FORETASTE OF RUSSIAN OCCUPATION IN VIENNA

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27213, 3 December 1953, Page 10

FORETASTE OF RUSSIAN OCCUPATION IN VIENNA

“TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY”

(By the Rt. Hon. Sir

WINSTON CHURCHILL]

XXXV

I addressed myself to the new President on April 18. Mr Truman was, of course only newly aware at second hand of all the complications that faced us and had to lean, heavily on his advisers. The purely military view, therefore, received an emphasis oevond its proper proportion. y Prime Minister to President

“Your armies soon, and ours, may come into contact with the Soviet forces. The Supreme Commander should be giy en by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible how to act . . • “2. I am quite prepared to adhere to the occupational zones, but 1 cto not wish our Allied troops or your American troops to be hustled back at any point by some cr “ de of a local Russian general. This must be provided against by an agreement between Governments so as to give Eisenhower a fair chance to settle on the spot in his own admirable way. “3 The occupational zones were aecided rather hastily at Quebec in September 1944 when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower’s armies would make such a mighty inroad into Germany. The zones cannot be altered except by agreement with the Russians. “But the moment VE Day has occurred we should try to set up the Allied Control Commission in Berlin and should insist upon a fair distribution of the food produced m Germany among all parts of Germany.

Feeding Conquered Germany "As it stands at present the Russian occupational zone has the smallest proportion of people and grows by far the largest proportion of food, the Americans have a not very satisfactoi y proportion of food to conquered population, and we poor British are to take over all the ruined Ruhr and large manufacturing districts which are, like ourselves, In normal times large importers of food. “I suggest that this tiresome question should be settled in Berlin by the Allied Control Commission before we move from the tactical positions we have at present achieved. “The Russian idea of taking these immense food supplies out of the foodproducing areas of Germany to feed themselves is very natural, but I contend that the feeding of the German population must be treated as a whole and that the available supplies must be divided pro rata among the occupational zones. , Mr Eden was in Washington, and fully agreed with the view I telegraphed to him. Prime Minister to Mr Eden (Washington). 19 Apr. ’45. “ ... It is thought most important that Montgomery should take Lubeck as soon as possible, and he has an additional American Army Corps to strengthen his movements if he requires it. Our arrival at Lubeck before our Russian friends from Stettin would save a lot of argument later on. “There is no reason why the Russians should occupy Denmark, which is a country to be liberated and to have its sovereignty restored. Our position at Lubeck, if we get it, would be decisive in this matter. “Thereafter, but partly concurrent, it is thought well to push on to Linz to meet the Russians tnere, and also by an American encircling movement to gain the region south ofi Stuttgart. In this region are the main German installations connected with their atomic research, and we had better get hold of these in the interests of the special secrecy attaching to this topic.”

Retirement to Agreed Zones Mr Truman’s reply, however, carried us little further. He proposed that the Allied troops should retire to their agreed zones in Germany and Austria as soon as the military situation allowed and sought my opinion on a draft telegram to Stalin to this effect. To this I answered: Prime Minister to President Truman. 24 Apr., ’45.

“I thank you for your answer to my telegram. I agree with the preamble, but later paragraphs simply allow the Russians to order us back to the occupational zones at any point they might decide, and not necessarily with regard to the position of the fronts as a whole. “It is your troops who would suffer most by this, being pushed back about 120 miles in the centre and yielding up to the unchecked Russian advance an enormous territory. And this while all questions of our sphere in Vienna or arrangements for triple occupation of Berlin remain unsettled.” On April 27, after discussion with the President, I sent this telegram to Stalin: Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. 27 Apr., ’45. " ... 2. Our immediate task is the final defeat of the German Army. Dur-

ing this period the boundaries between the forces of the three Allies must be decided by comrhanders in the field, and will be governed by operational considerations and requirements. “It is inevitable that our armies will in this phase find themselves in occupation of territory outside the boundaries of the ultimate occupational zones. “3. When the fighting is finished the next task is for the Allied Control

Commissions to be set up m Berlin and Vienna, and for the forces of the Allies to be redisposed and to take over their respective occupational zones. The demarcation of the zones in Germany has already been decided upon, and it is necessary that we shall without delay reach an agreement on the zones to be occupied in Austria at the forthcoming meeting proposed by you in Vienna. . . . Instructions to Eisenhower

“5. In order to meet the requirements of the situation referred to in paragraph 2 above, namely the emergence and temporary arrangements for the tactical zones, instructions have been sent to General Eisenhower. These are as follows: (a) To avoid confusion between the two armies to prevent either of them from expanding into areas already occupied by the other, both sides should halt as and where they meet subject to such adjustments to the rear or to the flanks as are required in the opinion of the local commanders on either side, to deal with any remaining opposition. (b) As to adjustments of forces after cessation of hostilities in an area, your troops should be disposed in accordance with military requirements regardless of zonal boundaries. You will, in so far as permitted by the urgency of the situation, obtain the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to any major adjustment, in contrast to local adjustments for operational and administrative reasons.

“6. It is requested that you will issue similar instructions to your commanders in the field. ...” The reply was guarded. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister. 2 May, ’45. "... For my part I should inform £ you that the Soviet High Command** has issued instructions that when the£ Soviet and Allied forces meet, thet' Soviet Command should immediately ♦ establish contact with the Command? of the American or English forces, andU that they should in agreement together (a) define a provisional tactical demarcation boundary line, and (b) take measures to suppress any opposition by the German forces within their provisional demarcation line.” Shut Out of Vienna

The Russians had not been long in Vienna before we got a foretaste of what would happen in a zone of their occupation. They announced that a Provisional Austrian Government had been formed, and they refused to let our missions fly in. All this made me fear that they were deliberately exploiting their arrival to “organise” the country before we got there. On April 30 I accordingly telegraphed to Mr Truman. “It has been our understanding that the treatment of Austria, as of Germany, is a matter of common concern to the four Powers who are to occupy and control those countries.

“We regard it as essential that British’ American and French representatives should be allowed to proceed at once to Vienna in order to report on conditions there before any final settlement is reached in the European ’ Advisory Commission on matters affecting the occupation and control of the country, and especially of Vienna itself. We hope you will issue the necessary instructions to Marshal Tolbukhin, in order that the Allied missions may fly in at once from Italy.” On May 3 President Truman replied that he was himself sending a protest to the Soviet Government.

This protest reminded the Russians of Stalin’s suggestion that American, British and French representatives should go to Vienna at once and settle the zones of occupation. Plans had been made for their journey and now the Soviet Government was saying their arrival would be “undesirable” until after the zones had been agreed by the European Advisory Commission. The commission had been unable to agree, partly through lack of information. The only way was to study the problem on the spot, and Soviet unwillingness to let us do so was holding up the commission’s work. Mr Truman concluded his message oy asking the Soviet Government to let the Allied representatives fly to Vienna at once. These representations were quite ineffectual. Meanwhile, the advance of the Allied armies continued with increasing momentum. All three “fronts’ Western, Eastern and Southern, once thousands of miles apart, at last came together, crushing the life out of the German armies. The end was near. (To be continued)

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