Reasons For Failure Of Brussels Talks

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27442, 31 August 1954, Page 11

Reasons For Failure Of Brussels Talks

(Rec. 8 p.m.) PARIS, August 29. France had been faced by a "united bloc" of opposition at the six-nation Brussels conference which failed last week, the Prime Minister (Mr Pierre Mendes-France) told the National Assembly during the crucial European Defence Community debate today. He said he considered the compromise proposal he took to Brussels was basically acceptable to the other five if they had wanted to reach agreement; “but I had a feeling we were engaged in negotiations which were without precedent. During the whole of the five days, which I must admit were sometimes painful and even humiliating for France, we were faced by a united bloc of five countries.” He said' the other five Ministers told him quite frankly why they united against his proposal. "Opposite me I had men who were exasperated—and they said so—by the policy adopted by France during the last few years. The fact that we could not decide one way or the other about a scheme, which we ourselves were said to have fathered, and the constant delay in coming to a decision, had become for them Intolerable, the Ministers told me." The five E.D.C. Foreign Ministers, using courteous diplomatic language, said in essence: "You are always asking for something. In six months* time another French Premier will probably ask for further changes," Mr Mendes-France said. "No Confidence in France"

The five Ministers said they had no more confidence in France’s undertakings. They wanted to know clearly—“yes” or “no”—whether France accepted the EJJ.C. treaty, Mr MendesFrance added. Loud applause from all benches greeted this remark. He admitted that the impatience of the five other nations was perfectly understandable. Four of them had already ratified the E.D.C. treaty, and two had even modified their constitutions because of it. AU five ffelt they had already made big concessions to France. “They are now entitled to ask us for a clear answer." he said. He told the Ministers this was the last delay and they would have their reply by the end of August In return the five said: "Are you sure of a majority in your Assembly if we agrefi to the whole of your compromise?” He had replied: “I think so. In any case my Government wiU fight with aU its strength and stake its existence on acceptance of the treaty if you agree to my protocol.” He disclosed that there was strong resistance to the French proposal on relations between N.A.T.0.. and E.D-C. laying down that E.D.C. be a subordinate part Of N.A.T.O. He said the alternatives proposed by the five other Powers were too vague. • There was an important discussion about whether Germany had the right to withdraw from the E.D.C. if she were reunified, Mr Mendes-France added. He recalled that after the Berlin conference the three Western Allies had declared in such event that a new German government would pave the right of withdrawal. Certain French leaders had claimed Germany did not have this right, Mr Mendes-France said. At Brussels he had tried to get the point cleared up. First he had suggested that in the event of German reunification all six EJJ.C countries should have the right to reconsider their position and withdraw if they wished. He had argued that this discriminated against no-one. But after several hours of difficult discussion. the five Ministers declined to accept this view. Mr Mendes-France said he then suggested as an alternative that all six nations should make a joint declaration that in the event of German uni--1 flcation, none of the E D.C. members, ; Germany included, would have the right to withdraw. This second sugI gestion was also rejected Gasps of astonishment from the Assembly greeted this statement. • Mr Mendes-France said finally the Belgian Foreign Minister (Mr Paul I Henri Spaak) proposed a third formula to the cleverness of which

he wished to pay tribute—but which was unsatisfactory from < the , French viewpoint. This for- < inula had two drawbacks. One was i deciding whether to withdraw from 1 the E.D.C. or not, whereas- France would only have the right to withdraw 1 once a German government made a 1 move to do so. The second drawback was that the i formula did not say clearly whetheWl Germany had the right to withdraw 1 in the event of her unification, Mr ; Mendes-France added. This was a serious matter. If and when German i reunification came—and he did not < mean by war or violence, in which i case all these paper treaties would be swept away by the Current of events 1 —the international situation would almost inevitably be critical and diffl- i cult. < He said a German government would i be quite free to secede from the E.D.C. 1 by basing its unified character on the ; three-Power declaration at Berlin. In 1 other words, at a most important moment in international affairs Ger- i many alone would be able to reply to • a question that could not be answered In the Assembly today. • Safeguards Requested He said France requested several ! safeguards which were considered ns- , sential about the application of the E.D.C.’s supranational functions, but the other five objected strongly. Since , the Brussels conference, Mr - Spaak ’ made a new suggestion to the effect ' that where the vital interest of any ' one country was concerned, a decision of the supranational commissariat would be suspended while the . E.D.-C. Council of Ministers tried to find a solution. But the Spaak proposition left the ; council’s decision to be taken by a ' simple majority, Mr Mendes-France . said. France feared that in those circumstances there would be the same majority in the council as in the commissariat and that as a result the Spaak proposal was no safeguard. ‘lt is also to be feared, at any rate during the beginning of the E.D.C., that members of the commissariat will inevitably take the interest of their own countries into account,” he said. "In my experience of international organisations I have often seen Frenchmen rise above mere French national interest, but I have rarely seen foreigners do likewise.” He said France also failed to get the others to agree that during the initial period common rules should-.be worked out but not immediately applied so that full consideration could be given to their implications. France also wanted a ruling that men appointed to the E.D.C.’s high commissariat should be different from those already working on the Coal and Steel Pool Authority—the aim being partly to avoid the creation of a sort of international technocracy. But the other five considered that on the contrary the Coal and Steel executives’ experience should be made available to the E.D.C. France argued that the E.D.C. needed a court of appeal composed solely of professional judges who offered guarantees of objectivity in their legal rulings, Mr Mendes-France added. The E.D.C. provided that the Coal and Steel Appeal Court should also act for the E.D.C., but that court contained many members selected for technical rather than judicial knowledge; nor did France sea in it adequate guarantees of objectivity towards the difficult political questions which must be expected. Mr Mendes-France said "very lively German resistance” was offered to a French demand that the E-D.C.’s integrated force should be those operating in "cover” zones. No discrimination was intended against Germany, he insisted. It was purely for geographical reasons that German forces would all be integrated because Germany was the cover zone. - Mr Mendes-France said it was like; wise a fact that France was situated further away and furthermore was . responsible for the defence and protection of territories still more dis- ; tant. But on this point, too, France i obtained no satisfaction, he said.