Union Loses Appeal Over Expenses Payment

Press, Volume C, Issue 29508, 9 May 1961, Page 22

Union Loses Appeal Over Expenses Payment

(New Zealand Press Association)

WELLINGTON, May 8. In a reserved judgment delivered this morning, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal brought by the Wellington Amalgamated Watersiders’ Industrial Union of Workers, its secretary. Albert Wathey, and its organiser, Edward George Thompson, arainst two judgments delivered by the Chief Justice in the Supreme Court at Wellington on July 27. 1960, and September 14, 1960.

In the Supreme Court, the respondent. Maurice Wall, of Wellington. waterside worker, had sought orders declaring unlawful a payment of £873. made by the appellants Wathey and Thompson on behalf of the eppellant union to its solicitor to meet the expenses of Fintan Patrick Walsh, the appellants Wathey and Thompson, and five others, all of whom had been successfully sued in libel by Anthony Joseph Neary. The Chief Justice said that such payment was in breach of the rules of the union and therefore ultra vires and unlawful.

It was from these judgments and against these orders that the appellants had appealed upon the grounds that the judgments were erroneous in fact and in law. Appeal Judgment Mr Justice North, delivering the Appeal Court’s judgment, said it was clear the union rules did not in express terms authorise the expenditure of the funds of the union in relieving members of personal obligations. The most that could be said by way of justification for the payment was that the second appellants were delegates appointed by the union to represent it on the Wellington Trades Council and, therefore, in a general way it might be argued the difficulty in which they found themselves stemmed from the fact they owed their appointment to the management committee of the Wellington Trades Council. However, the matter could not be looked at in such a broad, general way for the union was a body corporate and therefore bound by the rules which it adopted, ft had been argued for appellants that the payment could be justified as being incidental to the protection and furthering in a lawful way the interests of members and the union had met damages and costs incurred by the second appellants as something in the nature of an assurance to all future delegates of the union on related bodies that they could speak out fearlessly on industrial matters of concern io the union without running the risk of being mulcted in damages if they went too far and published a libel or slander. “Thus, according to the sub-

missions, the union by making the payment would secure the services of the kind of delegate who was most likely to improve the conditions in the industry. “Lacks Substance” ‘Tn our opinion this argument lacks any substance," said Mr Justice North. “It is altogether too far fetched. In our opinion the short answer to the submission U that it is not sufficient for ♦he appellants to show that in some remote or indirect way the union in the course of time may possibly derive some benefit from making the payment.” The judgment said with regard to whether if it was not authorised, the Court below had jurisdiction in the present proceedings to make an order requiring the second appellants to refund the amount to the union, that it would not be doubted that the respondent was entitled to bring the action in his own name seeking a declaration that the payment made by the appellant union was ultra vires.

It had been argued for appellant that even if in general the recipients of ultra vires payments could be ordered to refund the amount they had improperly received,

such an order could not be made against the second appellants for the reason they had neither sought assistance from the union nor had the mony been paid to them personally. Certs

"In our opinion, however, no such distinction can be drawn,” said Mr Justice North. “In the present case the money was received by their own solicitors on their behalf and therefore they are in precisely the same position as if the money had been paid to them personally. For these reasons we are of the opinion the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs to respondent on the highest scale together with an allowance of £2l for the second day.”