COMMAND DECISIONS

Press, Volume C, Issue 29536, 10 June 1961, Page 3

COMMAND DECISIONS

Command Decisions. Edited by K. R. Greenfield. Methuen. This book, first published in America ,and now- available in an English edition, is made up of 20 chapters, each of which deals with an important decision taken at a high level during the Second World Wait Apart from the introduction by Cyril Falls, all the chapters are by Americans who are past or present members of the Office of the Chief of Military History, a staff division responsible for preparing a detailed official account of the United States Army’s record in the war. As professional military historians, these writers use a jargon which may not always please the general reader.' In addition, theqr continue to use code names which may have, been necessary for security’ireasohs or for'convenience during the war but which are of no great value today. Thus the reader of the first chapter will .find that the statement, “Rainbow 3 established virtually the same conditions as the . Orange plan” will send him searching hack to discover just what these names stood,for. In the process. he may discover that Rainbow 5 resembled Rainbow 2 in assuming the active collaboration of Great Britain and France but differed so far as American effort in the Pacific was concerned. “Germany First: the Basic Concept of Allied Strategy" and “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb” are probably the most interesting chapters. In the former, the basic differences in outlook between the British and the Americans are examined as' are the grounds for their

adoption of joint strategic objectives. The chapter on the A-bomb decision reveals some interesting points. Thus, the scientists engaged on the production of the atomic bomb were much divided on its use. About two-thirds of the 64 who voted wanted a preliminary demonstration of the power of the new weapon given to the world before it was used against Japanese cities and people; the remainder were divided on “all-out use or no use at all,” Some of the highest ranking officers never believed that the bomb would work at all. Admiral Leahy remained unconvinced until after the successful dropping of the first A-bombs. He told the President: ‘This is the biggest fool thing we have ever done. The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives.” But the bomb did go off and a new chapter in military history was opened. The writer of this chapter makes., it clear that Japan was already well and truly beaten before the bomb was dropped and that only the demand for unconditional surrender kept the Japanese in the war. As to the effect of the bomb, he is uncertain: “What finally forced the Japanese to surrender? Was it air bombardment, naval power, the atomic bomb, or Soviet entry?” He then lists exponents of each viewpoint. Three of the chapters deal with German decisions. These are concerned with the invasion of Norway and Denmark, Hitler's anxiety to hold on in Italy, and the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes. The capture of German documents by the Americans made the writing of these chapters simpler and more authoritative. All three show that Hitler was something of a gambler, hoping for a miracle that never came. Members of the 2nd New Zealand Division who fought in Italy may be interested in the comment on Hitler's decision to hold and defend the Bernhard Line which set the stage for the bloody battles of Cassino and Anzio: “Kesselring’s best claim for success can only be that he lost a campaign more slowly. The time Kesselring may have gained for Hitler could not be put to use to change the fortunes of war.” This book is not easily read and it will not appeal particularly to the general reader. Nevertheless, each chapter contains information of interest and value on the military reasons for and the consequences of 20 of the most important decisions taken during the Second World War. Enthusiasts for military history will make the effort required to get and read this book, not least because it gives official American conclusions.