MR EISENHOWER AND CONGRESS

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27090, 13 July 1953, Page 13

MR EISENHOWER AND CONGRESS

BOLDER POLICY BY PRESIDENT

“SIGNS OF POSITIVE LEADERSHIP ” (From a Reuter Correspondent.) WASHINGTON. President Eisenhower is beginning to fight his rebellious republican conservatives in Congress. Showing more signs of positive leadership, he has already intervened successfully to persuade Congressional leaders to drop or modify legislation regarded by the Administration as detrimental to foreign policy. Within recent weeks there have been clear indications that Mr Eisenhower is now abandoning his "let Congress alone” policy which was so evident during the first 100 days of his occupancy of the White House. This noninterference had apparently encouraged right-wing followers of Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, the most powerful figure in Congress to challenge and even defy the authority of the President. To beat down such defiance, Mr Eisenhower often had to rely heavily on the support of the opposition Democrats, particularly in foreign policy matters. It was becoming evident, however, that much of this Democrat support might be withdrawn unless the President himself took more active steps on behalf of his own policy legislation. Even Liberal Republicans were privately critical of Mr Eisenhower’s “soft” attitude toward rebellious Conservatives and were urging a firmer stand to prevent his leadership from being undermined. Now it would appear that the White House has decided the time has come for action to combat these Congressional efforts to take over control.

The first signs of a stronger Eisenhower front came recently when he summoned Republican leaders to an "imperative” White House conference and got them to abandon a money bill proviso which would have stopped United States contributions to the United Nations if Communist China were given membership. This proviso headed for approval by Congress had been pressed by the powerful “Asiafirst” bloc of fervent backers in Congress of Chiang-Kai-Shek's Chinese Nationalist regime and the shadowy “China lobby" which have been able to exert great influence on Government decisions concerning the Far East. Challenge Met Mr Eisenhower took up this open challenge to his leadership, called the White House conference and forced - the “Asia-firsters,” led by Senator William Knowland of California, to yield. In place of the controversial proviso, a simple resolution was approved which merely expressed the opinion of Congress that Communist China-should not be admitted to the United Nations. Unlike the proviso, this would not have the force of law to bind the President to a course of action. While this was hailed as an Eisenhower victory, many Washington observers felt

that the whole issue might have been avoided if White House pressure had been exerted earlier when it was known that the proviso would be introduced in Congress. In another move against his challengers, Mr Eisenhower made full use of "personal diplomacy” to score an important first-round win over hightariff advocates who were threatening to cripple the reciprocal trade agreements programme and the "trade-not-aid” concept. This could have been done through the Simpson Bill, which would have deprived the President of discretionary authority in tariff-rate questions and made it easier for domestic industries to get greater tariff protection against imports. To the surprise and chagrin of the “protectionist” trade interests, this bill was suddenly dropped after Mr Eisenhower had personally intervened to exert his influence on its sponsor, Mr Richard Simpson (Republican, Pennsylvania) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr Joseph Martin. More Teats Ahead In both these achievements, it wag noted, Mr Eisenhower had the cooperation of the leading Congressional figures. How long such co-operation would last and how strongly the White House would fight to compel it were subjects for acute speculation. It was recognised that major tests of strength still lay ahead. Particularly, the outcome of the forthcoming fight over the Administration’s 5,474,000,000dollar foreign aid programme would be closely watched for pointers to the future pattern of Presidential relations with Congress. A Republican-led economy bloc, supported by isolationist sentiment, is demanding cuts ranging up to 2,000,000,000 dollars. Such a reduction would be a damaging blow to the Allied defence project and to the leadership of Mr Eisenhower, himself a military man and former Supreme Commander of the Atlantic Pact Forces. As a first step in meeting this challenge, he planned to mobilise public support through nation-wide radio and television talks for the full aid funds, which presumably would register on Congressional thinking, but it was becoming apparent that, to save the programme from crippling cuts, the President would have to use substantial personal pressure in Congress itself and prepare for a “show-down" clash, rather than let Congress “go jt - alone.”