence

Neither the Kennedy Administration nor the American people have forgotten the Cuban invasion fiasco, for which the inefficiency or inadequacy of the United States intelligence services has been blamed. Mr Kennedy’s reverse thus early in his term was all the more galling because the concluding months of Mr Eisenhower’s Presidency had been clouded by the U-2 incident, itself a consequence of ill-judged intelligence. It is not surprising, therefore, that a drastic ■overhaul of intelligence services has received high priority among Mr Kennedy’s proposals for strengthening America and the West against the latest rigours of the cold war. Generally the Americans can claim better success for their security system than the other North Atlantic allies. But because America is the keystone as well as the foundation of Western defence, American security needs to be as foolproof as possible. Moreover, in an age of speed and nuclear arms, co-ordination and verification of intelligence must be far more exact than ever before. President Kennedy’s preparations for this overhaul were twofold > first, soon after the Cuban affair, he appointed a special committee headed by the Attorney-General (Mr Robert Kennedy) to investigate the Central Intelligence Agency; second, he authorised General Maxwell D. Taylor, a former Army Chief of Staff, to study intelligence activities as part of his assignment as personal military . adviser to the President. The results of these investigations are now apparent in reported proposals for changes within the C.1.A., and for the appointment of a coordinator who would be responsible for the final analysis and communication of military intelligence This scheme, the Ad ministration hopes, would ensure more fruitful liaison j among the intelligence ser-

vices of the various armed forces. Even since the Cuban affair the C.1.A., headed by Mr Allen Dulles, a brother of John Foster Dulles, has not lacked defenders. “ What is amazing ”, wrote Joseph Alsop, “is not that “the story [of the C.I.A.] “shows one bad failure. “What is amazing is that “this agency stood up so “well for so long under “ the burden it was im- “ properly required to “ carry According to David Lawrence, who commands respect in Rightwing circles, “the Soviet “ Union is looking to its “ biggest victory in the cold “war—the possible disruption and disintegration of “the C.1.A., which has for “many years been a thorn “ in the side of international “ communism ”. Critics of President Kennedy sometimes ' forget that international changes since Mr Eisenhower’s Camp David negotiations with Mr Khrushchev made inevitable a review of intelligence efficiency. Unfortunately the President’s methods of dealing with administrative problems have increased the opportunities for political controversy. For instance, his approval of F. 8.1. inquiries into a recent news “ leak ” was resented at the Pentagon. In addition Mr Kennedy is hampered by the general rule that, because secrecy is all-important, no government can ventilate fully its views on espionage.